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INTRODUCTION	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  century,	  the	  immunity	  from	  lawsuit	  of	  sovereign	  states,	  their	  political	  subdivisions,	  and	  their	  officials	  in	   federal	   and	   state	   court	   has	   become	   an	   increasingly	   complex	  topic,	  as	  both	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  act	   similar	   to	   a	   private	   party	   change.1	   	   Governments	   have	   long	  been	   lenders,2	   guarantors,	   and	   investors	  around	   the	  world.	   	  The	  financial	   crisis	   of	   2008	   seemed	   to	   highlight	   and	   enhance	   their	  involvement	   as	   quasi-­‐private	   actors	   in	   these	   roles.	   	   These	  governmental	   actions	   raise	   sovereign	   immunity-­‐related	  questions.	   	   For	   instance,	   when	   may	   the	   government	   be	   held	  accountable	  just	  as	  any	  other	  private	  entity	  would,	  and	  when	  does	  it	   maintain	   special	   immunity?	   	   The	   sweeping	   movements	   to	  contract	   out	   certain	   social	   service	   functions	   of	   government	   to	  private	  sector	  entities,	  and	  even	  that	  of	  providing	  security	  in	  war	  zones,	   have	   also	   raised	   complex	   issues	   related	   to	   sovereign	  immunity.3	   	   Under	  what	   circumstances	   do	   those	   private	   entities	  derive	   immunity	   from	   the	   governments	   they	   serve?	   	   And,	   in	  nations	  such	  as	  Libya	  and	  Venezuela,	  where	  the	  nationalization	  of	  industries	  dealing	   in	  certain	  key	  natural	   resources	  has	  occurred,	  as	   well	   as	   in	   other	   places	   where	   state	   owned	   enterprises	   have	  
	   1 See,	  e.g.,	  Christopher	  Bean,	  Can	  California	  Declare	  Bankruptcy?,	  SLATE	  MAG.	  (Mar.	  8,	   2010),	   http://www.slate.com/id/2246915	   (discussing	   the	   implications	   of	  sovereign	   immunity	   in	   the	  case	  of	  a	  bankruptcy	   filing	  by	  a	  sovereign	  entity	   like	   the	  state	   of	   California	   or	   Greece).	   	   These	   issues	   could	   also	   affect	   sovereign	   states	   that	  themselves	  need	  bailouts.	  	  Id.	  2 See,	  e.g.,	  Cent.	  Va.	  Cmty.	  Coll.	  v.	  Katz,	  546	  U.S.	  356,	  360	  (2006).	  3 See	   ALASDAIR	   S.	   ROBERTS,	   THE	   LOGIC	   OF	   DISCIPLINE:	   	   GLOBAL	   CAPITALISM	   AND	   THE	  ARCHITECTURE	   OF	   GOVERNMENT	   1–20	   (2010)	   (discussing	   efforts	   to	   maximize	  government	   efficiency	   by	   adopting	   certain	   elements	   of	   corporate	   governance	   from	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  contracting	  out	  certain	  functions	  of	  government);	  Al-­‐Quraishi	  v.	  Nakhla,	  Civ.	  No.:	  PJM	  08-­‐1696,	  2010	  U.S.	  Dist	  LEXIS	  76450,	  at	  *733-­‐34	  (D.	  Md.	  July	  29,	  2010)	  (discussing	  derivative	  sovereign	   immunity	   for	  government	  contractors	   in	  Iraq).	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  experienced	   a	   resurgence,	   these	   governmental	   actions	   have	  raised	  still	  different	  issues	  for	  courts	  in	  the	  United	  States.4	  Changes	  have	  come	  in	  other	  areas	  as	  well.	  	  As	  the	  debate	  about	  basic	   universal	   principles	   of	   international	   human	   rights	  continues,	   sovereigns,	   officials,	   quasi-­‐sovereign	   militants,	   and	  multi-­‐national	  corporations	  find	  themselves	  increasingly	  brought	  to	  court	  to	  defend	  their	  actions	  against	  principles	  of	  human	  rights.	  5	   	  Should	  individual	  responsibility	  under	  international	  law	  defeat	  any,	   or	   some,	   forms	   of	   sovereign	   immunity?6	   	   Globalization	   is	  pressing	  these	  questions,	  because	  these	  global	  debates	  are	  taking	  place	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   changes	   in	   statutory	   and	   federal	  common	  law	  that,	  commentators	  have	  noted,	  signals	  the	  gradual	  decline	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   of	   the	   relevance	   of	   territoriality	   to	  issues	   of	   jurisdiction.7	   	   The	   evolution	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	  protections	   is	   highly	   relevant	   to	   this	   trend.	   	   History	   illuminates	  that	   sovereign	   immunity	   is	   becoming	   an	   elastic	   doctrine	   that	  permits	  common	  law	  courts8	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  role	  of	  	   4 Michael	  Wines,	  China	  Fortifies	  State	  Businesses	  to	  Fuel	  Growth,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Aug.	  29,	  2010,	  at	  A1;	  Francisco	  Flores-­‐Macias	  and	  Aldo	  Musacchio,	  The	  Return	  of	  State-­‐Owned	  
Enterprises,	   HARVARD	   INT’L	   REV.,	   Apr.	   4,	   2009,	   http://hir.harvard.edu/print/the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐return-­‐of-­‐state-­‐owned-­‐enterprises.	  5 GARY	  CLYDE	  HUFBAUER	  &	  NICHOLAS	  K.	  MITROKOSTAS,	  AWAKENING	  THE	  MONSTER:	  ALIEN	  TORT	  CLAIM	  ACT	  18–36	  (2003).	  	  See	  also	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute	  Only	  Applies	  to	  Individuals,	  
Not	  Corporations,	  2nd	  Circuit	  Rules,	  NEWSINFERNO.COM	  (Sept.	  20,	  2010),	  http://www	  .newsinferno.com/legal-­‐news/alien-­‐torts-­‐statute-­‐only-­‐applies-­‐to-­‐individuals-­‐not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐corporations-­‐2nd-­‐circuit-­‐rules/;	   Jad	   Mouawad,	   Shell	   to	   Pay	   $15.5	   Million	   to	   Settle	  
Nigerian	   Case,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   June	   8,	   2009,	   available	   at	   http://www.nytimes.com	  /2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html;	   Kiobel	   v.	   Royal	   Dutch	   Petroleum	   Co.,	  621	   F.3d	   111,	   117	   (2010)	   (listing	   significant	   ATCA	   cases	   reviewed	   on	   appeal,	   but	  noting	  that	  many	  more	  settled	  before	  that	  and	  concluding	  that	  corporations	  may	  not	  be	  sued	  under	  the	  ATCA	  statute	  for	  violations	  of	  international	  law).	  6 Gwynne	  Skinner,	  Nuremberg’s	  Legacy	  Continues:	  The	  Nuremberg	  Trials’	  Influence	  
on	  Human	  Rights	  Litigation	  in	  U.S.	  Courts	  Under	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute,	  71	  ALB.	  L.	  REV.	  321,	   326–27	   (2008)	   (discussing	   Nuremberg	   trials	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   individual	  responsibility	   for	   violation	   of	   customary	   international	   law	  human	   rights	   norms	   via	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Claims	  Act).	  7 Kal	  Raustiala,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Territoriality:	   International	  Relations	  &	  American	  
Law,	   in	   TERRITORIALITY	   AND	   CONFLICT	   IN	   AN	   ERA	   OF	   GLOBALIZATION	   (Miles	   Kahler	   &	  Barbara	  Walter,	   eds.	  2005)	   (noting	   “[c]asual	  empiricism	  suggests	   that	  globalization	  has	  driven	  the	  US	  to	  relax	  doctrines	  of	  legal	  spatiality	  as	  interdependence	  has	  risen	  in	  the	   postwar	   era”);	   Judith	   Resnik	   &	   Julie	   Chi-­‐hye	   Suk,	   Adding	   Insult	   to	   Injury:	  
Questioning	   the	   Role	   of	   Dignity	   in	   Conceptions	   of	   Sovereignty,	   55	   STAN.	   L	   REV.	   1921,	  1925,	  n.17	  (2003)	  (discussing	  the	  “dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  content	  of	  sovereignty”	  and	  citing	  to	  further	  relevant	  literature	  on	  this	  subject).	  8 The	  doctrine	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  was	  and	  is	  a	  judge-­‐made	  doctrine.	  	  Although	  Congress	   has	   codified	   exceptions	   to	   the	   doctrine	   in	   statutes,	   large	   bodies	   of	   judge-­‐made	  common	  law	  exist	  that	  grant	  immunity	  to,	  for	  example,	  Native	  American	  tribes.	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  the	  state	  by	  balancing	  what	  they	  conceive	  to	  be	  a	  need	  to	  preserve	  state	   authority	   with	   the	   legitimate	   need	   for	   compensation	   for	  official	  wrongs.9	  The	   doctrine	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	   in	   common	   law	   systems	  has	   a	   long	   history,	   dating	   in	   some	   form	   back	   to	   the	   twelfth	  century.10	   	   British	   political	   philosophers	   and	   scholars	   generally	  believed	   that	   sovereigns	   should	   have	   absolute	   immunity	   from	  suit,	  and	  in	  practice	  in	  England	  the	  sovereign	  could	  not	  be	  sued	  in	  court	   absent	   his	   consent.11	   	   Officers	   of	   the	   king	   or	   sovereign,	  however,	   could	   be	   subject	   to	   suit	   for	   unlawful	   acts	   done	   on	   the	  king’s	  behalf.12	   	   Since	   that	   time,	   legal	   commentators,	   judges,	   and	  legislators	   have	   carved	   out	   similar	   exceptions	   to	   the	   doctrine	   of	  absolute	   sovereign	   immunity,	   either	   by	   creating	   rights	   of	   action	  against	   the	   state	   through	   legislation	   or	   by	   refusing	   to	   grant	  immunity	   to	   their	   fellow	   sovereigns	   under	   certain	  circumstances.13	  	  Cash	  Advance	  &	  Preferred	  Cash	  Loans	  v.	  Colo.,	  ex	  rel.	  Suthers,	  2010	  Colo.	  LEXIS	  911	  (Colo.	  Nov.	  30,	  2010)	  (“It	   is	  this	   judicially	  promulgated	  body	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  principles,	   rather	   than	   any	   congressional	   or	   Supreme	   Court	   treatment	   of	   Indian	  Tribes	   in	   particular,	   that	   has	   led	   to	   the	   widespread	   acceptance	   by	   both	   state	   and	  lower	   federal	   courts	   that	   tribal	   immunity,	   as	   a	   species	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	  generally,	   extends	   to	   state	   judicial	   orders	   that	  would	  operate,	   in	   fact	   even	   if	   not	   in	  name,	  against	  a	  sovereign	  tribe.”).	  9 Some	  judges,	  such	  as	  Justice	  Stevens,	  view	  sovereign	  immunity	  very	  negatively:	  “Sovereign	  immunity	  inevitably	  places	  a	  lesser	  value	  on	  administering	  justice	  to	  the	  individual	  than	  on	  giving	  government	  a	  license	  to	  act	  arbitrarily.”	  	  Hess	  v.	  Port	  Auth.	  Trans-­‐Hudson	   Corp.,	   513	   U.S.	   30,	   54	   (1994)	   (Stevens,	   J.	   concurring).	   	   Justice	  O’Connor,	  however,	  seems	  to	  display	  a	  more	  accepting	  view	  of	  sovereign	  immunity;	  she	   states	   that	   if	   the	   state	   acts	   permissibly	   then	   it	   is	   indeed	   entitled	   to	   claim	  sovereign	   immunity.	   	   Id.	  at	  57	   (O’Connor,	   J.	  dissenting)	   (“Sovereign	   immunity,	  after	  all,	  inheres	  in	  the	  permissible	  exercise	  of	  state	  power.”).	  	  Katherine	  Florey,	  Sovereign	  
Immunity’s	  Penumbras:	  Common	  Law	  “Accident”	  and	  Policy	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  
Sovereign	  Immunity	  Doctrine,	  43	  WAKE	  FOREST	  L.	  REV.	  765–66	  (2008)	  (discussing	  the	  “fuzziness”	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  sovereign	  immunity	  doctrine).	  10 MELVYN	   R.	   DURCHSLAG,	   STATE	   SOVEREIGN	   IMMUNITY:	   A	   REFERENCE	   GUIDE	   TO	   THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  CONSTITUTION	  3	  (2002).	  11 DONALD	   L.	   DOERNBERG,	   SOVEREIGN	   IMMUNITY	   OR	   THE	   RULE	   OF	   LAW:	   THE	   NEW	  FEDERALISM’S	  CHOICE	  13–70	  (2005)	  (setting	   forth	   the	  philosophical	   literature	  behind	  sovereignty).	  12 Id.	  at	  77–80	  (noting	  that	  under	  English	  law	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  King’s	  agents	  were	  not	   imputable	   to	   the	  King	  and	  therefore	   the	  agents	  enjoyed	  no	  sovereign	   immunity	  for	  actions	  done	  on	  his	  behalf;	  a	  practice	  which	  differs	  from	  American	  jurisprudence	  which	  does	  grant	  state	  officials	  varying	  extensions	  of	  sovereign	  immunity).	  13 See,	  e.g.,	  28	  U.S.C.	  1605	  (exceptions	  to	  immunity	  of	  foreign	  sovereigns);	  28	  U.S.C.	  1346(b)	   (Federal	   Tort	   Claims	   Act	  waives	   federal	   government	   immunity);	   41	   U.S.C.	  602(a)	  (Contract	  Disputes	  Act	  permits	  suits	  by	  those	  doing	  business	  with	  the	  federal	  government).	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  Today,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  think	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  as	  divided	  into	  three	  types	  or	  categories.	  	  The	  first	  type	  is	   the	   sovereign’s	   immunity	   in	   its	   own	   territory.	   	   The	   federal	  government	   (United	   States)	   enjoys	   absolute	   sovereign	   control	  over	   its	   own	   jurisdiction	   and	   has	   therefore	   absolute	   immunity	  from	   suit.14	   	   Although	   this	   type	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	   is	   not	  mentioned	   in	   the	   Constitution	   itself,	   U.S.	   courts	   have	   found	  implicit	   support	   for	   this	   concept	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	   structure	  of	  provisions	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   such	   as	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  federal	   courts	   and	   Congress’s	   power	   over	   appropriations.15	  	  United	  States	  courts	  have	  often	  applied	  sovereign	  immunity	  to	  the	  federal	   government	   with	   same	   force	   they	   would	   an	   express	  Constitutional	  mandate.	  16	  The	   immunity	   of	   federal	   and	   state	   governments	   from	   suit	   in	  court	  has	  been	  the	  target	  of	  criticism	  from	  those	  scholars	  who	  see	  sovereign	   immunity	  as	  an	  anachronistic	   concept	   that	   is	   contrary	  to	   the	   rule	   of	   law.17	   	   Those	   scholars	   have	   called	   for	   its	  abolishment.	   	   Alternatively,	   other	   scholars	   have	   defended	  sovereign	   immunity,	   seeing	   it	   as	   an	   important	   mechanism	   to	  preserve	   the	   functionality	   of	   government,	   and	   its	   separation	   of	  powers,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   costly,	   protracted	   civil	   litigation.18	   	  While	  the	  doctrine	  remains	   in	   force,	   the	   federal	  and	  state	  governments	  have	  gradually	  waived	  their	  immunity	  by	  statute	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  different	   types	   of	   suits,	   such	   as	   those	   suits	   permitted	   by	   the	  
	   14 Nevada	  v.	  Hall,	  440	  U.S.	  410,	  414	  (1979)	  (“The	  immunity	  of	  a	  truly	  independent	  sovereign	  from	  suit	  in	  its	  own	  courts	  has	  been	  enjoyed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  absolute	  right	  for	  centuries.	  	  Only	  the	  sovereign's	  own	  consent	  could	  qualify	  the	  absolute	  character	  of	  that	  immunity.”).	  15 Vicki	   C.	   Jackson,	   Suing	   the	   Federal	   Government:	   Sovereignty,	   Immunity,	   and	  
Judicial	  Independence,	  35	  GEO.	  WASH.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	  521,	  523–25	  (2003).	  16 Pennhurst	   State	   Sch.	   &	   Hosp.	   v.	   Halderman,	   465	   U.S.	   89,	   98–99	   (1984)	   (“In	  short,	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  is	  a	  constitutional	  limitation	  on	  the	  federal	  judicial	  power	  established	   in	  Art.	   III[.]”).	   	  Cf.	  Caleb	  Nelson,	  Sovereign	   Immunity	  as	  a	  
Doctrine	  of	  Personal	  Jurisdiction,	  115	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1561	  (2002).	  	  17 See,	   e.g.,	  Erwin	  Chemerinksy,	  Against	   Sovereign	   Immunity,	   53	  STANFORD	  L.	  REV.	  1201	   (2001)	   (arguing	   that	   sovereign	   immunity	   is	   antithetical	   to	   our	   constitutional	  system);	  Don	  Mayer,	  Sovereign	  Immunity	  and	  the	  Moral	  Community,	  2	  BUS.	  ETHICS	  Q.	  411	  (1992)	  (arguing	  that	  sovereign	  immunity	  impairs	  the	  building	  of	  a	  strong	  moral	  and	  ethical	  community	  by	  reducing	  the	  accountability	  of	  government	  for	  its	  actions);	  Kenneth	  Culp	  Davis,	  Sovereign	  Immunity	  Must	  Go,	  22	  ADMIN.	  L.	  REV.	  383	  (1969).	  18 Harold	   J.	   Krent,	   Reconceptualizing	   Sovereign	   Immunity,	   45	   VAND.	   L.	   REV.	   1529	  (1992).	  	  See	  also	  Larson	  v.	  Domestic	  &	  Foreign	  Corp.,	  337	  U.S.	  682,	  704	  (1949).	  
76	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	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  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  Federal	  Tort	  Claims	  Act,	  the	  Tucker	  Act,	  the	  Contract	  Disputes	  Act,	  and	  the	  Administrative	  Procedure	  Act.19	  The	  second	  type	  of	  immunity	  is	  immunity	  amongst	  sovereigns.	  	  For	  example,	   states	  within	   the	  United	  States	   (as	  quasi-­‐sovereign	  entities)	  enjoy	   immunity	   from	  suit	   in	  United	  States	   federal	  court	  under	  the	  Eleventh	  Amendment	  and	  related	  common	  law.20	  	  That	  immunity,	  while	  complex,	  is	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  Article.21	  	  This	  Article	   focuses	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   immunity	   that	   exists	  amongst	  foreign,	  and	  not	  domestic,	  sovereigns.	  Foreign	  sovereigns	  enjoy	  a	  kind	  of	  qualified	  immunity	  from	  suit	  in	  the	  U.S.	  federal	  and	  state	  courts.	  	  Under	  U.S.	  law,	  this	  immunity	  is	   based	   on	   the	   equality	   of	   sovereigns	   in	   the	   world,	   and	   on	  principles	   of	   comity,22	   but	   it	   is	   not	   something	   that	   the	   federal	  government	  is	  required	  to	  grant	  as	  of	  right	  to	  another	  sovereign.23	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  noted	  that	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  is	  a	   privilege	   and	   a	   “matter	   of	   grace	   and	   comity	   rather	   than	   a	  constitutional	   requirement.”24	   	   Foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   of	  this	  type	  has	  its	  basis	  in	  “common	  interests”	  amongst	  nations,	  as	  articulated	   by	   Justice	   John	   Marshall	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Schooner	  	   19 Courts	   may	   also	   find	   an	   implicit	   waiver	   of	   sovereign	   immunity,	   although	   the	  standard	   is	   high.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Smith	   v.	   Socialist	   People’s	   Libyan	   Arab	   Jamahiriya,	   101	  F.3d	  239,	  243–44	  (2d	  Cir.	  1996);	  Princz	  v.	  Fed.	  Republic	  of	  Ger.,	  26	  F.3d	  1166,	  1174	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1994);	  Siderman	  de	  Blake	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Arg.,	  965	  F.2d	  699,	  720–22	  (9th	  Cir.	  1992).	  20 See	   Northern	   Ins.	   Co.	   v.	   Chatham	   County,	   547	   U.S.	   189,	   193–94	   (2006)	  (describing	  the	  source	  and	  general	  contours	  of	  state	  sovereign	  immunity).	  21 I	   would	   also	   classify	   tribal	   immunity	   as	   a	   type	   of	   sovereign	   versus	   sovereign	  immunity.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Kiowa	  Tribe	  v.	  Mfg.	  Techs.,	  523	  U.S.	  751,	  754–55	  (1998).	  22 Philippines	   v.	   Pimentel,	   553	   U.S.	   851,	   865,	   (2008)	   (“The	   doctrine	   of	   foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  has	  been	  recognized	  since	  early	  in	  the	  history	  of	  our	  Nation.	  	  It	  is	  premised	   upon	   the	   ‘perfect	   equality	   and	   absolute	   independence	   of	   sovereigns,	   and	  th[e]	   common	   interest	   impelling	   them	   to	   mutual	   intercourse.’”	   (internal	   citations	  omitted)).	  	  “‘Comity,’	  in	  the	  legal	  sense,	  is	  neither	  a	  matter	  of	  absolute	  obligation,	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	   nor	   of	   mere	   courtesy	   and	   good	   will,	   upon	   the	   other.	   	   But	   it	   is	   the	  recognition	  which	  one	  nation	  allows	  within	  its	  territory	  to	  the	  legislative,	  executive,	  or	   judicial	  acts	  of	  another	  nation,	  having	  due	  regard	  both	   to	   international	  duty	  and	  convenience,	  and	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  its	  own	  citizens,	  or	  of	  other	  persons	  who	  are	  under	  the	  protection	  of	   its	   laws.”	   	  Turner	  Entm’t	  Co.	   v.	  Degeto	  Film	  GmbH,	  25	  F.3d	  1512,	  1519	  (11th	  Cir.	  1994)	  (quoting	  Hilton	  v.	  Guyot,	  159	  U.S.	  113	  (1895)).	  23 “[C]omity	  in	  the	  legal	  sense	  [is]	   ‘neither	  a	  matter	  of	  absolute	  obligation,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  nor	  of	  mere	  courtesy	  and	  good	  will,	  upon	  the	  other.’”	   	  Banco	  Nacional	  de	  Cuba	   v.	   Sabbatino	   Receiver,	   et	   al.,	   376	   U.S.	   398,	   408–09	   (1964)	   (quoting	   Hilton	   v.	  Guyot	  159	  U.S.	  113,	  163–64	  (1895))	  (The	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Sabbatino	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  rare	  for	  foreign	  sovereigns	  to	  be	  denied	  the	  privilege	  of	  suing	  in	  U.S.	  court,	  unless	  we	  are	  at	  war	  with	  them.).	  	  Id.	  at	  409–10.	  24 Republic	  of	  Austria	  v.	  Altmann,	  541	  U.S.	  677,	  689	  (2004).	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Exchange	   v.	   McFaddon,	   which	   still	   serves	   as	   a	   reference	   to	   U.S.	  courts.25	  	  Today,	  however,	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  has	  a	  more	  defined	   statutory	   basis	   under	   the	   Foreign	   Sovereign	   Immunities	  Act	  (FSIA).26	  Under	  FSIA,	  with	  some	  exceptions	  such	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	   state	  sponsors	   of	   terrorist	   activities	   and	   expropriation,	   foreign	  sovereigns	  primarily	  enjoy	  immunity	  for	  their	  public	  acts.27	  	  More	  specifically,	   under	   the	   current,	   and	   internationally	   accepted,	  theory	  of	  restrictive	  sovereign	  immunity	  codified	  in	  FSIA,	  foreign	  sovereigns	  may	  be	   sued	  when	   they	  act	   just	   as	   any	  other	  private	  party	  would	  in,	  for	  example,	  a	  commercial	  transaction	  connected	  to	   the	  United	  States.	   	   If	   FSIA	  does	  not	  provide	   for	   jurisdiction,	   a	  foreign	   sovereign	   is	   absolutely	   immune.28	   	   Nearly	   all	   of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  opinions	   interpreting	  FSIA	  have	  emphasized	  that	  it	   is	  the	  exclusive	  means	  for	  obtaining	  both	  personal	  and	  subject	  matter	   jurisdiction	  over	   foreign	  sovereigns	  and	   their	  component	  entities.29	  	   25 Schooner	  Exch.	  v.	  McFaddon,	  7	  Cranch	  116,	  137	  (1812).	  	  See	  also,	  Lee	  M.	  Caplan,	  
State	  Immunity,	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  Jus	  Cogens:	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Normative	  Hierarchy	  
Theory,	  97	  AM.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  741,	  745–48	  (2003)	  (describing	  the	  origins	  in	  international	  law	  of	   state	   immunity	   from	  suit	   in	   the	   courts	  of	   another	   state	  as	  one	   rooted	   in	   the	  principles	  of	  state	  equality).	  26 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1602,	  et	  seq.	  (2010).	  27 28	  U.S.C	  §	  1605.	  28 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1602.	  29 See,	   e.g.,	  Permanent	  Mission	   of	   India	   to	   the	  U.N.	   v.	   City	   of	  New	  York,	   551	  U.S.	  193,	   197	   (2007)	   (reinforcing	   that	   FSIA	   is	   the	   “sole	   basis”	   for	   obtaining	   jurisdiction	  over	  foreign	  sovereigns	  in	  U.S.	  courts);	  Altmann,	  541	  U.S.	  at	  691	  (describing	  FSIA	  as	  “a	   comprehensive	   statute	   containing	   a	   set	   of	   legal	   standards	   governing	   claims	   of	  immunity	   in	   every	   civil	   action	   against	   a	   foreign	   state.”)	   (internal	   quotation	   marks	  omitted);	  Saudi	  Arabia	  v.	  Nelson,	  507	  U.S.	  349,	  355	  (1993)	  (“The	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act	  provides	  the	  sole	  basis	  for	  obtaining	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  foreign	  state	  in	  the	  courts	  of	  this	  country.”)	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted);	  Republic	  of	  Arg.	  v.	  Weltover,	   Inc.,	  504	  U.S.	  607,	  610	  (1992)	  (“The	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act	  of	  1976	   (FSIA),	   28	   U.S.C.	   §	   1602	   et	   seq.,	   establishes	   a	   comprehensive	   framework	   for	  determining	   whether	   a	   court	   in	   this	   country,	   state	   or	   federal,	   may	   exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  foreign	  state.”);	  Arg.	  Republic	  v.	  Amerada	  Hess	  Shipping	  Corp.,	  488	  U.S.	  428,	  434	  (1989)	  (“We	  think	  that	  the	  text	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  FSIA	  demonstrate	  Congress'	   intention	   that	   the	  FSIA	  be	   the	   sole	  basis	   for	  obtaining	   jurisdiction	  over	  a	  foreign	  state	   in	  our	  courts.”);	  Verlinden	  B.V.	  v.	  Cent.	  Bank	  of	  Nig.,	  461	  U.S.	  480,	  488	  (1983)	  (stating	  that	  FSIA	  “contains	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  legal	  standards	  governing	  claims	   of	   immunity	   in	   every	   civil	   action	   against	   a	   foreign	   state	   or	   its	   political	  subdivisions,	   agencies,	   or	   instrumentalities.”).	   	   Despite	   this,	   a	   plaintiff	   must	   also	  satisfy	  the	  due	  process	  clause’s	  requirements	  for	  personal	  jurisdiction,	  although	  this	  is	  typically	  the	  case	  wherein	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  alleged	  the	  adequate	  nexus	  between	  the	  commercial	   or	   tortious	   behavior	   covered	   by	   FSIA	   and	   the	  United	   States.	   	   Joseph	   F.	  Morrissey,	  Simplifying	   the	  Foreign	  Sovereign	   Immunities	  Act:	   If	  Sovereign	  Acts	  Like	  a	  
 
78	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  The	   third	   type	   of	   immunity	   is	   derivative	   sovereign	   immunity.	  	  This	   term,	   “derivative	   immunity,”	   is	   sometimes	  used	   to	  describe	  immunity	  that	  private	  actors	  derive	  from	  sovereigns	  when	  acting	  in	   concert	   with	   them.	   	   I	   would	   argue,	   however,	   that	   it	   makes	  conceptual	   sense	   to	   use	   the	   term	   very	   broadly	   to	   describe	   any	  entity	  or	  person	   that	   receives	  sovereign	   immunity	  protection	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   some	   relationship	   to	   the	   sovereign.	   	   Therefore,	  although	   not	   the	   core	   sovereign	   entity,	   agencies,	  instrumentalities,	   political	   subdivisions,	   and	   majority	   owned	  corporations30	   of	   both	   the	   U.S.	   government	   and	   foreign	  governments	   derive	   immunity	   from	   their	   respective	   sovereigns.	  	  The	   same	   may	   be	   true	   for	   officials	   of	   the	   state.31	   	   In	   addition,	  contractors	   and	   private	   companies	   that	   work	   with	   the	  government	   and	   that	   effectively	   stand	   “in	   the	   shoes	   of	   the	  sovereign”	  may	   also	   derive	   sovereign	   immunity.32	   	   Because	   this	  derivative	   sovereign	   immunity	   is	   not	   viewed	   as	   inherent	   in	   the	  entity	  or	  person	   itself,	   determining	  under	  what	   circumstances	   if	  any	   an	   entity	   or	   person	   related	   to	   the	   sovereign	   qualifies	   has	  historically	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  inquiry.	  Immunity	   of	   individual	   government	   officials	   is	   a	   strong	  example	   of	   this	   complexity.	   	   Under	   English	   common	   law,	   and	  older	   U.S.	   precedents,	   officials	   were	   not	   entitled	   to	   sovereign	  immunity	   from	   suit.33	   	   This	   has	   changed	   and	   officials	   are	   now	  entitled	   to	   a	   spectrum	   of	   immunity	   depending	   on	   their	   rank	   or	  position,	   their	   status	   (current	   or	   former),	   and	   the	   capacity	   in	  which	   they	  are	  sued	  (personal	  or	  official).34	   	  Certain	  officials	  are	  treated	  as	  virtually	   inseparable	  from	  the	  sovereign	  itself,	  at	   least	  
	  
Private	   Party,	   Treat	   it	   Like	   One,	   5	   CHI.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   675,	   678–79	   (Winter	   2005)	  (discussing	   whether	   a	   court	  must	   also	   take	   into	   account	   due	   process	   demands	   on	  personal	   jurisdiction,	   despite	   FSIA	   framework	   of	   obtaining	   personal	   jurisdiction	  through	  a	  statutorily	  mandated	  form	  of	  service	  of	  process).	  30 Dole	   Food	   Co.	   v.	   Patrickson,	   538	   U.S.	   468,	   477	   (2003)	   (“A	   corporation	   is	   an	  instrumentality	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  under	  the	  FSIA	  only	  if	  the	  foreign	  state	  itself	  owns	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  corporation's	  shares.”).	  31 See,	   e.g.,	   Guevara	   v.	   Republic	   of	   Peru,	   468	   F.3d	   1289,	   1305	   (11th	   Cir.	   2006)	  (noting	  that	  the	  immunity	  of	  officials	  of	  the	  state	  is	  derivative	  of	  state	  immunity).	  32 See,	   e.g.,	   Al-­‐Quraishi	   v.	   Nakhla,	   Civ.	   No.:	   PJM	   08-­‐1696,	   2010	   U.S.	   Dist	   LEXIS	  76450,	   at	   *733	   (D.	   Md.	   July	   29,	   2010)	   (discussing	   derivative	   sovereign	   immunity	  cases).	  33 Jackson,	   Suing	   the	   Federal	   Government,	   supra	  note	   15,	   at	   525–26;	   DOERNBERG,	  
supra	  note	  11,	  at	  77–78.	  34 Infra	  Part	  II.A.2	  text	  and	  accompanying	  notes.	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  while	   they	   are	   in	   office.35	   	   This	   category	   of	   inseparable	   officials	  includes	  certain	  heads	  of	  state.36	   	  These	  officials	  may	  be	  entitled	  to	  absolute	  immunity	  for	  their	  public	  acts	  while	  in	  office.	  In	   the	   United	   States,	   under	   the	   Westfall	   Act,	   government	  officials	   are	   immune	   from	   state	   common	   law	   tort	   actions	   if	   the	  attorney	   general	   certifies	   that	   they	   were	   acting	   in	   the	   scope	   of	  their	   employment.37	   	   In	   other	   contexts,	   lower	   ranking	   federal	  officials	  enjoy	  qualified	   immunity.	   	  Although	   they	  cannot	  usually	  be	   sued	   in	   their	   official	   capacity	   as	   a	   pretext	   for	   suing	   the	  sovereign	  itself,	  38	  they	  can	  be	  sued	  in	  their	  personal	  capacity	  for	  serious	   violations	   of	   law,	   including	   grave	   violations	   of	  constitutional	  rights	  or	  federal	  law.39	  	  Both	  lower	  ranking	  federal	  and	   state	   officials	   can	   be	   sued	   in	   this	   personal	   capacity.40	   	   The	  Supreme	   Court’s	   formulation	   of	   this	   common	   law	   doctrine	   of	  qualified	   immunity	   has	   changed	   from	   one	   that	   assessed	   official	  behavior	  from	  both	  subjective	  and	  objective	  points	  of	  view	  to	  an	  objective	   approach,	   such	   that	   “government	   officials	   performing	  discretionary	   functions,	   generally	   are	   shielded	   from	   liability	   for	  civil	   damages	   insofar	   as	   their	   conduct	   does	   not	   violate	   clearly	  established	   statutory	   or	   constitutional	   rights	   of	   which	   a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  known.”41	  Foreign	  official	  immunity	  is	  more	  complex.	  	  As	  this	  Article	  will	  discuss,	   until	   recently	   the	   rule	   in	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   federal	  circuits	   that	   had	   considered	   the	   issue	   was	   that	   foreign	   officials	  received	   the	   same	   immunity	   from	   suit	   that	   foreign	   states	   did	  	   35 Infra	   Part	   II.C.2;	   Nixon	   v.	   Fitzgerald,	   457	   U.S.	   731,	   751	   (1982)	   (President	  entitled	  to	  immunity	  for	  official	  acts).	  36 Infra	  Part	  3.A	  text	  and	  accompanying	  notes.	  37 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  2679	  (2011).	  38 Cf.	   Osborn	   v.	   Haley,	   549	   U.S.	   225,	   229–30	   (2007)	   (“The	   Federal	   Employees	  Liability	   Reform	   and	   Tort	   Compensation	   Act	   of	   1988,	   commonly	   known	   as	   the	  Westfall	   Act,	   accords	   federal	   employees	   absolute	   immunity	   from	   common-­‐law	   tort	  claims	  arising	  out	  of	  acts	  they	  undertake	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  official	  duties.	  	  See	  28	  U.S.C.	   §	   2679(b)(1).	   	   When	   a	   federal	   employee	   is	   sued	   for	   wrongful	   or	   negligent	  conduct,	   the	  Act	   empowers	   the	  Attorney	  General	   to	   certify	   that	   the	   employee	   ‘was	  acting	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  office	  or	  employment	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  incident	  out	  of	  which	  the	  claim	  arose.’”).	  	  Infra	  Part	  II.A.2.	  39 See,	  e.g.,	  Ex	  Parte	  Young,	  209	  U.S.	  123,	  157–59	  (1908).	  40 Infra	  Part	  II.A.	  41 Harlow	  v.	  Fitzgerald,	  457	  U.S.	  800,	  818	  (1982).	   	  The	  objective	  inquiry	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  court	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  case	  on	  pretrial	  motion,	  as	  the	  subjective	  intent	  of	   an	   official	   making	   a	   discretionary	   judgment	   call	   frequently	   presents	   factual	  disputes	   not	   permissibly	   resolved	   on	   motions	   for	   summary	   judgment	   or	   other	  pretrial	  dispositive	  motions.	  	  Id.	  at	  816.	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  under	  the	  FSIA.	  42	  	  FSIA’s	  exclusivity	  as	  a	  statute	  led	  a	  majority	  of	  courts	   to	   declare	   that	   FSIA’s	   definition	   of	   an	   agency	   or	  instrumentality	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  could	  be	  read	  to	  include	  foreign	  officials	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   list	   of	   political	   subdivisions,	   agencies,	  state-­‐run	   organizations	   and	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   that	   find	   a	  more	  express	  basis	  in	  FSIA’s	  text.43	  The	  Second,	  Fifth,	  Sixth,	  Ninth,	  and	  District	  of	  Columbia	  circuits	  concluded	   that	   FSIA	   covered	   officials44	   because,	   as	   the	   Second	  Circuit	   noted,	   the	   state	   cannot	   act	   except	   through	   its	   agents.45	  	  But,	   the	   Seventh	   Circuit,46	   later	   joined	   by	   the	   Fourth	   Circuit,47	  espoused	  a	  minority	  view	  that	  FSIA’s	   text	  and	   legislative	  history	  do	  not	  support	  coverage	  of	  individual	  foreign	  officials.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   recent	   decision	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Samantar	   v.	  
Yousuf	  ended	  the	  battle	  and	  rejected	  the	  majority	  rule,	  concluding	  that	   foreign	  official	   immunity	   is	  not	  covered	  by	  FSIA	  and	  leaving	  its	   future	   in	   doubt.	   48	   After	   Samantar,	   foreign	   officials	   sued	   in	  their	   personal	   capacity	   must	   look	   to	   various	   common	   law	  doctrines	  for	  immunity.	  Thus,	   the	  Samantar	  decision	  may	  have	  a	  significant	   impact	  on	  the	   interpretation	   of	   federal	   common	   law	   and	   on	   practice	   of	  transnational	   civil	   litigation	   in	   federal	   courts.	   	   Courts	   are	  beginning	   to	   grapple	   with	   these	   issues	   and	   the	   amount	   of	  scholarship	   on	   them	   is	   growing.49	   	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   suits	  	   42 See,	  e.g.,	  In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  71,	  84	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008)	  (listing	  cases	   from	  the	  other	  circuits	  supporting	   the	  rule	   that	  FSIA	  applies	   to	  foreign	  officials).	  43 Chuidian	  v.	  Philippine	  Nat’l	  Bank,	  912	  F.2d	  1095,	  1101–03	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990).	  44 Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  563	  F.3d	  9,	  12	  (2d	  Cir.	  2009);	  Belhas	  v.	  Ya’alon,	  515	  F.3d	  1279,	  1284	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2008);	  In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  81;	  Keller	  v.	  Cent.	  Bank	  of	  Nigeria,	  277	  F.3d	  811,	  815	  (6th	  Cir.	  2002);	  Byrd	  v.	  Corporacion	  Forestal	   y	   Indus.	   de	   Olancho	   S.A.,	   182	   F.3d	   380,	   388	   (5th	   Cir.	   1999);	   Jungquist	   v.	  Sheikh	  Sultan	  Bin	  Khalifa	  Al	  Nahyan,	  115	  F.3d	  1020,	  1027	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1997);	  Chuidian,	  912	   F.2d	   at	   1101–03;	   see	   also	   Leutwyler	   v.	   Office	   of	   Her	  Majesty	   Queen	   Rania	   Al-­‐Abdullah,	  184	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  277,	  286–87	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2001);	  Tannenbaum	  v.	  Rabin,	  1996	  WL	  75283,	  at	  *2	  (E.D.N.Y.	  Feb.	  13,	  1996);	  Bryks	  v.	  Canadian	  Broad.	  Corp.,	  906	  F.	  Supp.	  204,	  210	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1995);	  Kline	  v.	  Kaneko,	  685	  F.	  Supp.	  386,	  389	  n.1	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1988).	  45 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  71,	  84	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008).	  46 Enahoro	  v.	  Abubakar,	  408	  F.3d	  877,	  881–82	  (7th	  Cir.	  2005).	  47 Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar,	  552	  F.3d	  371,	  381–83	  (4th	  Cir.	  2009).	  48 Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278,	  2292–93	  (2010).	  49 E.g.,	  cf.	   Curtis	  A.	  Bradley	  &	   Jack	  L.	  Goldsmith,	  Foreign	  Sovereign	   Immunity	  and	  
Domestic	  Officer	  Suits,	  13	  GREEN	  BAG	  2D	  137	  (2010).	  	  This	  Article	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  good	   justifications	   for	   dealing	   with	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   immunities	   for	   public	  officials	  so	  differently.	  	  Id.	  at	  145–46.	  	  Specifically,	  they	  argue	  that	  U.S.	  courts	  should	  not	  attempt	  the	  same	  type	  of	  social	  balancing—vindication	  of	  clearly	  established	  law	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  against	   foreign	   officials	   are	   adjudicated	   in	   a	   principled	   and	  regularized	  way—the	  goals	   that	   FSIA	  was	  meant	   to	   effectuate—the	  situation	  now	  calls	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  solution.	  This	  Article	  reviews	  the	  debate	  regarding	  official	  immunity	  that	  culminated	   in	   the	   Samantar	   decision,	   and	   argues,	   in	   contrast	   to	  other	   commentators,50	   that	   in	   civil	   human	   rights	   litigation	  involving	  foreign	  officials,	  federal	  courts	  should	  eschew	  analyzing	  these	  questions	  under	  other	  common	   law	  doctrines	  and—where	  a	   statute	   does	   not	   indicate	   otherwise	   and	   where	   a	   political	  question	   is	   not	   presented—draw	   heavily	   on	   guidance	   from	   the	  common	   law	   doctrine	   developed	   to	   determine	   questions	   of	  domestic	   official	   immunity	   for	   constitutional	   torts,	   primarily	  under	   42	   U.S.C.	   §1983.51	   	   This	   doctrine	   provides	   “qualified	  immunity”	   for	   officials	   so	   long	   as	   an	   official	   has	   not	   violated	   a	  “clearly	  established”	  law	  or	  constitutional	  right.52	  	  In	  comparison,	  	  to	   compensate	   victims	   and	   preservation	   of	   officials’	   abilities	   to	   exercise	   their	  discretion	  freely—when	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  suit	  against	  an	  official	  of	  a	  foreign	  nation	  that	  has	  a	  different	  political	  culture.	  	  Id.	  at	  147–48.	  	  Permitting	  international	  human	  rights	  suits	  against	  foreign	  officials	  might	  put	  foreign	  governments	  in	  a	  position	  where	  they	  would	   feel	  compelled	  to	   indemnify	   foreign	  officials	  sued	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   	   Id.	  at	  148–49.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  federal	  courts	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   international	   law	   is	   clearly	   established,	   such	   that	   a	  qualified	   immunity	   defense	   might	   apply—this	   is	   particularly	   so	   given	   that	   our	  Supreme	  Court’s	   interpretations	  of	   international	   law	  are	  considered	  “idiosyncratic.”	  	  
Id.	   at	   149–50.	   	   Finally,	   they	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   other	   (nonjudicial)	   channels	   to	  vindicate	   international	   law	   that	   better	   preserve	   our	   foreign	   relations	   with	   other	  regimes.	   	   I	   disagree	   that	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   immunity	   frameworks	   cannot	   serve	  the	  same	  ends	   for	  reasons	  set	   forth	   in	  Part	   II	  of	   this	  Article,	  but	   I	  do	  not	   take	   issue	  with	  the	  points	  above	  necessarily	  in	  the	  same	  order	  as	  they	  are	  presented	  here.	  50 Id.	  51 Other	   commentators	   have	   noted	   that	   domestic	   law	   on	   official	   immunity	  provides	   useful	   analogies.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Beth	   Stephens,	   The	   Modern	   Common	   Law	   of	  
Foreign	   Official	   Immunity,	   79	   FORDHAM	   L.	   REV.	   2669,	   2686	   (2011)	   (“Domestic	  immunity	  doctrines	  offer	  interesting	  insights,	  but	  are	  based	  on	  distinct	  constitutional	  foundation.”).	  	   Although	  the	  immunity	  of	  a	  sovereign	  may	  differ	  depending	  on	  where	  it	  is	  sued	  (i.e.	  domestically	   or	   in	   foreign	   courts)	   the	   principles	   guiding	   derivative	   immunity	   need	  not	   be	   so	   different	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   determining	   the	   degree	   of	   derivation	   of	  sovereign	   immunity	   for	   officials	   of	   varying	   ranks.	   	   See	   also	   Curtis	   A.	   Bradley	   &	  Laurence	   R.	   Helfer,	   International	   Law	   and	   the	   U.S.	   Common	   Law	   of	   Foreign	   Official	  
Immunity,	   2011	   SUP.	   CT.	   REV.	   213,	   267-­‐70	   available	   at	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719707	  (stating	  that	  human	  rights	  advocates	  will	  want	  to	  turn	  to	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983	  principles	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  Samantar,	  but	  arguing	  that	  this	   is	  inappropriate	   because	   U.S.	   courts	   should	   not	   be	   deciding	   qualified	   immunity	  questions	   and	   making	   social	   judgments	   and	   tradeoffs	   that	   could	   influence	   foreign	  relations).	  52 Pearson	  v.	  Callahan,	  555	  U.S.	  223,	  129	  S.	  Ct.	  808,	  815–16	  (2009).	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   customary	   international	   law,	   there	   is	   support	   for	   the	  notion	  that	  an	  official	  may	  be	  liable	  even	  for	  acts	  committed	  while	  he	  was	   in	  office,	   if	  he	  acted	  in	  an	   illegitimate	  fashion	  that	  was	   in	  violation	  of	  international	  law.53	  	  But,	  there	  is	  little	  agreement	  as	  to	  the	   best	   framework	   for	   determining	   what	   acts	   in	   what	  circumstances	  disqualify	  the	  official	  for	  immunity.	  The	   doctrine	   of	   qualified	   immunity	   furthers	   the	   role	   of	  sovereign	   immunity	   in	   preserving	   a	   sometimes	   awkward	  compromise—one	   that	   I	   argue	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   immunity	  generally—between	  preserving	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  need	  for	  channels	  by	  which	  individuals	  can	  fight	  their	  aggressors	  when	   they	   are	   the	   victims	   of	   wrongful	   official	   behavior.	   	   The	  domestic	  framework,	  with	  slight	  modifications,	  permits	  the	  courts	  to	   conduct	   an	   intensive	   objective	   evaluation	   of	   the	   official’s	  conduct	   under	   the	   circumstances,	   paying	   due	   attention	   to	   a	  balance	   between	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   the	  domestic	  law	  of	  the	  official’s	  home	  nation,	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  principles	  embodied	  in	  U.S.	  federal	  law.	  This	   Article	   will	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   additional	   sections.	  	  Section	   II	   discusses	   the	   circuit	   split	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Samantar	  case	  itself,	  and	  it	  examines	  the	  implications	  of	  Samantar	  on	  future	  cases	  of	  foreign	  official	   immunity.	   	  Finally,	   section	   III	  proposes	  how	  courts	  could	  utilize	  the	  common	  law	  inquiry	  developed	  by	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	   Court	   in	   domestic	   constitutional	   tort	   cases	   and	   in	   the	  various	   circuit	   courts,	   with	   certain	   modifications,	   to	   determine	  whether	   foreign	  officials	  are	  entitled	   to	  qualified	   immunity	   from	  suit.	  
I	  
THE	  DEBATE	  OVER	  OFFICIAL	  IMMUNITY	  UNDER	  FSIA	  
A.	  	  The	  Circuit	  Split	  Although	   the	   circuit	   court	   cases	   that	   analyzed	   the	  question	  of	  official	   immunity	   under	   FSIA	   are	   now	   water	   under	   the	   bridge,	  some	  of	  the	  sub-­‐issues	  that	  they	  analyzed	  are	  not.	  	  A	  discussion	  of	  those	  cases	  ex	  post	  facto	  is	  useful	  to	  understanding	  why	  Samantar	  came	   out	   the	   way	   it	   did,	   what	   the	   Samantar	   decision	   did	   not	  analyze,	  and	  what	  concepts	  and	  approaches	  may	  prove	  useful	   to	  plaintiffs	   and	   defendants	   in	   the	   future.	   	   Importantly	   for	   this	  	   53 Infra	  Part	  II.C.6.	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   the	  circuit	  court	  cases	  are	  peppered	  with	  citations	   to	  and	  concepts	  from	  §	  1983	  qualified	  immunity	  cases,	  which	  show	  that	   courts	   have	   found	   the	   analogy	   to	   the	   constitutional	   tort	  context	  useful	  in	  some	  respects.	  The	  primary	  debate	  amongst	   the	  circuits	  concerned	  the	  scope	  and	  purposes	   of	   FSIA	   and	  what	   portion	   of	   the	   old	   patchwork	  of	  common	  law	  immunity	  doctrines	  Congress	  meant	  to	  codify	  in	  that	  statute.	   	   In	   determining	   whether	   FSIA	   applied,	   the	   Circuits,	   to	  different	  degrees,	  wrestled	  with	  three	  issues	  (1)	  what	  do	  the	  text	  and	  legislative	  history	  of	  FSIA	  support;	  (2)	  what	  did	  the	  common	  law	  provide	   for	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	   the	   foreign	  state	   and	   the	   official	   in	   terms	   of	   immunity	   prior	   to	   Congress’s	  enactment	   of	   FSIA;	   and	   (3)	  what	   decision	  would	   best	   effectuate	  the	  purposes	  of	  FSIA.	  The	  cases	  involved	  in	  the	  circuit	  split	  involved	  both	  commercial	  and	   human	   rights	   claims.	   	   An	   example	   is	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit’s	  decision	  in	  Chuidian	  v.	  Philippine	  National	  Bank,	  which	  concerned	  claims	  of	  the	  holder	  of	  a	  letter	  of	  credit,	  which	  the	  defendant	  Bank	  refused	   to	   honor,	   against	   an	   employee	   of	   the	   Bank	   (and	   an	  official)	  for	  tortious	  interference	  with	  contract.54	  Plaintiffs	   in	   these	   cases	   typically	   brought	   the	   human	   rights	  claims	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Claims	  Act	  (ATCA),	  which	  states	  that	   “[t]he	   district	   courts	   shall	   have	   original	   jurisdiction	   of	   any	  civil	   action	  by	   an	   alien	   for	   a	   tort	   only,	   committed	   in	   violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  or	  a	  treaty	  of	  the	  United	  States.”55	  	  In	  addition,	  many	   of	   the	   plaintiffs	   also	   asserted	   claims	   under	   the	   Torture	  Victims	  Protection	  Act	  (TVPA),	  which	  states,	  in	  relevant	  part,	  that	  “[a]n	  individual	  who,	  under	  actual	  or	  apparent	  authority,	  or	  color	  of	  law,	  of	  any	  foreign	  nation—(1)	  subjects	  an	  individual	  to	  torture	  shall,	  in	  a	  civil	  action,	  be	  liable	  for	  damages	  to	  that	  individual[.]”56	  The	  Seventh	  Circuit’s	  decision	  in	  Enahoro	  v.	  Abubakar	  involved	  the	   claims	   of	   seven	   Nigerian	   citizens	   against	   a	   former	   Nigerian	  general	   and	  member	   of	   the	   ruling	  military	   junta	   for	   torture	   and	  extra-­‐judicial	   killing	   under	   the	   ATCA	   and	   the	   TVPA.57	   	   In	   the	  Fourth	  Circuit’s	  case,	  Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar,	  plaintiffs	  brought	  claims	  against	   the	   defendant,	   a	   former	   prime	   minister,	   vice	   president,	  and	  minister	  of	  defense	  in	  Somalia,	  under	  the	  ATCA	  and	  the	  TVPA	  	   54 912	  F.2d	  at	  1097–98.	  55 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1350	  (2010).	  56 Id.	  57 Enahoro,	  408	  F.3d	  at	  880.	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  and	  extra-­‐judicial	  executions.58	  	  In	  the	  Second	  Circuit’s	  decision,	   In	   re	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   on	   September	   11,	   2001,	   several	  plaintiffs	  who	  were	  injured	  by	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  September	  11th	   filed	   tort	   actions	  under	   the	  ATCA,	   the	  TVPA,	   the	  Racketeer	  Influenced	   and	   Corrupt	   Organizations	   Act,59	   and	   the	  Antiterrorism	  Act60	   in	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York	  against,	  
inter	   alia,	   four	   princes	   of	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia.61	   	   The	  plaintiffs	   alleged	   that	   the	   princes	   had	   caused	   funds	   to	   be	  transferred	   to	   Muslim	   charities	   that,	   in	   turn,	   gave	   money	   to	   Al	  Qaeda.62	   	   The	   relevant	   complaints	   averred	   that	   the	   princes	   had	  arranged	   for	   donations	   from	   the	   Kingdom	   itself	   and	   from	   their	  own	  personal	  funds.63	  In	  addition,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  debate	  more	  fully,	  some	  further	  background	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  foreign	  sovereign	   immunity	  at	   common	   law	   leading	   to	   the	  enactment	  of	  the	  FSIA	  and	  the	  circuit	  split	   is	   important.	   	   In	  1812—the	  time	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  case	  on	  sovereign	  immunity,	  Schooner	  Exchange	  
v.	   McFaddon—the	   prevailing	   view	   was	   that	   sovereigns	   enjoyed	  absolute	  immunity	  from	  suit,	  except	  where	  they	  had	  consented.64	  	  Although	   the	   Schooner	   opinion	   suggested	   there	   were	   additional	  exceptions	   to	   sovereign	   immunity	   and	   even	   hinted	   at	   the	  paradigm	   that	   exists	   today	   wherein	   there	   is	   no	   sovereign	  immunity	   when	   a	   sovereign	   acts	   like	   any	   other	   private	   party,	  those	  dicta	  are	  not	  typically	  mentioned	  and	  the	  Schooner	  opinion	  “came	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  extending	  virtually	  absolute	  immunity	  to	  foreign	  sovereigns.”65	  After	   Schooner,	   however,	   the	   courts	   gradually	   began	   to	   relax	  the	   idea	  of	  absolute	   immunity.66	   	  Until	  approximately	   the	  1940s,	  the	   federal	  courts	  still	  made	  determinations	  of	   foreign	  sovereign	  
	   58 Yousuf,	  552	  F.3d	  at	  379.	  59 18	  U.S.C.	  §	  1961	  (2010).	  60 18	  U.S.C.	  §	  2331	  (2010).	  61 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2011,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  75–76.	  62 Id.	  63 Id.	  at	  76–77.	  64 HAROLD	   HONGJU	   KOH,	   TRANSNATIONAL	   LITIGATION	   IN	   UNITED	   STATES	   COURTS	   108	  (2008)	  [hereinafter	  KOH,	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LITIGATION].	  65 Verlinden	  B.V.	  v.	  Cent.	  Bank	  of	  Nig.,	  461	  U.S.	  480,	  486	  (1983).	  66 JOSEPH	  W.	  DELLAPENNA,	  SUING	  FOREIGN	  GOVERNMENTS	  AND	  THEIR	  CORPORATIONS	  26	  (2003)	  (discussing	  19th	  century	  cases	  that	  appeared	  to	  reject	  the	  absolute	  theory	  of	  sovereign	  immunity).	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  immunity.67	   	   At	   that	   time,	   the	   courts	   began	   to	   defer	   to	   the	  judgment	  of	  the	  political	  departments	  of	  the	  executive,	  that	  is,	  the	  State	  Department.	  	  The	  oft-­‐cited	  source	  of	  this	  trend	  is	  the	  case	  of	  
Ex	   Parte	   Peru.68	   	   Although	   the	   relevant	   suits	   were	   filed	   in	   the	  courts,	   the	   courts	   would	   wait	   for	   a	   determination	   by	   the	   State	  Department	   regarding	   a	   foreign	   nation’s	   or	   official’s	   immunity	  and	   treat	   that	   determination	   as	   nearly	   conclusive.69	   	   This	  procedure	  still	  continues	  in	  some	  respects	  today.70	  Ultimately,	   a	   two-­‐step	   procedure	   developed	   under	   which	   the	  sovereign	  or	   its	  component—including	  officials—would	  apply	   to	  the	  State	  Department	  for	  a	  suggestion	  of	  immunity.	  71	  	  If	  the	  State	  Department	   issued	   such	   a	   suggestion,	   then	   the	   courts	  dismissed	  the	  case.	  	  If	  the	  State	  Department	  did	  not	  respond,	  however,	  then	  the	  court	  would	  make	   its	  own	  determination	  by	  examining	  State	  Department	   policies.72	   	   The	   State	   Department’s	   policies	   and	  procedures	   to	   make	   these	   determinations	   were	   not	   always	  clear.73	  	  In	  1952,	  however,	  the	  State	  Department	  determined	  that	  	   67 Republic	  of	  Mex.	  v.	  Hoffman,	  324	  U.S.	  30,	  34	  (1945)	  (“[P]olicy	  recognized	  both	  by	   the	   Department	   of	   State	   and	   the	   courts	   that	   the	   national	   interests	   will	   be	   best	  served	  when	  controversies	  growing	  out	  of	   the	   judicial	   seizure	  of	  vessels	  of	   friendly	  foreign	   governments	   are	   adjusted	   through	   diplomatic	   channels	   rather	   than	   by	   the	  compulsion	  of	  judicial	  proceedings[.]”);	  Ex	  parte	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  318	  U.S.	  578,	  589–90	  (1943)	  (determination	  of	  executive	  on	  immunity	  is	  conclusive).	   	  See	  also	  William	  R.	  Dorsey,	  III,	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act	  after	  Twenty	  Years,	  28	  J.	  MAR.	  L.	  COM.	  257,	  259	  (1997).	  68 In	   the	   case	   of	  Ex	  Parte	   Peru,	   a	   ship	  belonging	   to	   the	   government	   of	   Peru	  was	  seized	   in	   conjunction	  with	   a	   civil	   action	   for	   failing	   to	  deliver	   sugar	   as	   agreed	  upon	  between	   a	   Peruvian	   company,	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Peruvian	   government	   and	   a	  Cuban	  company.	   	  318	  U.S.	  at	  580.	   	  The	  Peruvian	  government	  intervened	  in	  the	  case,	  and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Peruvian	   ambassador	   filed	   a	   request	   for	   sovereign	  immunity	  with	  the	  State	  Department.	  	  Id.	  at	  580–82.	  	  The	  State	  Department	  accepting	  the	  request	  for	  sovereign	  immunity	  applied	  to	  the	  attorney	  general	  and	  asked	  that	  it	  direct	   the	   appropriate	  U.S.	   attorney	   to	   file	   a	   suggestion	   of	   immunity	   in	   the	   district	  court.	  	  Id.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  State’s	  suggestion	  of	  immunity,	  however,	  the	  district	  court	  ruled	  that	  Peru	  had	  waived	  its	  sovereign	  immunity	  by	  applying	  to	  the	  court	  for	  certain	  extensions	  of	  time.	  	  Id.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  and	  concluded	  that	   the	   district	   court	  was	   required	   to	   accept	   the	   State	  Department’s	   suggestion	   of	  immunity	   as	   a	   conclusive	   determination	   of	   the	   political	   arm	   of	   government	   that	  further	  adjudication	  of	  the	  case	  would	  interfere	  with	  foreign	  relations.	  	  Id.	  at	  589.	  69 Ex	  parte	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  318	  U.S.	  at	  589.	  70 Yousuf	   v.	   Samantar,	   2007	   U.S.	   Dist.	   LEXIS	   56227,	   at	   *20–21	   (E.D.	   Va.	   Aug.	   1,	  2007)	   (discussing	   failure	   of	   the	   State	   Department	   to	   file	   a	   statement	   of	   interest	  regarding	  the	  defendant).	  71 Robert	  B.	  von	  Mehren,	  The	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Immunities	  Act	  of	  1976,	  17	  COLUM.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  33,	  38–39	  (1978).	  72 KOH,	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LITIGATION,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  109.	  73 Id.	  at	  110.	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  it	   should	   adopt	   a	   “restrictive”	   approach	   to	   determinations	   of	  foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   and	   thus	   aimed	   to	   confine	   its	  suggestions	   of	   immunity	   only	   to	   those	   cases	   that	   involved	   the	  public	  acts	  of	  the	  sovereign.74	   	  It	  issued	  a	  statement	  to	  this	  effect	  in	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Tate	  Letter.”75	   	  But,	   in	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  the	  State	  Department’s	  decisions	  were	  erratic	  and	  political	  considerations	  sometimes	  led	  the	  Department	  to	  file	  suggestions	  of	  immunity	  in	  cases	  where	  immunity	  would	  not	  have	  been	  available	  under	  the	  restrictive	  theory.”76	   	  There	  is	  a	  paucity	  of	   precedent	   from	   this	   period,	   whether	   administrative	   or	  otherwise,	   on	   foreign	   official	   immunity.77	   	   As	   this	   Article	   will	  discuss	   later	   in	   more	   detail,	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine—which	  prohibited	   suits	   in	   which	   courts	   were	   required	   to	   judge	   the	  validity	   of	   the	   act	   of	   another	   sovereign—shielded	   some	   officials	  from	  suit.78	  The	   FSIA	  was	   enacted	   to	   create	   uniformity	   and	   predictability	  both	  for	  foreign	  states	  and	  for	  the	  private	  parties	  doing	  business	  with	  them.	  	  Since	  its	  enactment,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  been	  clear	  that	   FSIA	   is	   “the	   sole	   basis	   for	   obtaining	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	  foreign	   state	   in	   our	   courts,”	   eclipsing	   all	   other	   jurisdictional	  statutes	  that	  might	  apply,	   including	  the	  ATCA.79	   	   Indeed,	   the	  text	  of	   FSIA	   strongly	   supports	   the	   Court’s	   earlier	   assertion	   that	   its	  coverage	   is	   broad.80	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Act	   covers	   not	   only	   the	  sovereign	   itself	   (i.e.,	   the	   “foreign	   state”),	   but	   also	   its	   “agenc[ies]	  	   74 Mehren,	  supra	  note	  71,	  at	  41.	  75 Id.	  at	  41–42.	  	  See	  also	  Alfred	  Dunhill	  of	  London,	  Inc.	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Cuba,	  425	  U.S.	  682,	  698	  (1976)	  (stating	  that	  “[a]lthough	  it	  had	  other	  views	  in	  years	  gone	  by,	  in	  1952,	  as	   evidenced	   by	   Appendix	   2	   (the	   Tate	   letter)	   attached	   to	   this	   opinion,	   the	   United	  States	   abandoned	   the	   absolute	   theory	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	   and	   embraced	   the	  restrictive	   view	   under	  which	   immunity	   in	   our	   courts	   should	   be	   granted	   only	  with	  respect	   to	   causes	   of	   action	   arising	   out	   of	   a	   foreign	   state's	   public	   or	   governmental	  actions	   and	   not	  with	   respect	   to	   those	   arising	   out	   of	   its	   commercial	   or	   proprietary	  actions.	  	  This	  has	  been	  the	  official	  policy	  of	  our	  Government	  since	  that	  time	  .	  .	  .	  ”	  and	  annexing	  the	  Tate	  Letter	  thereto).	  76 Altmann,	  541	  U.S.	  at	  690–91.	  77 Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278,	  2291	  n.18	  (2010)	  (“A	  study	  that	  attempted	  to	  gather	  all	  of	   the	  State	  Department	  decisions	  related	   to	  sovereign	   immunity	   from	  the	  adoption	  of	   the	   restrictive	   theory	   in	  1952	   to	   the	  enactment	  of	   the	  FSIA	   reveals	  only	   four	   decisions	   related	   to	   official	   immunity,	   and	   two	   related	   to	   head	   of	   state	  immunity,	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  110	  decisions.”)	  78 See	  infra	  Part	  II.C.4.	  text	  and	  accompanying	  notes.	  79 Argentine	  Republic	  v.	  Amerada	  Hess	  Shipping	  Corp.,	  488	  U.S.	  428,	  443	   (1989)	  (concluding	  that	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Claims	  Act	  does	  not	  provide	  independent	  jurisdiction,	  when	  an	  exception	  to	  FSIA	  does	  not	  apply).	  80 DELLAPENNA,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  31–34	  (discussing	  history	  and	  purposes	  of	  FSIA).	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  and	  instrumentalit[ies]”	  which	  are	  defined	  as	  “any	  entity”	  that	  is	  a	  “separate	   legal	   person”	   and	   is	   an	   organ	   of	   the	   foreign	   state	   or	  majority	  owned	  by	  the	  foreign	  state,	  and	  is	  not	  “a	  citizen”	  of	  any	  of	  the	  United	  States	  or	  created	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  a	  third	  country.81	  
1.	  	  FSIA’s	  Text	  and	  Legislative	  History	  The	  circuit	  and	  district	  courts	  debated	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  FSIA’s	   definitions	   of	   “foreign	   state”	   and	   “agency	   or	  instrumentality”	   could	   be	   read	   to	   include	   individuals.82	   	   Courts	  that	  sought	  to	  include	  officials	  under	  FSIA	  appeared	  to	  struggle	  to	  find	   a	   textual	   basis	   to	   support	   their	   conclusion,	   because	   the	  definitions	   of	   both	   foreign	   state	   and	   agency	   or	   instrumentality	  seemed	   to	   refer	   only	   to	   entities.83	   	   Ultimately	   those	   courts	  determined	  that,	  while	  those	  definitions	  spoke	  in	  terms	  of	  entities	  and	  not	  individuals,	  the	  definitions	  were	  not	  exhaustive,	  and	  used	  the	  word	  “includes,”	  which	  can	  be	  read	  to	  mean	  “including	  but	  not	  limited	  to”	  the	  items	  in	  a	  specific	  list.84	  	  Therefore,	  while	  FSIA	  did	  not	   expressly	   include	  officials,	   it	   did	   not	   expressly	   exclude	   them	  either.85	  	  The	  same	  logic	  applied	  to	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  FSIA,	  which	   is	   replete	  with	  mentions	  of	   the	  entities	   that	   it	   covers,	  but	  does	   not	   make	  mention	   of	   any	   coverage	   for	   individual	   officials,	  except	   to	   say	   that	   diplomatic	   immunity	  would	   not	   be	   affected.86	  	  Therefore,	   while	   FSIA’s	   legislative	   history	   did	   not	   explicitly	  mention	   individuals,	   it	   did	   not	   explicitly	   exclude	   them	   from	   the	  Act’s	   coverage.87	   	   The	   “ambiguity”	   of	   the	   text	   and	   legislative	  history	   on	   these	   points	   prompted	   the	   courts	   to	   consider	   other	  factors	  that	  are	  discussed	  below.88	  For	   the	   courts	   that	   ultimately	   concluded	   that	   FSIA	   did	   not	  cover	   individuals,	   the	   textual	   analysis	   was	   stronger.	   	   Again,	  Congress’s	   use	   of	   words,	   such	   as	   political	   subdivision,	   agency,	  instrumentality,	   entity,	   legal	   person,	   and	   corporate,	   that	   are	  	   81 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1603(a)–(b)	  (2010).	  82 Chuidian	  v.	  Phillippine	  Nat’l	  Bank,	  912	  F.2d	  1095,	  1101	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990);	  see	  also	  
In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  71,	  83–84	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008).	  83 Chuidian,	  912	  F.2d	  at	  1101–02.	  84 Chuidian,	   912	   F.2d	   at	   1101;	   see	   also	   In	   re	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   on	   September	   11,	  
2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  83.	  85 Chuidian,	  912	  F.2d	  at	  1101–02.	  86 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  83–84.	  87 Id.	  88 Chuidian,	   912	   F.2d	   at	   1103;	   see	   also	   In	   re	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   on	   September	   11,	  
2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  85.	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  naturally	   read	   to	   include	   legal	   fictions	   such	   as	   entities	   and	  institutions,	   convinced	   these	   courts	   that	   there	   was	   no	   basis	   for	  including	   individuals.89	   	   One	   court	   drew	   an	   analogy	   that	   these	  terms	  in	  general	  corporate	  law	  parlance	  are	  meant	  to	  refer	  to	  “the	  fiction	   of	   corporate	   personhood.”90	   	   Moreover,	   the	   courts	   noted	  that	   other	   parts	   of	   FSIA	   do	   explicitly	   reference	   individual	  officials.91	   	   Therefore,	   if	   Congress	   had	   wanted	   to	   include	  individual	   officials	   it	  would	   have	  done	   so	   explicitly	   in	   the	   terms	  that	   it	   used	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   statute.92	   	   Regarding	   the	  legislative	  history,	   the	  minority	  courts	  noted	  the	  flipside	  of	  what	  the	   majority	   courts	   did:	   the	   House	   and	   Senate	   Reports	   only	  mentioned	  legal	  entities	  and	  did	  not	  explicitly	  include	  or	  exclude	  individual	  persons.93	  
2.	  	  Common	  Law	  Codified	  by	  FSIA	  Finding	   little	   in	   FSIA’s	   congressional	   legislative	   history,	   the	  courts	   examined	   the	   common	   law	   that	   existed	   prior	   to	   FSIA’s	  enactment,	   which	   FSIA	   was	   meant	   to	   codify.94	   	   The	   court	   in	  
Chuidian	   focused	   on	   the	   Restatement	   (Second)	   of	   Foreign	  Relations	   Law	   of	   the	   United	   States.95	   	   The	   Restatement	   Second	  stated	   that	   a	   “public	   minister”	   other	   than	   a	   head	   of	   state	   or	  foreign	   minister	   would	   be	   immune	   with	   respect	   to	   “acts	  performed	   in	   his	   official	   capacity	   if	   the	   effect	   of	   exercising	  jurisdiction	  would	  be	  to	  enforce	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  against	  the	  state.”96	  	  Because	   this	   immunity	   attached	   to	   their	   acts,	   and	   not	   their	  positions,	   it	   was	   a	   conduct-­‐based	   immunity—at	   least	   one	   court	  noted	   this	   point,97	  which	   is	   important	   because	   it	  means	   that	   an	  official	  would	  receive	  immunity	  even	  after	  he	  loses	  the	  status	  that	  accompanies	   his	   position.	   	   The	   Ninth	   Circuit	   in	   Chuidian	   noted	  that	  once	  FSIA	  was	  enacted,	  however,	  the	  Restatement	  (Third)	  of	  Foreign	   Relations	   deleted	   the	   section	   on	   official	   immunity	   and	  
	   89 Enahoro	  v.	  Abubakar,	  408	  F.3d	  877,	  881–82	  (7th	  Cir.	  2005).	  90 Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar,	  552	  F.3d	  371,	  379	  (4th	  Cir.	  2009).	  91 Id.	  at	  379–80.	  92 Id.	  93 Id.	  at	  381.	  94 Permanent	  Mission	  of	  India	  v.	  City	  of	  New	  York,	  551	  U.S.	  193,	  198	  (2007).	  95 Chuidian	  v.	  Philippine	  Nat’l	  Bank,	  912	  F.2d	  1095,	  1103	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990).	  96 RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   FOREIGN	   RELATIONS	   LAW	   OF	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES	   §	   66	  (1965).	  
97	  Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  563	  F.3d	  9,	  13	  (2d	  Cir.	  2009).	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  replaced	   it	   with	   a	   section	   on	   FSIA	   itself.98	   	   The	   reasonable	  conclusion,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   emphasis	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   has	   placed	   on	   the	   comprehensiveness	   of	   FSIA,	   was	   that	  FSIA	   had	   replaced	   and	   codified	   the	   derivative	   immunity	   of	  officials	  for	  official	  acts.99	  The	   circuits	   analyzed	   whether	   the	   suit	   was	   an	   “official	  capacity”	  suit.100	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  opinions,	  however,	  what	  the	   courts	   considered	   an	   official	   capacity	   suit	   to	  mean—that	   is,	  whether	   it	   is	   defined	   by	   official	   acts,	   representative	   capacity,	   or	  remedies.	   	   The	   Seventh	   Circuit	   seemed	   to	   adopt	   an	   official-­‐act	   -­‐based	   definition	   of	   an	   official	   capacity	   suit.	   	   It	   noted	   that	   in	  contrast	   to	   an	   individual	   acting	   in	   his	   official	   capacity,	   a	   foreign	  official	  “being	  sued	  by	  a	  personal	  family	  employee	  [or	  a	  domestic	  servant]	  was	   not	   immune	   because	   he	  was	   not	   acting	  within	   the	  scope	   of	   his	   official	   duties”	   and	  would	   therefore	   not	   qualify	   for	  sovereign	   immunity.101	   	   Under	   this	   formulation,	   any	   suit	  containing	  allegations	  relating	  to	  official	  duties	  could	  conceivably	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  official	  capacity	  suit.	  Two	  other	  circuit	  decisions—those	  of	  the	  Ninth	  and	  the	  Second	  Circuits—also	  viewed	  suits	  against	   individual	  officials	   for	  official	  acts	  as	  inseparable	  from	  the	  legal	  entity	  of	  the	  sovereign	  itself.102	  	  The	   Second	   Circuit	   noted	   that	   it	  was	   an	   “evident	   principle”	   that	  the	  state	  cannot	  act	  except	   through	   individuals,	  and	   it	  borrowed	  from	  a	   line	  of	  reasoning	   from	  §	  1983	  constitutional	   tort	  cases	   in	  which	   suits	   against	   the	   agents	   of	   municipal	   corporations	   are	  against	   the	   entity	   itself	   when	   the	   agents	   were	   executing	   the	  official	   policy	   of	   the	   state.103	   	   Both	   the	   Second	   and	   the	   Ninth	  	   98 Chuidian,	  912	  F.2d	   at	   1103–04.	   	  See	   also	  RESTATEMENT	   (THIRD)	   OF	   THE	   FOREIGN	  RELATIONS	  LAW	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  §	  451	  (1990).	  99 In	   re	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   on	   September	   11,	   2001,	   538	   F.3d	   71,	   83–84	   (2d	   Cir.	  2008).	  100 See,	  e.g.,	  Enahoro	  v.	  Abubakar,	  408	  F.3d	  877,	  883	  (7th	  Cir.	  2005).	  101 Id.	  at	  882.	  102 Chuidian,	   912	   F.2d	   at	   1101	   (“It	   is	   generally	   recognized	   that	   a	   suit	   against	   an	  individual	  acting	  in	  his	  official	  capacity	  is	  the	  practical	  equivalent	  of	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  sovereign	  directly.”).	  103 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  85.	   	  Put	  differently,	  “municipalities	   and	   other	   bodies	   of	   local	   government	   are	   ‘persons’s	   within	   the	  meaning	  of	   [42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983].	   	  Such	  a	  body	  may	   therefore	  be	  sued	  meaning	  of	   this	  statute.	   	  Such	  a	  body	  may	  therefore	  be	  sued	  directly	  if	   it	   is	  alleged	  to	  have	  caused	  a	  constitutional	   tort	   through	   ‘a	   policy	   statement,	   ordinance,	   regulation,	   or	   decision	  officially	  adopted	  and	  promulgated	  by	  that	  body's	  officers.’”	   	  St.	  Louis	  v.	  Praprotnik,	  485	  U.S.	   112,	   121	   (1988)	   (quoting	  Monell	   v.	   N.Y.	   City	  Dept.	   of	   Soc.	   Servs.,	   436	  U.S.	  658,	  690	  (1978)).	  
90	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  Circuits	   cited	   Monell	   v.	   Department	   of	   Social	   Services	   for	   the	  proposition	   that	   “official-­‐capacity	   suits	   generally	   represent	   only	  another	  way	  of	  pleading	   an	  action	  against	   an	   entity	  of	  which	  an	  officer	  is	  an	  agent.”104	  	  Monell	  overturned	  the	  holding	  in	  Monroe	  v.	  
Pape	  that	  local	  municipal	  governments	  are	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  §	  1983,	  and	  therefore	  not	  liable	  under	  it.105	  	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  to	  cite	  from	  regarding	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  suit	  against	  an	  official	   is	   essentially	   one	   against	   the	   state	   in	   the	   human	   rights	  context,	   because	   one	   cannot	   sue	   the	   local	   government	   on	   a	  
respondeat	   superior	   theory	   of	   liability	   but	   rather	   must	   sue	   the	  local	   government	   based	   on	   the	   claim	   that	   its	   illegal	   policy	  deprived	  individual(s)	  of	  their	  constitutional	  rights.106	  	  If	  officials	  are	   named	   in	   the	   suit	   in	   their	   official	   capacity,	   then	   they	   are	  representing	   the	   state	   with	   the	   illegal	   policy.107	   	   So	   is	   the	  implication	  of	  the	  citation	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  official	  capacity	  in	  
Monnell	   that	   these	   foreign	   officials	   accused	   of	   torture	   and	   other	  heinous	  acts	  were	  representing	  a	   foreign	  state	  with	  policies	   that	  support	  those	  actions?	  The	   Second	   Circuit	   reviewed	   claims	   against	   the	   four	   Saudi	  princes	  in	  their	  official	  and	  personal	  capacities.108	  	  The	  distinction	  between	   those	   two	   claims	   rested	   on	   whether	   the	   princes	   were	  donating	   funds	   (which	  ultimately	  ended	  up	  with	  Al	  Qaeda)	   from	  their	   personal	   accounts	   (personal	   capacity)	   or	   from	   the	  Kingdom’s	   treasury	   (official	   capacity).109	   	   If	   the	   terms	   personal	  and	  official	  capacity	  were	  used	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  §	  1983	  context,	  then	   the	   princes	   could	   be	   sued	   for	   supervising	   government	  donations	   in	   both	   their	   personal	   and	   official	   capacities;	   the	  difference	  would	  be	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  official	  and	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  source	  of	  the	  damages.	  In	  the	  constitutional	  tort	  context,	  “personal-­‐capacity	  suits	  seek	  to	  impose	  personal	  liability	  upon	  a	  government	  official	  for	  actions	  
	   104 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  at	  85	  (quoting	  Monell,	  436	  U.S.	  at	  691	  n.55).	  105 Monell,	  436	  U.S.	  at	  690.	  106 Id.	  at	  691–92.	  107 Id.	  at	  694–96.	  108 Id.	  at	  77–78.	  109 Id.	  	  See	  also	  In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  392	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  539,	  553	   (S.D.N.Y.	   2005)	   (“To	   the	   extent	   the	   allegations	   concern	   actions	   undertaken	   in	  their	  government	  positions,	   the	  Court	   finds	   that	   [the	  princes]	  are	   foreign	  states	   for	  FSIA	  purposes.”).	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   takes	  under	   the	   color	  of	   state	   law.”110	   	   In	  a	  personal-­‐capacity	  suit,	   the	   official	   is	   being	   sued	   because	   he	   or	   she	   has	   acted	  illegitimately,	   that	   is,	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   “constitutionally	   void.”111	  	  And,	   the	  damages	  being	   sought	   in	  a	  personal-­‐capacity	   suit	   come	  from	  the	  individual	  official’s	  pockets.112	  	  If	  the	  state	  has	  a	  policy	  of	  indemnifying	  officials	  for	  these	  types	  of	  suits,	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   the	  court	   is	  compelling	  damages	   from	  the	  state	   treasury	   for	  purposes	  of	  sovereign	  immunity.113	  An	   officer’s	   ostensible	   official	   acts—that	   is,	   acts	   taken	   “under	  color	  of	  law”—may	  properly	  be	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  allegations	  in	  a	  personal	  capacity	  suit,	  because	  “personal”	  refers	  to	  the	  capacity	  in	  which	   the	  officer	   “is	   sued”	  and	   “not	   the	   capacity	   in	  which	   the	  officer	   inflicts	  the	  alleged	  injury.”114	   	  Any	  immunity	  that	  attaches	  to	  an	  official	   in	  a	  personal	  capacity	  suit	   for	  acts	   taken	  under	   the	  color	  of	  state	  law	  is	  conduct-­‐based,	  meaning	  that	  it	  attaches	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  individual	  himself,	  whether	  a	  former115	  or	  current	  official,	  and	  not	  to	  his	  current	  status	  or	  position.116	  An	   official-­‐capacity	   suit	   is	   an	   action	   in	   which	   the	   official	   is	  named	  as	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   sovereign	   entity,	   and	   in	  which	  damages,	   for	  example,	  would	  come	  from	  the	  state’s	  treasury	  and	  not	   the	   individual	   official.	   	   Sued	   in	   this	   capacity,	   the	   official	   is	  entitled	   to	   the	   same	   immunity	   as	   the	   sovereign	   entity	   itself,	   if	  
	   110 Kentucky	  v.	  Graham,	  473	  U.S.	  159,	  165	  (1985).	  111 See	  Malone	   v.	   Bowdoin,	   369	   U.S.	   643,	   647–48	   (1962)	   (seeking	   to	   resolve	   a	  debate	  brought	  on	  by	  two	  contrary	  lines	  of	  decisions	  in	  which	  officers	  of	  the	  United	  States	   could	   be	   sued	   for	   acting	   under	   color	   of	   law	   without	   incurring	   the	  consequences	  of	   the	   sovereign	   immunity	  of	   the	   federal	   government	   itself);	   see	   also	  Sanchez-­‐Espinoza	  v.	  Reagan,	  770	  F.2d	  202,	  207	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1985).	  112 See	  Hafer	  v.	  Melo,	  502	  U.S.	  21,	  30–31	  (1991).	   	  See	  also	  MARTIN	  A.	  SCHWARTZ	  &	  KATHRYN	  R.	  URBONYA,	  SECTION	  1983	  LITIGATION	  127–28	  (2d	  ed.	  2008)	   (noting	   that	   in	  personal	   capacity	   suits	   the	   damages	   come	   from	   the	   official’s	   “personal	   funds”	   and	  that	  even	   if	   the	  state	  decides	  to	   indemnify	   the	  official	   then	  that	   is	   the	  state’s	  choice	  and	  does	  not	  generate	  sovereign	  immunity).	  113 SCHWARTZ	  &	  URBONYA,	   SECTION	  1983	  LITIGATION,	   supra	  note	  112	   at	   128	   (citing	  Stoner	  v.	  Wis.	  Dep’t	  of	  Agric.,	  50	  F.3d	  481,	  482–83	  (7th	  Cir.	  1995))	  (“The	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  agreed	  to	  indemnify	  the	  state	  official	  for	  a	  personal	  capacity	  monetary	  judgment	  does	  not	  create	  Eleventh	  Amendment	  immunity	  because	  the	  decision	  to	  indemnify	  is	  a	   voluntary	   policy	   of	   the	   state	   government;	   it	   is	   not	   compelled	   by	  mandate	   of	   the	  federal	  court.”).	  114 Hafer,	  502	  U.S.	  at	  26.	  115 See,	  e.g.,	  Price	  v.	  Hawaii,	  921	  F.2d	  950,	  958–59	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990).	  116 See	  Hafer,	  502	  U.S.	  at	  30.	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  any.117	  	  It	  has	  become	  axiomatic	  that	  official	  capacity	  suits	  of	  this	  character	   are	   essentially	   suits	   against	   the	   sovereign	   itself.118	  	  Because	   the	   official	   is	   essentially	   representing	   the	   sovereign,	  when	   that	   official	   dies	   or	   is	   replaced,	   then	   the	   successor	   in	   that	  position	  will	  automatically	  assume	  his	  role	  in	  the	  litigation.119	  Finally,	   there	   is	   another	   type	   of	   suit	   that	   a	   plaintiff	   brings	  against	   an	   individual	   who	   only	   coincidentally	   happens	   to	   be	   a	  current	  or	   former	  official,	   and	   the	   suit	   alleges	  no	  public/official-­‐act	  connection,	  but	  rather	  seeks	  liability	  for	  the	  private	  acts.120	  	  In	  most	  cases	  of	  this	  type	  no	  immunity	  should	  attach.121	  The	  circuit	  courts	  cited	  to	  the	  case	  law	  associated	  with	  official-­‐capacity	  suits	  under	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983,	  but	   they	  did	  not	  make	   full	  use	   of	   it	   in	   reasoning	   through	   the	   cases	   on	   FSIA	   and	   foreign	  official	   immunity.	   	   Instead,	   the	  circuit	   courts	   treated	   the	  suits	  as	  official-­‐capacity	   suits	   because	   they	   were	   predicated	   on	   conduct	  that	   the	   official	   undertook	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   job.	   	   Therefore,	   it	  would	  also	  be	  safe	  to	  presume	  under	  this	  formulation	  that,	   if	  the	  state	  or	  instrumentality	  that	  employed	  the	  official	  would	  not	  have	  immunity	   under	   the	   exceptions	   in	   28	   U.S.C.	   §	   1605	   of	   the	   FSIA,	  then	   there	   is	   no	   immunity	   for	   the	   official	   to	   derive	   from	   the	  state,122	   and	   courts	   would	   have	   to	   handle	   cases	   of	   this	   type	  according	  to	  principles	  of	  agency,	  corporate,	  civil	  procedure,123	  or	  general	   commercial	   law	   that	   permit	   individuals	   to	   be	   separated	  from	  entities	  for	  purposes	  of	  damages.124	  	   117 Such	   as	   state	   officials	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   for	   example,	   protected	   under	   the	  State	  government’s	  sovereign	  immunity	  as	  bestowed	  by	  the	  Eleventh	  Amendment	  in	  this	  type	  of	  suit.	  118 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  71,	  84	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008)	  (citing	  Monell	  v.	  N.Y.	  City	  Dept.	  of	  Soc.	  Servs.,	  436	  U.S.	  658,	  691	  n.55	  (1978)).	  	  See	  also	  Printz	  v.	  United	  States,	  521	  U.S.	  898,	  930–31	  (1997)	  (same	  proposition).	  119 Hafer,	  502	  U.S.	  at	  30–31.	  120 Park	  v.	  Shin,	  313	  F.3d	  1138,	  1142	  (9th	  Cir.	  2002).	  121 Id.	  122 Guevara	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  468	  F.3d	  1289,	  1305	  (11th	  Cir.	  2006).	  123 See	  infra	  Part	  II.C.5.	  text	  and	  accompanying	  notes	  (discussing	  suits	  in	  which	  the	  case	  against	  an	  individual	  official	  must	  be	  dismissed	  because	  it	  would	  prejudice	  the	  necessary	  party	  of	  the	  immune	  sovereign	  itself).	  124 This	   inquiry	   can	   be	   difficult.	   	   See	   First	   Nat'l	   City	   Bank	   v.	   Banco	   Para	   El	  Comercio	  Exterior	  De	  Cuba,	  462	  U.S.	  611,	  622	  (1983)	  (“[W]here	  state	  law	  provides	  a	  rule	   of	   liability	   governing	   private	   individuals,	   the	   FSIA	   requires	   the	   application	   of	  that	   rule	   to	   foreign	   states	   in	   like	   circumstances.	   	   The	   statute	   is	   silent,	   however,	  concerning	  the	  rule	  governing	  the	  attribution	  of	   liability	  among	  entities	  of	  a	  foreign	  state.”),	  superseded	  in	  part	  by	  statute,	  Terrorism	  Risk	  Insurance	  Act,	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1610,	  
as	  stated	  in,	  Weinstein	  v.	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran,	  609	  F.3d	  43,	  51	  (2d	  Cir.	  2010).	  	  The	  Court	   in	   Banco	   Para	   El	   Comercio	   Exterior	   De	   Cuba	   concluded,	   under	   principles	   of	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3.	  	  Effectuating	  the	  Purposes	  of	  FSIA	  The	  circuits	  analyzed	  implications	  of	  suing	  an	  official	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity,	  and	  for	  the	  majority-­‐rule	  courts	  this	  consideration	  seemed	  to	  be	  significant	  in	  their	   decision	   to	   include	   officials	   in	   FSIA.	   	  More	   specifically,	   the	  courts	   analyzed	   whether	   the	   suit	   against	   the	   official	   was	  tantamount	  to	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  state	  itself	  and	  thereby	  damaging	  of	  the	  immunity	  conferred	  on	  the	  state	  by	  the	  FSIA.125	  	  Or,	  rather,	  the	   courts	   asked	   when	   the	   individual	   official	   can	   be	   separated	  from	  the	  state	  for	  purposes	  of	  suit?	  	  For	  the	  majority	  rule	  courts,	  the	  effects	  of	  excluding	  officials	   from	  coverage	  of	  FSIA	  produced	  results	   that	   would	   unduly	   frustrate	   the	   congressional	   purpose.	  	  The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  stated:	  [W]e	  cannot	  infer	  that	  Congress,	  in	  passing	  the	  [FSIA],	  intended	  to	   allow	   unrestricted	   suits	   against	   individual	   foreign	   officials	  acting	  in	  their	  official	  capacities.	  	  Such	  a	  result	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  blanket	  abrogation	  of	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  by	  allowing	  litigants	  to	  accomplish	  indirectly	  what	  the	  Act	  barred	  them	  from	  doing	  directly.	   	   It	  would	  be	   illogical	   to	   conclude	   that	   Congress	  would	  have	  enacted	  such	  a	  sweeping	  alteration	  of	  existing	   law	  implicitly	   and	   without	   comment.	   	   Moreover,	   such	   an	  interpretation	  would	  defeat	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Act:	  the	  statute	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  codification	  of	  immunity	  and	  its	   exceptions.	   	   The	   rule	   that	   foreign	   states	   can	   be	   sued	   only	  pursuant	   to	   the	   specific	   provisions	   of	   sections	   1605-­‐07	  would	  be	  vitiated	  if	  litigants	  could	  avoid	  immunity	  simply	  by	  recasting	  the	  form	  of	  their	  pleadings.126	  Separation	  of	  the	  individual	  from	  the	  state	  for	  purposes	  of	  suit	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  debate	  in	  U.S.	  courts.	  	  Nineteenth	  century	   decisions	   of	   the	   federal	   courts	   show	   that	   citizens	   often	  pled	   suits	   against	   individual	   officers	   of	   the	   U.S.	   government	   in	  order	   to	   avoid	   sovereign	   immunity	   and	   to	   seek	   redress	   for	   a	  	  international	   law	   and	   federal	   common	   law	   that	   foreign	   states	   and	   their	  instrumentalities	  are	  juridically	  distinct	  entities	  for	  purposes	  of	  liability,	  but	  that	  this	  presumption	  could	  be	  overcome	  if	  a	  requisite	  degree	  of	  control	  was	  shown	  or	  if	  the	  circumstances	  involved	  fraud.	   	  Banco	  Para	  El	  Comercio	  Exterior	  De	  Cuba,	  462	  U.S.	  at	  622–23.	   	   For	   the	   Court	   in	  Banco	   Para	   El	   Comercio	   Exterior	   De	   Cuba	   the	   law	   of	   the	  place	  of	  incorporation	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  because,	  in	  that	  case,	  the	  government	  had	  already	  dissolved	   the	  corporation	   to	  escape	   liability,	  and	   the	  application	  of	   internal	  law	   would	   permit	   the	   nation—i.e.,	   Cuba—to	   avoid	   the	   obligations	   of	   international	  law	  with	   impunity.	   	   Id.	  at	  623–24.	   	  See	  also	  Oveissi	   v.	   Islamic	  Republic	  of	   Iran,	  573	  F.3d	  835,	  841	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2009)	  (same	  proposition);	  DELLAPENNA,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  §	  8.1	  (agreeing	  that	  choice	  of	  law	  questions	  under	  FSIA	  are	  complex,	  to	  say	  the	  least).	  125 In	  re	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  538	  F.3d	  71,	  85	  (2d	  Cir.	  2008).	  126 Chuidian	  v.	  Philippine	  Nat’l	  Bank,	  912	  F.2d	  1095,	  1102	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990).	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   of	  wrongs,	   such	   as	   disputes	   over	   government	   payments,	  uncompensated	  takings	  of	  land,	  and	  unlawful	  seizures	  of	  movable	  chattels.127	  	  Courts	  permitted	  these	  suits	  to	  proceed,	  provided	  that	  the	  United	  States	  itself	  was	  not	  named	  as	  a	  defendant,	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   tradition	   of	   granting	   the	  sovereign	   immunity	   from	   suit	   and	   the	   need	   to	   provide	   common	  law	   avenues	   for	   individuals	   to	   seek	   relief	   in	   their	   disputes	  with	  the	  State.128	  Courts	   gradually	   stopped	   using	   this	   line	   of	   decisions	   as	   the	  federal	   government	   set	   in	   place	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   federal	  Court	   of	   Claims,	   and	   statutory	   mechanisms	   for	   bringing	   suits	  against	  it.129	  	  Accordingly,	  courts	  increasingly	  barred	  suits	  against	  specific	   federal	   officers	   based	   on	   the	   doctrine	   of	   sovereign	  immunity.130	  In	  addition,	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  can	  be	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  finds	  support	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  under	  the	  U.N.	  Convention	  on	  Jurisdictional	  Immunities	  of	  States	  and	  Their	  Property.131	   	  As	  one	   commentator	  has	   remarked	   “The	  UN	   Convention	   .	   .	   .	   treats	   an	   individual	   whose	   acts	   can	   be	  identified	   as	   those	   of	   a	   foreign	   State	   as	   coming	   within	   the	  definition	  of	  a	  State.	  	  State	  immunity	  is	  extended	  to	  a	  person	  who	  performs	   an	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   State	   to	   prevent	   proceedings	  which	  indirectly	  implead	  the	  foreign	  State,	  where	  the	  State	  would	  have	  enjoyed	  immunity	  had	  the	  proceedings	  been	  brought	  against	  it.”132	  Despite	   this,	   the	  court	   in	  Chuidian	  went	  on	   to	  conclude	   that	   if	  any	  official	  acted	  outside	  the	  legal	  mandate	  of	  his	  authority,	  then	  he	  would	  not	  be	  part	  of	   the	  state	  and	  would	  not	  be	  part	  of	  FSIA.	  	  	   127 Jackson,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  534.	  128 Id.	  at	  534	  (“[T]he	  disruptive	  potential	  of	   the	  conceptual	  tensions	  surrounding	  the	   idea	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	  was	  mitigated	   in	   the	   early	   years	   by	   its	   coexistence	  with	  traditions	  of	  specific	  relief	  against	   individual	  officers,	  of	  both	  state	  and	  federal	  governments.”).	  	  See	  also,	  e.g.,	  United	  State	  v.	  Lee,	  106	  U.S.	  196	  (1882).	  129 Jackson,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  561–63.	  130 Id.	   at	   567	   (“Whereas	   in	   the	   early	   nineteenth	   century	   remedies	   against	  individual	   officers	  were	   a	   predominant	  mode	  of	   judicial	   redress	   and	   accountability	  (and	  remain	  so	  for	  state	  officers),	   today	  remedies	  against	   individual	   federal	  officers	  are	   often	   precluded,	   and	   the	   only	   remedy	   is	   against	   the	   government.”).	   	   See	   also	  Jonathan	  R.	   Siegel,	   Suing	   the	   President:	   Nonstatutory	   Review	  Revisited,	   97	   COLUM.	   L.	  REV.	  1612	  (1997)	  (describing	  the	  availability	  of	  non-­‐statutory	  review	  of	  official	  action	  under	  the	  sovereign	  immunity	  waiver	  of	  the	  APA).	  131 HAZEL	  FOX,	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  STATE	  IMMUNITY	  457	  (2d	  ed.	  2008).	  132 Id.	  at	  455–56.	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   question	   of	  whether	   particular	   acts	   should	   be	   attributed	   or	  identified	  with	  the	  state	  is	  difficult,	  and	  the	  following	  sections	  will	  deal	  with	  that	  issue	  in	  more	  detail.133	  
4.	  	  Tangential	  Debate	  Over	  Conduct	  and	  Status–Based	  Immunities	  
for	  Former	  Officials	  Another	  more	  narrow	  debate	  emerged	   in	   the	  circuit	  decisions	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Samantar	  decision:	  even	  if	  FSIA	  covered	  officials,	  did	  it	  cover	  former	  officials?	  	  This	  debate	  relates	  somewhat	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Dole	   Foods	   v.	  
Patrickson.	   	   In	  Dole	  Foods	   the	  Court	  determined	   that	   in	  order	   to	  receive	  FSIA	   immunity	  as	  a	  majority	  owned	   instrumentality	  of	   a	  foreign	  state	  the	  instrumentality	  had	  to	  be	  majority	  owned	  by	  the	  sovereign	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   suit	   in	   question,	   rather	   than	   at	   the	  time	   of	   the	   allegedly	   improper	   conduct.134	   	   The	   defendant	   thus	  must	  have	   the	   status	  of	   a	   state-­‐owned	   corporation.135	   	   Similarly,	  the	  Fourth	  Circuit’s	  decision	  in	  Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar	  concluded,	  as	  a	  backstop	  to	  its	  holding	  that	  FSIA	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  individuals,	  that	  the	  defendant	  (and	  former	  Somalian	  official)	  Muhamed	  Samantar	  would,	   in	  any	  event,	  not	  qualify	  because	  he	  was	  a	   former	  official	  at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   suit	   and	   therefore	   did	   not	   hold	   the	   required	  status	   for	   FSIA	   immunity	   to	   apply.136	   	   In	   support	   of	   the	   counter	  position,	   Samantar’s	   lawyers	   argued,	   before	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  that	   the	   Dole	   Foods	   decision	   only	   applied	   to	   agencies	   or	  instrumentalities	  of	  foreign	  states	  and	  not	  the	  foreign	  state	  itself,	  of	  which	  Samantar	  was	  a	  part,	  or	  that	  it	  could	  be	  limited	  to	  state	  owned	   corporations.137	   	   Consequently,	   they	   argued,	   former	  officials	  would	  not	  lose	  immunity	  under	  FSIA	  when	  they	  left	  office	  because	   their	   immunity	   emanates	   directly	   from	   the	   foreign	  state.138	  
	   133 Mizushima	   Tomonori,	   The	   Individual	   as	   the	   Beneficiary	   of	   State	   Immunity:	  
Problems	   of	   the	   Attribution	   of	   Ultra	   Vires	   Conduct,	   29	   DENV.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   &	   POL’Y	   261	  (2001).	  	  See	  also	  Jones	  v.	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  [2006]	  UKHL	  26,	  [30],	  [2007]	  1	  A.C.	  270,	  290	  (appeal	  taken	  from	  England)	  (“A	  state	  can	  only	  act	  through	  servants	  and	  agents;	  their	  official	  acts	  are	   the	  acts	  of	   the	  state;	  and	   the	  state’s	   immunity	   in	   respect	  of	   them	   is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  state	  immunity.”).	  134 538	  U.S.	  468,	  480	  (1993).	  135 Id.	  at	  479–80.	  136 Samantar,	  552	  F.3d	  at	  381–82.	  137 Brief	  of	  the	  Petitioner	  at	  9,	  Samatar	  v.	  Yousuf	  2008	  U.S.	  Briefs	  1555	  at	  *19.	  138 Brief	   for	  Petitioner	  at	  20,	  Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278	  (2010)	  (No.	  08-­‐1555)	  [hereinafter	  Petitioner’s	  Brief].	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  in	  another	  case,	   the	  D.C.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  disagreed	  with	   the	   Fourth	   Circuit.	   	   In	   Belhas	   v.	   Moshe	   Ya’lon,	   the	   plaintiff	  brought	  suit	  against	  a	  former	  Israeli	  general	  under	  the	  ATCA	  and	  the	   TVPA	   for	   targeting	   civilians	   during	   the	   shelling	   of	   a	   village	  where	   a	   United	   Nations	   compound	   was	   located	   in	   southern	  Lebanon.139	   	   The	   D.C.	   Circuit	   ultimately	   dismissed	   the	   case	   on	  other	   grounds	   but	   noted	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   defendant	  was	   a	  former	  official	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  he	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  sovereign	  immunity.140	   	   According	   to	   the	   court,	   FSIA	   codified	   the	   common	  law	  of	  official	   immunity	  that	  granted	  conduct-­‐based	  immunity	  to	  officials	   for	   their	  official	  acts	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  state.141	   	  To	  hold	  a	  former	   official	   liable	   for	   official	   acts	   would	   be	   contrary	   to	   this	  immunity	   and	   to	   the	   purposes	   of	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	  generally,	   because	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   exists	   to	   free	  states	   from	   the	   inconvenience	   of	   suit	   in	   a	   foreign	   court—particularly	  a	  suit	   that	  would	  allow	  that	  court	   to	   “micromanage”	  its	  military	  decisions.142	  The	   circuit	   court	   decisions	   (and	   the	   parties’	   arguments	   that	  shaped	   them)	   enunciated	   a	   number	   of	   points	   of	   statutory	  interpretation	   and	   common	   law	   doctrines	   that	   found	   their	   way	  into	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Samantar.	   	   Indeed,	   as	   the	  sections	   below	   will	   show	   and	   post-­‐Samantar	   commentary	   has	  argued,143	   these	   issues	   of,	   for	   example,	   personal	   capacity	   versus	  official	   capacity	   and	   conduct-­‐based	   versus	   status-­‐based	  immunities	  will	  likely	  continue	  to	  be	  relevant	  as	  the	  lower	  courts	  determine	   what	   non-­‐FSIA	   immunity	   applies	   to	   foreign	   officials	  	   139 515	  F.3d	  1279,	  1285–86	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2008).	  140 Id.	  141 Id.	  142 Id.	  143 Professor	   Keitner	   argues	   that	   status-­‐based	   immunities	   apply	   only	   when	   the	  individual	  holds	  a	  certain	  position,	  and	  conduct	  based	  immunities	  attach	  to	  the	  acts	  of	  an	  official	  and	  remain	  even	  when	  the	  position	  is	  gone.	  	  See	  Chimene	  I.	  Keitner,	  The	  
Common	  Law	  of	  Foreign	  Official	  Immunity,	  14	  GREEN	  BAG	  2D	  61,	  63	  (2010).	  	  She	  argues	  that	   the	  distinction	  has	  been	  confused	   in	  some	  U.S.	   case	   law,	  but	  should	  be	  revived	  and	   utilized	   going	   forward.	   	   Id.	   at	   63,	   69–70.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   analyzing	   an	   individual	  official’s	   acts,	   Professor	   Keitner	   sees	   three	   formulations.	   	   Id.	   	   An	   individual	   official	  may	   perform	   acts	   that	   are	   purely	   private,	   purely	   public,	   and	   acts—resulting	   in	  individual	  responsibility	  under	  international	  law,	  such	  as	  genocide	  and	  war	  crimes—that	  are	  neither	  purely	  public	  nor	  purely	  private.	  	  Id.	  at	  68–69.	  	  Whether	  an	  individual	  official	   is	   entitled	   to	   conduct-­‐based	   immunity	   for	   these	   acts	   falling	   into	   the	   third	  category	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   remedy	   sought	   and	   whether	   its	   effect	   would	   be	   to	  enforce	  a	  rule	  against	  the	  state—a	  standard	  articulated	  by	  the	  Restatement	  Second	  of	  Foreign	  Relations.	  	  Id.	  at	  69–70.	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  and	   in	   what	   contexts.	   	   The	   next	   Section	   discusses	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	   viewpoint,	   and	   the	   significance	   of	   its	   viewpoint,	   on	   the	  issues	  discussed	  above.144	  
B.	  	  The	  Samantar	  Decision	  The	   Samantar	   decision	   ended	   the	   circuit	   split	   over	   FSIA’s	  coverage	  of	   individual	  officials,	  and	  has	   left	   the	  determination	  of	  foreign	   official	   immunity	   under	   the	   common	   law	   in	   a	   state	   of	  doubt.145	  	  The	  court’s	  decision	  will	  likely	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	   pending	   and	   future	   cases	   in	   this	   area	   of	   the	   law,	   and	   may	  increase	   the	   number	   of	   international	   human	   rights-­‐based	   law	  suits	  that	  foreign	  plaintiffs	  file	  in	  federal	  court	  each	  year.	  	  Despite	  the	  size	  of	   its	   impact,	   the	  decision	   itself	   is	   remarkably	  short	  and	  general.	   	   It	   does	   not	   discuss	   the	   extensive	   amounts	   of	   U.S.	   and	  international	  cases	  potentially	  related	  to	  foreign	  official	  immunity	  that	  the	  parties	  cited	  in	  their	  briefs;	  indeed,	  it	  does	  not	  mention	  a	  single	   international	   law	   decision.	   	   Like	   the	   circuit	   decisions,	   the	  
Samantar	   opinion	   essentially	   offers	   three	   relevant	   analytical	  parts:	   (1)	   the	   textual	   and	   legislative	   history	   analysis	   of	   the	  phrases	   “foreign	   state”	   and	   “agency	   or	   instrumentality”	   under	  FSIA,	  (2)	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  common	  law	  prior	  to	  FSIA,	   and	   (3)	   hints	   about	   the	   future	   of	   suits	   against	   foreign	  officials	  under	  the	  common	  law.	  The	   Court’s	   opinion	   provides	   some,	   but	   not	   a	   great	   deal,	   of	  factual	   and	   procedural	   background	   on	   the	   dispute	   and	   the	  disposition	  of	   the	   case	  before	   the	  district	   court	   and	   the	   court	   of	  appeals.	   	  For	  purposes	  of	   this	  discussion	  and	  the	  discussion	  that	  follows	   as	   to	   how	   this	   Article	   proposes	   that	   similar	   suits	   are	  handled	   in	   the	   future,	   some	   additional	   background	   from	   the	  
	   144 Several	  commentators	  also	  supported	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  circuit	  courts	  that	   applied	   FSIA	   to	   foreign	   officials	   before	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision.	   	   Their	  rationale	   was	   essentially	   this	   interpretation	   of	   FSIA	   provided	   a	   comprehensive	  solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   official	   immunity,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   would	   clearly	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  human	  rights	   litigation	  in	  the	  federal	  courts.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Curtis	  A.	  Bradley	   and	   Jack	  L.	  Goldsmith,	  Foreign	   Sovereign	   Immunity,	   Individual	  Officials,	   and	  
Human	   Rights	   Litigation,	   13	   GREEN	   BAG	   2D	   9,	   22–23	   (2009);	   Lila	   Kanovsky,	   Better	  
Never	  than	  Late:	  Why	  Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar	  Should	  be	  Overturned	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (Working	   Paper,	   2009),	   available	   at	   http://SSRN.com/abstract=1519491;	   Working	  Group	   of	   the	   American	   Bar	   Association,	   Report:	   Reforming	   the	   Foreign	   Sovereign	  
Immunities	  Act,	  40	  COLUM.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  489,	  537–41	  (2002).	  145 Peter	  Rutledge,	  Thoughts	  on	  Samantar,	  OPINIO	  JURIS	  9	  (June	  4,	  2010,	  9:12	  PM),	  http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/04/thoughts-­‐on-­‐samantar.	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   record	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	   lower	   court	   decisions	   and	   the	  general	  history	  of	  the	  dispute	  may	  be	  useful.	  Somalia	   gained	   independence	   from	   colonial	   powers	   and	  became	   a	   sovereign	   nation-­‐state	   in	   or	   about	   1960.	   146	   	   The	  resulting	   state	   adopted	   a	   constitution	   that	   “pledged	   respect	   for	  internationally	   recognized	   human	   rights”	   and	   “provided	   for	   an	  independent	   judiciary,	   incorporating	   elements	   of	   British,	   Italian,	  and	   Shar’ia	   legal	   codes.”147	   	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   1963	   Constitution	  pledges	   acceptance	   of	   international	   law	   and	   mandates	   that	  international	   law	   and	   international	   treaties	   have	   the	   force	   of	  law.148	   	   In	   addition,	   Article	   7	   of	   the	   1963	   Constitution	   states,	  “[t]he	   laws	   of	   the	   Somali	   Republic	   shall	   comply,	   in	   so	   far	   as	  applicable,	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   0£	  [sic]	   Human	   Rights	   adopted	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly	   of	   the	  United	   Nations	   on	   10	   December	   1948.”	   	   Another	   constitution	  adopted	  in	  1979	  also	  pledged	  support	  for	  human	  rights.149	  By	  1969,	  a	  military	  coup	  d’état	   installed	  Mohamed	  Siad	  Barre,	  who	   would	   later	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   a	   ruthless	   dictator,	   as	   the	  president.150	   	   The	   Siad	   Barre	   regime	   would	   control	   Somalia	   for	  over	   twenty	   years,	   from	   1970	   through	   1991,	   until	   opposition	  militias	   ultimately	   overthrew	   it.151	   	   The	   regime	   ignored	   the	  principles	  it	  ascribed	  to	  in	  its	  constitution	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  system	  of	  widespread	   oppression	   of	   minority	   groups	   and	   political	  opponents,	   increasingly	   employing	   “arrests,	   detentions,	   and	  executions”	   to	   suppress	   dissent.152	   	   The	   plaintiffs	   in	   the	   case	  against	   Muhamed	   Ali	   Samantar,	   the	   former	   first	   vice	   president,	  prime	  minister,	  and	  minister	  of	  defense	  under	   the	  Barre	  regime,	  alleged	   that	   they	   or	   their	   family	   members	   were	   tortured	   or	  executed	   without	   judicial	   process	   during	   the	   1980s	   while	  Samantar	  was	  in	  power.153	  	  The	  Barre	  regime	  ultimately	  collapsed	  	   146 Brief	  of	  Amici	  Curiae	  Academic	  Experts	  in	  Somali	  History	  and	  Current	  Affairs	  in	  Support	   of	   Respondents	   at	   6	   Samantar	   v.	   Yousuf,	   130	   S.	   Ct.	   2278	   (2010)	   (No.	   08-­‐1555)	  [hereinafter	  Somali	  History	  Brief].	  147 Id.	  at	  6–7.	  148 CONST.OF	   SOM.,	   http://www.somalilaw.org/Documents/Constitution1960.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  27,	  2011).	  149 Somali	  History	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  146	  at	  17,	  n.17.	  150 Id.	  at	  7.	  151 Id.	  at	  19.	  152 Id.	  at	  7–19.	  153 Brief	  for	  the	  Respondents	  at	  3	  Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278	  (2010)	  (No.	  08-­‐1555)	  [hereinafter	  Brief	  for	  the	  Respondents].	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  in	  1991	  and	  its	  leaders	  fled	  Somalia.	  	  Samantar	  ultimately	  settled	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Virginia.154	  Since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Barre	  regime,	  Somalia	  has	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  the	   state	   it	   was	   in	   the	   1960s.155	   	   The	   northern	   part	   of	   former	  Somalia	   has	   essentially	   seceded	   and	   become	   The	   Republic	   of	  Somaliland,	   which	   is	   a	   relatively	   stable	   state	   with	   a	   working	  government.156	   	   Although	   Somaliland	   is	   not	   yet	   formally	  recognized	   by	   most	   nations,	   including	   the	   United	   States,	   its	  governmental	   officers	   have	   paid	   visits	   to	   the	   United	   States	   and	  met	  with	  U.S.	  federal	  officials.157	  	  In	  the	  south	  and	  central	  parts	  of	  the	   former	  Somalia,	   an	   independent	   state	   is	   also	  growing,	   called	  the	   Puntland	   State	   of	   Somalia.158	   	   The	   United	   States	   does	   not	  recognize	   this	   entity	   either,	   but	   Puntland	   State	   of	   Somalia	   has	  become	   an	   increasingly	   stable	   self-­‐governing	   unit.159	   	   Southern	  and	   central	   Somalia	   meanwhile	   have	   fallen	   into	   chaos.160	   	   A	  governing	  body	  called	  the	  Transitional	  Federal	  Government	  is	  the	  fifteenth	   attempt	   at	   recreating	   a	   government	   in	   Somalia.161	  	  Currently	   the	   TFG	   controls	   only	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   capital	   city	   of	  Mogadishu.162	  	  Somalia,	  ostensibly	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  TFG,	  does	  not	   enjoy	   formal	   U.S.	   recognition,	   although	   Samantar’s	   lawyers	  asserted	   that	   it	   does.	   163	   	   Despite	   a	   lack	   of	   international	  recognition	   of	   these	   different	   governments	   in	   the	   area	   formerly	  known	   as	   Somalia,	   the	   general	   debate	   about	   FSIA’s	   coverage	   of	  officials	   in	   the	   Samantar	   case	   was	   more	   prominent	   than	   any	  discussion	  of	  resolving	  the	  case	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Samantar	  could	  not	  obtain	  immunity	  from	  a	  sovereign	  that	  no	  longer	  exists.	   	  One	  reason	   for	   this	   approach	   might	   be	   forcing	   a	   court	   to	   resolve	   a	  	   154 Samantar,	  552	  F.3d	  at	  374.	  155 Somali	  History	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  146,	  at	  19–21.	  156 Id.	  at	  24.	  157 Id.	  158 Id.	  at	  28.	  159 Id.	  at	  29–30.	  160 Id.	  161 Somali	  History	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  146,	  at	  20.	  162 Id.	  163 Petitioner’s	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  138	  at	  8.	  	  But	  see,	  Somali	  History	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  146,	   at	   4	   (“Amici	   note	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   at	   Bar,	   Petitioner	   has	   made	   certain	  representations	  concerning	  the	  recent	  history	  and	  current	  status	  of	  Somalia	  that	  are	  inconsistent	   with	   their	   own	   observations	   and	   understanding	   of	   the	   facts	   on	   the	  ground	   in	   that	   country.	   	   In	   particular,	   Petitioner	   suggests	   .	   .	   .	   that	   the	   Transitional	  Federal	  Government	  of	   Somalia	   (“TFG”)	   is	   currently	   a	   functioning	   government	   that	  administers	   the	   territory	   of	   Somalia,	   provides	   services	   to	   its	   citizens,	   and	   has	  received	  the	  official	  recognition	  of	  the	  United	  States.”).	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  potentially	   even	   more	   complicated	   question	   regarding	   what	  attributes	  constitute	  a	  state	  for	  purposes	  of	  sovereign	  immunity.	  It	  was	   against	   this	   background	   that	   the	   plaintiffs,	   two	   named	  individuals	   and	   two	   who	   chose	   to	   remain	   anonymous,	   filed	   a	  sealed	  complaint	  in	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  Eastern	  District	  of	   Virginia	   against	   Muhamed	   Samantar.	   	   The	   complaint	   alleged	  that	   Samantar,	   as	   an	   official	   in	   the	   Barre	   regime,	   had	   presided	  over	   individuals	   engaged	   in	   acts	   of	   torture	   and	   extrajudicial	  killing	   against	   the	  plaintiffs	   and	   their	   families	   in	   violation	  of	   the	  Alien	  Tort	  Claims	  Act164	  and	  the	  Torture	  Victims	  Protection	  Act.165	  The	  defendant	  filed	  a	  motion	  to	  dismiss	  for	  lack	  of	  personal	  and	  subject	   matter	   jurisdiction.	   	   The	   district	   court	   subsequently	  stayed	   the	   proceedings	   pending	   a	   determination	   from	   the	   State	  Department	   on	   the	   entitlement	   of	   the	   defendant	   to	   sovereign	  immunity.166	   	   Receiving	   no	   response	   from	   the	   State	  Department	  after	   several	   years,	   the	   district	   court	   reinstated	   the	   case	   and	  ultimately	   dismissed	   the	   plaintiffs’	   Second	   Amended	   Complaint	  because	   the	   court	   concluded,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   majority	  view	  of	  official	  immunity	  under	  FSIA,	  that	  it	  lacked	  subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  defendant.167	  	  The	  Fourth	  Circuit	  reversed.168	  	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  text	  of	  FSIA	  lent	  no	  support	  for	  inclusion	  of	  governmental	   officials	   in	   the	   definitions	   of	   a	   foreign	   state	   and	  agency	  or	  instrumentality	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  in	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1603.169	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   affirmed.	   	   In	   a	   short	   decision,	   the	   court	  rejected	  the	  view	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  federal	  courts	  of	  appeals	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  text	  and	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  FSIA	  did	  not	  support	  the	  inclusion	  of	  foreign	  governmental	  officials	  within	  its	  coverage.	  	  Writing	  for	  a	  unanimous	  court	  on	  this	  issue,	  Justice	  Stevens,	  who	  notably	  has	  been	   an	  opponent	   of	   the	   expansion	  of	  sovereign	   immunity,170	   began	   by	   summarizing	   the	   development	  
	   164 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1350	  (2010)	  (“The	  district	  courts	  shall	  have	  original	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  civil	  action	  by	  an	  alien	  for	  a	  tort	  only,	  committed	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  or	  a	  treaty	  of	  the	  United	  States.”).	  165 Complaint	  at	  ¶¶	  94–118	  Samantur	  v.	  Yousuf,	  No.	  1:04	  CV	  1360	  (E.	  D.	  Va.	  Aug.	  1,	  2007);	  see	  also	  Brief	  for	  the	  Respondents,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  6.	  166 Samantar	   v.	   Yousuf,	   2007	  U.S.	   Dist.	   LEXIS	   56227,	   at	   *20–21	   (E.D.	   Va.	   Aug.	   1,	  2007).	  167 Id.	  168 Yousuf	  v.	  Samantar,	  552	  F.3d	  371,	  384	  (4th	  Cir.	  2009).	  169 Id.	  170 See,	   e.g.,	   Seminole	   Tribe	   v.	   Florida,	   517	   U.S.	   44,	   93	   (1996)	   (Stevens,	   J.,	  dissenting)	   (identifying	   “the	   questionable	   heritage	   of	   the	   doctrine	   [of	   sovereign	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  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  from	  a	  common	  law	  concept	   to	   a	   privileged	   granted	   (somewhat	   arbitrarily)	   by	   the	  State	  Department,	  and	  finally	  to	  an	  element	  of	  a	  statutory	  regime	  under	  the	  FSIA.171	  Moving	  to	  a	  textual	  analysis,	   Justice	  Stevens	  analyzed	  the	  case	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	   to	   the	  Seventh	  and	  Fourth	  Circuits’	  analysis.	  	  He	  concluded	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  “agency	  or	  instrumentality”	  of	  a	   foreign	   state	   is	   not	   susceptible	   to	   a	   reading	   that	   included	  
natural,	  as	  opposed	   to	  corporate,	   legal	  persons.172	   	  Furthermore,	  he	  concluded	   that	  a	  natural	  person,	   that	   is	  an	  official,	   could	  also	  not	  be	  included	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  foreign	  state	  itself,	  because	  the	  list	   of	   legal	   persons	   illustrative	   of	   the	   components	   of	   a	   foreign	  state	  also	  consisted	  of	  all	  corporate	  entities.173	  	  And,	  no	  provisions	  in	   the	  FSIA	  suggest	  officials	  are	  meant	   to	  be	   included	  within	   the	  definition	  of	  agency	  or	  instrumentality.174	  	  In	  addition,	  if	  the	  court	  were	   forced	   to	   choose	   whether	   officials	   were	   part	   of	   a	   foreign	  state	   or	   an	   agency	   or	   instrumentality	   of	   a	   foreign	   state,	   then	   it	  would	  be	  making	  an	  arbitrary	  choice	  that	  would	  have	  an	  arbitrary	  consequence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  FSIA’s	  application	  to	  officials.175	  	  The	  court	  concluded	  that	  the	  legislative	  history	  provided	  no	  support	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  officials	  in	  FSIA’s	  legislative	  history	  and	  purpose.176	  Justice	   Stevens	   touched	   upon	   the	   common	   law	   that	   existed	  prior	  to	  Congress’s	  enactment	  of	  FSIA.	   	  He	  noted,	  first,	  that	  there	  were	  few	  cases	  concerning	  the	  immunity	  of	  foreign	  officials	  prior	  to	   the	   enactment	   of	   FSIA,	   and	   therefore,	   it	   was	   reasonable	   to	  conclude	  Congress	  did	  not	  view	  these	  types	  of	  suits	  as	  a	  problem	  the	   FSIA	  was	  meant	   to	   resolve.177	   	   And,	   second,	   even	   in	   the	   few	  cases	  that	  there	  were,	  official	  and	  state	  immunity	  could	  be	  treated	  separately.178	  
	  immunity]	  and	  [suggesting]	  that	  there	  are	  valid	  reasons	  for	  limiting,	  or	  even	  rejecting	  that	  doctrine	  altogether,	  rather	  than	  expanding	  it”).	  171 Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278,	  2284–85	  (2010).	  172 Id.	  at	  2284–87.	  173 Id.	  174 Id.	  175 Id.	  at	  2287–89.	  176 Id.	   at	   2290–91	   (Justice	   Stevens’s	   analysis	   focused	   mainly	   on	   the	   purpose	   of	  codifying	  the	  common	  law	  and,	  in	  light	  of	  that	  purpose,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Congress	  was	  not	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  individuals	  because	  the	  common	  law	  was	  so	  concerned	  with	  entities.).	  177 Id.	  at	  2290.	  178 Id.	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  But,	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   stop	   with	   FSIA.	   	   Rather,	   the	   Court	  continued	   to	   discuss	   various	   concepts	   not	   necessarily	   related	   to	  the	   statutory	   interpretation	  question.	   	   It	   suggested	   that	   litigants	  might	   resort	   to	   the	   “common	   law”	   for	   immunity,	   as	   well	   as	  perhaps	   the	   State	   Department’s	   intervention,	   the	   act	   of	   state	  doctrine,	  and	  other	  civil	  procedure	  doctrines	  such	  as	  Rule	  19	  and	  personal	   jurisdiction	   for	   defenses.	   	   It	   also	   suggested	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  official	  and	  personal	  capacity	  suits	  would	  be	  relevant	   in	   future	   common	   law	   determinations.179	   	   The	   Court	  concluded	   that	   there	   would	   be	   “some	   circumstances	   [in	   which]	  the	  immunity	  of	  the	  foreign	  state	  extends	  to	  an	  individual	  for	  acts	  taken	  in	  his	  official	  capacity.”180	  	  But,	  although	  it	  cited	  to	  them,	  the	  Court	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   endorse	   expressly	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	  Restatement	   Second.181	   	   More	   interestingly,	   continuing	   with	   a	  trend	  that	  commentators	  have	  noted	  of	  citing	  domestic	  sovereign	  immunity	   cases	   in	   the	   context	   of	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	  cases,182	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   cited	  Kentucky	   v.	   Graham,	   a	   Section	  1983	   cases	   that	   made	   the	   distinction	   between	   personal	   and	  official	  capacity	  cases	  clearer.183	   	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  Section	  1983	   jurisprudence	   could	   become	   more	   meaningful	   in	  international	   cases.	   	   Under	   the	   Court’s	   reasoning,	   although	   all	  official	   capacity	   cases	   might	   be	   essentially	   against	   the	   state,	  certainly	   this	   case,	   in	  which	   the	   plaintiffs	   sued	   Samantar	   “in	   his	  personal	  capacity	  and	  seek	  damages	  from	  his	  own	  pockets,”	  is	  not	  a	  suit	  against	  a	  foreign	  state	  as	  FSIA	  defines	  that	  term.184	  
	   179 Id.	  at	  2290–91.	  180 Id.	  (emphasis	  added).	  181 Id.	  at	  2291,	  n.16.	  182 Katherine	   Florey,	   Sovereign	   Immunity’s	   Penumbras:	   Common	   Law,	   “Accident,”	  
and	  Policy	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  Sovereign	  Immunity	  Doctrine,	  43	  WAKE	  FOREST	  L.	  REV.	  765,	  769–70	  (2008)	  (“On	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  all	  [forms	  of	  sovereign	  immunity]	  derive	  from	  the	  common	  notion	  that	   limited	  amenability	   to	  suit	  (with	  the	  question	  of	  how	  far	  those	  limits	  extend	  being,	  of	  course,	  a	  subject	  of	  debate)	  is	  an	  inherent	  attribute	  of	  sovereignty.	   	   Moreover,	   as	   a	   practical	   matter,	   courts	   often	   speak	   of	   the	   various	  immunities	   interchangeably,	   relying	   on	   cases	   discussing	   one	   sort	   of	   immunity	   as	  authority	   in	  a	  case	  about	  another.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  core	  aspects	  of	  the	   doctrines	   have	   developed	   in	   tandem.	   	   Precisely	   because	   this	   process	   of	  mutual	  influence	   is	   often	   overlooked,	   it	   is	   an	   important	   element	   in	   any	   attempt	   at	   a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  sovereign	  immunity’s	  development.”).	  183 Samantar,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2291.	  184 Id.	  at	  2292.	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C.	  	  Implications	  of	  the	  Samantar	  Decision	  Through	   his	   reference	   to	   the	   “common	   law”	   Justice	   Stevens	  implies	   that	   there	  might	   be	   some	   immunity	   left	   for	   officials	   like	  Samantar.	   	   The	   court	   did	   not	   propose	   to	   do	   away	   with	   official	  immunity	  altogether	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  Such	  a	  proposal	  would	  not	  be	  unheard	   of,	   though.	   	   As	   discussed	   above,	   there	   is	   a	   body	   of	  scholarly	   literature	   calling	   for	   the	   abolishment	   of	   sovereign	  immunity	  at	  least	  in	  the	  domestic	  context.	  This	   section	   examines	   the	   remaining	   avenues	   for	   foreign	  official	  immunity	  using	  Muhamed	  Samantar’s	  case	  as	  a	  reference.	  	  There	   is	  head	  of	   state	   immunity,	  which	  protects	   sitting	  heads	  of	  state.	   	   There	   are	   suggestions	   of	   immunity	   offered	   by	   the	   State	  Department,	  to	  which	  a	  court	  may	  defer	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  making	  its	   own	   determination,	   and	   there	   is	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine,	  which	   provides	   a	   defense	   on	   the	   merits.	   	   Finally	   there	   is	   the	  potential	   for	   customary	   international	   law	   to	   inform	   federal	  common	   law	  as	   to	  whether	  an	  official	  can	  seek	   immunity.	   	  All	  of	  these	   doctrines	  might	   play	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   foreign	   official	  immunity,	   in	   addition	   to	   certain	   statutory	   and	   treaty-­‐based	  diplomatic	  or	  consular	  immunities.	  
1.	  	  Common	  Law	  of	  Executive-­‐Deference	  Prior	   to	   the	   Samantar	   decision,	   at	   least	   one	   circuit	   had	   the	  occasion	  to	  decide	  what	  immunity	  under	  the	  “common	  law”	  could	  mean	  for	  a	  former	  official.	  	  In	  Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  individual	  plaintiffs	  brought	  a	   civil	   complaint	  against	  a	   former	  director	  of	   the	   Israeli	  Security	   Agency	   for	   violating	   international	   law	   by	   injuring	   the	  plaintiffs	   or	   killing	   their	   relatives	   during	   Israel’s	   bombing	   of	   an	  apartment	   complex	   in	   the	   Gaza	   strip.185	   	   The	   bombing	   was	  designed	   to	   kill	   Hamas	   leader	   Saleh	   Mustafah.186	   	   Plaintiffs	  brought	  claims	  under	  both	  the	  ATCA	  and	  the	  TVPA.187	  	  The	  Israeli	  government	   wrote	   to	   the	   State	   Department	   asserting	   that	   the	  defendant	   was	   acting	   in	   the	   course	   of	   his	   official	   duties	   and	  should	   therefore	   be	   declared	   immune.188	   	   The	   State	  Department	  then	   issued	   a	   memorandum	   supporting	   immunity	   for	   the	  defendant.189	  	  The	  district	  court	  concluded	  that	  the	  defendant	  was	  	   185 Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  563	  F.3d	  9,	  10–11	  (2d	  Cir.	  2009).	  186 Id.	  187 Id.	  at	  11;	  Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  500	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  284,	  286	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2007).	  188 Matar,	  500	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  at	  286.	  189 Id.	  at	  287.	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  entitled	  to	   immunity	  under	  FSIA	  or,	  alternatively,	   the	  allegations	  in	  the	  complaint	  framed	  a	  non-­‐justiciable	  political	  question.190	  The	  Second	  Circuit	  affirmed.191	  	  It	  acknowledged	  that	  decisions	  by	   the	   D.C.	   Circuit	   and	   the	   Fourth	   Circuit	   had	   concluded	   that	  former	   officials	   were	   not	   covered	   by	   FSIA.192	   	   But,	   the	   court	  declined	   to	   conclusively	   answer	   that	  question	  because,	   even	   if	   a	  former	   official	   were	   not	   covered	   by	   FSIA,	   in	   this	   case	   the	  defendant	   was	   eligible	   for	   immunity	   under	   the	   common	   law.193	  	  Beginning	   its	   analysis	   under	   the	   common	   law,	   the	   court	   noted	  that	  under	  the	  Restatement	  (Second)	  of	  Foreign	  Relations,	  which	  existed	   before	   FSIA,	   a	   foreign	   official	   was	   entitled	   to	   immunity	  based	  on	  acts	  performed	   in	   the	   course	  of	  his	  duties.194	   	  Because	  this	   immunity	   attached	   to	   acts,	   and	   not	   status,	   a	   former	   official	  could	   be	   entitled	   to	   immunity.195	   	   Thus,	   in	   principle,	   the	   court	  determined	  that	  a	  former	  official	  could	  be	  entitled	  to	  common	  law	  immunity.196	   	   Ultimately	   the	   court	   concluded	   the	   common	   law	  principle	  of	  deference	   to	   the	  suggestions	  of	   the	  executive,	  which	  pre-­‐dated	   FSIA,	   was	   the	   applicable	   common	   law	   and,	   therefore,	  the	   defendant	   was	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   because	   the	   State	  Department	   had	   filed	   a	   suggestion	   of	   immunity	   on	   his	   behalf.197	  	  This	  holding,	   said	   the	  court,	  was	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	   tenet	  of	  foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   that	   these	   types	   of	   cases	   presented	  questions	   of	   “policy”	   rather	   than	   law	   and,	   thus,	   are	   more	   “for	  diplomatic	  rather	  than	  legal	  discussion.”198	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  might	  support	  a	  similar	  policy	  of	  executive	  deference	   in	   future	   cases.	   	   The	   Court	   implicated	   this	   position	  when	   it	   stated	   in	   Samantar,	   “We	   have	   been	   given	   no	   reason	   to	  believe	   that	  Congress	   saw	  as	  a	  problem,	  or	  wanted	   to	  eliminate,	  the	   State	   Department’s	   role	   in	   determinations	   regarding	  individual	   official	   immunity.”199	   	   The	   amicus	   brief	   of	   the	   United	  States,	   which	   the	   Court’s	   decision	   appears	   to	   follow	   closely	   in	  
	   190 Matar,	  563	  F.3d	  at	  12–13.	  191 Id.	  at	  15.	  192 Id.	  at	  13.	  193 Id.	  at	  14.	  194 Id.	  at	  13–14.	  195 Id.	  at	  14.	  196 Id.	  197 Id.	  198 Id.	  at	  10	  (citing	  Schooner	  Exchange	  v.	  McFaddon,	  11	  U.S.	  116,	  146	  (1812)).	  199 Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278,	  2290	  (2010).	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  some	  respects,	  argued	  for	  this	  approach.200	  	  Moreover,	  other	  prior	  Supreme	   Court	   decisions	   illustrate	   a	   view	   as	   stated	   in	   Schooner	  
Exchange	   that	   the	   executive	   retains	   some	   prerogative	   to	   take	  away	  the	  immunity	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  or	  its	  components	  based	  on	  foreign	  policy	  concerns.	   	  For	  example,	   in	  a	  recent	  case	  regarding	  the	   President’s	   power	   to	   waive	   Iraq’s	   liability	   under	   the	   FSIA’s	  terrorism	   exception,	   the	   Court	   emphasized	   in	   passing	   the	  appropriateness	   of	   the	   executive’s	   role	   in	   determining	   foreign	  sovereign	   immunity	   because	   the	   doctrine	   reflects	   “current	  political	   realities”	   and	   its	   “availability	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   is	   not	  something	  on	  which	  the	  parties	  can	  rely	  in	  shaping	  their	  primary	  conduct.”201	   	   This	   sentiment	   echoes	   from	   Republic	   of	   Austria	   v.	  
Altmann,	   from	  which	  the	  above	   language	   is	  quoted	  and	   in	  which	  Justice	  Stevens	  made	  it	  clear	  that,	  even	  when	  FSIA	  does	  apply,	  the	  State	   Department	   is	   free	   to	   offer	   its	   views	   via	   a	   suggestion	   of	  immunity	  and	  the	  court	  can	  accord	  those	  views	  particular	  weight	  as	   the	   considered	   judgment	   of	   the	   executive	   branch.202	   	   Indeed,	  Justice	  Stevens	  notes	  that	  historically	  “foreign	  sovereigns	  have	  no	  right	  to	  immunity	  in	  our	  courts.”203	  Given	   this	   authority,	   courts	   following	   Samantar	   may	   indeed	  follow	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  court	   in	  Matar,	  under	  which	  deference	  to	   the	   State	   Department’s	   determination	   is	   the	   common	   law.	   	   If	  foreign	  sovereigns	  have	  no	  right	  to	  immunity,	  it	  would	  seem	  odd	  to	  grant	  their	  officials	  any	  kind	  of	  derivative	  immunity	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  right.	  If	  the	  process	  that	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  FSIA	  was	  to	  resume	  control,	  the	  State	  Department	  would	  presumably	  make	  a	  determination	  as	   to	   the	   immunity	  of	  an	  official,	   according	   to	   the	  principles	   of	   restrictive	   immunity	   that	   it	   announced	   in	   the	   Tate	  Letter.204	   	   If	   the	   State	  Department	   denies	   immunity,	   then	   courts	  will	  hear	   the	  case,	  and	   if	   it	  grants	   immunity	   then	  the	  court	  must	  dismiss	  it.205	  	  If,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  opinion	  as	  to	  immunity	  from	  the	   State	   Department,	   courts	  may	  make	   their	   own	   independent	  determination,	   but	   they	   must	   do	   so	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  	   200 Brief	   for	   the	  United	  States	  as	  Amicus	  Curiae	  Supporting	  Affirmance	  at	  27–28,	  Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278	  (2010)	  (No.	  08-­‐1555).	  201 Republic	  of	  Iraq	  v.	  Beaty,	  129	  S.	  Ct.	  2183,	  2194	  (2009).	  202 Republic	  of	  Austria	  v.	  Altmann,	  541	  U.S.	  677,	  701–02	  (2004).	  203 Id.	  at	  688.	  204 Republic	   of	  Mexico	   v.	   Hoffman,	   324	   U.S.	   30,	   34	   (1945);	  Ex	   parte	   Republic	   of	  Peru,	  318	  U.S.	  578,	  589–90	  (1943).	  205 Ex	  Parte	  Peru,	  318	  U.S.	  at	  590.	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  principles	   of	   restrictive	   immunity	   accepted	   by	   the	   State	  Department	  and	  the	  prior	  experience	  in	  similar	  matters.206	  Professors	  Stephens	  and	  Keitner	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Ex	  Parte	  
Peru	  deference	  is	  not	  appropriate	  in	  the	  case	  of	  individual	  officials	  because	   prior	   cases	   only	   extend	   that	   absolute	   deference	   to	  questions	   related	   to	   ownership	   of	   ships	   or	   diplomatic	   officials,	  questions	  which	   are	   “constitutionally	   delegated	   to	   the	   executive	  branch.”207	  	  Indeed,	  deferral	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  may	  present	  a	   number	   of	   practical	   problems.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   provides	  flexibility	   for	   the	   executive	   branch	   to	   manage	   foreign	   affairs	  without	   (embarrassing)	   interference	   from	   the	   judiciary.	   	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	  potentially	  raises	   fairness	  concerns	   for	   individuals	  who	   are	   parties	   to	   suits	   involving	   foreign	   officials	   because	   the	  State	   Department	   may	   not	   have	   a	   transparent	   and	   regularized	  hearing	   process	   to	   adjudicate	   issues	   of	   foreign	   official	  immunity.208	   	   Would	   the	   Department’s	   determination	   be	  reviewable	  by	  a	  court	  and,	  if	  so,	  according	  to	  what	  standard?	  	  Or,	  would	   the	   Department’s	   determination	   simply	   be	   binding	   on	   a	  court	  and,	   if	   so,	  under	  what	  authority?	   	  A	   similar	  debate	  ensued	  under	   the	   Westfall	   Act	   concerning	   the	   reviewability	   of	   a	  certification	  of	  substitution	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  defendant	  in	  place	  of	  a	  U.S.	  government	  official.209	  	   206 In	  Mexico	  v.	  Hoffman,	  324	  U.S.	  30,	   the	  plaintiff	   sued	   for	  damage	   to	  his	   fishing	  vessel	   caused	  by	  a	   ship	  owned	  by	   the	  Mexican	  government.	   	  The	  State	  Department	  filed	   a	   suggestion	  of	   immunity	  with	   the	  district	   court	   stating	   that	   it	   recognized	   the	  
ownership	  of	  the	  ship	  by	  the	  Mexican	  government,	  but	  the	  court	  did	  not	  dismiss	  the	  suit	  on	  this	  basis.	   	  Id.	  at	  31-­‐32.	   	  The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  determined	  that	  the	   ship,	   while	   owned	   by	   the	  Mexican	   government,	   was	   not	   immune	   from	   seizure	  because	  it	  was	  not	  in	  the	  use	  and	  service	  of	  that	  government.	  	  Id.	  at	  33.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  affirmed.	  Id.	  at	  34-­‐36.	  	  Citing	  the	  practice	  from	  Ex	  Parte	  Peru,	  with	  its	  roots	  in	  
Schooner	   Exchange,	   under	   which	   courts	   must	   give	   deference	   to	   the	   views	   of	   the	  executive	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  ship	  is	  immune.	  	  Id.	  at	  37-­‐38.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  guidance	  from	   the	   State	   Department	   as	   to	   immunity,	   the	   court	   should	   make	   its	   own	  determination	   according	   to	   the	   prior	   practices	   of	   the	   executive.	   	   Following	   this	  rationale,	   the	  court	  determined	  by	  examining	  case	   law	  and	  prior	  executive	  practice	  that	   the	   executive	   had	   never	   allowed	   immunity	   based	   solely	   on	   ownership	   of	   the	  vessel.	  207 Stephens,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  2713	  (agreeing	  with	  and	  citing	  Keitner).	  208 See	   Jerrold	   L.	   Mallory,	   Note,	   Resolving	   the	   Confusion	   Over	   Head	   of	   State	  
Immunity:	   The	   Defined	   Rights	   of	   Kings,	   86	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   169,	   184–85	   (1986)	  (discussing	   the	   inadequacies	   of	   State	   Department	   for	   making	   head	   of	   state	  determinations).	  209 See	   Juan	   R.	   Balboa,	   Legislative	   Reform:	   The	   Westfall	   Act	   and	   Scope	   of	  
Employment:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  21	  J.	  LEGIS.	  125,	  126	  (1995);	  Gutierrez	  de	  Martinez	  v.	  Lamagno,	  515	  U.S.	  417,	  419–20	  (1995).	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  Second,	   permitting	   a	   foreign	   affairs	   agency	   to	   make	   the	  conclusive	   determination	   may	   damage	   the	   policy	   that	   Congress	  meant	  to	  promote	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  FSIA.210	  	  Specifically,	  a	   “principal	   purpose”	   of	   the	   FSIA	   was	   to	   reduce	   foreign	   policy	  implications	   of	   immunity	   determinations	   by	   placing	   those	  determinations	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   to	   thereby	  reduce	  pressures	  on	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  grant	  immunity	  for	  foreign	   officials.211	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   FSIA	   was	   also	   meant	   to	  bring	   U.S.	   practice	   into	   accord	  with	   other	   nations	   that	   used	   the	  judiciary,	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  foreign	  affairs	  ministry	  or	  agency,	  to	  make	   immunity	   determinations.212	   	   If	   the	   State	   Department	   is	  permitted	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   immunity	   determinations	   for	  foreign	  officials,	   then	   it	   could	   re-­‐politicize	   the	   immunity	  process	  and	  interfere	  with	  the	  FSIA’s	  purpose—even	  if	  only	  the	  official	  is	  sued	   the	   suit	  will	   be	   associated	  with	   the	   official’s	   home	   state	   in	  the	  media	  and	  political	  channels.	  In	   addition,	   it	   is	   not	   entirely	   clear	   why	   courts	   should	  automatically	  defer	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  in	  lieu	  of	  conducting	  a	   more	   principled	   analysis	   of	   whether	   the	   dispute	   is	  nonjusticiable	   because	   it	   involves	   a	   political	   question	   more	  appropriately	  handled	  by	  the	  executive.213	  	  An	  analysis	  under	  the	  political	   question	   doctrine	   would	   permit	   the	   court	   to	   consider	  “the	   appropriateness	   under	   our	   system	   of	   government	   of	  attributing	   finality	   to	   the	  action	  of	   the	  political	  departments	  and	  also	   the	   lack	   of	   satisfactory	   criteria	   for	   a	   judicial	  	   210 See	  Republic	  of	  Philippines	  v.	  Marcos,	  665	  F.	   Supp.	  793,	  797	   (N.D.	  Cal.	   1987)	  (“The	   power	   of	   the	   executive	   to	   determine	   when	   courts	   may	   exercise	   jurisdiction	  over	   foreign	   sovereigns	   has	   been	   abolished,	   and	   those	   cases	   inconsistent	   with	   the	  FSIA	  are	  obviously	  no	  longer	  persuasive.”).	  211 H.R.	  Rep.	  No.	  94-­‐1487	  at	  8–11	  (1976).	  212 Id.	  213 See	   Freund	   v.	   Republic	   of	   France,	   592	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   540,	   565	   (S.D.N.Y.	   2008)	  (citing	  Baker	  v.	  Carr,	  369	  U.S.	  186,	  217	  (1962))	  (Baker	  enunciates	  a	  six	  factor	  test	  to	  guide	   the	   analysis:	   “[1]	   a	   textually	   demonstrable	   constitutional	   commitment	   of	   the	  issue	  to	  a	  coordinate	  political	  department;	  or	  [2]	  a	  lack	  of	  judicially	  discoverable	  and	  manageable	  standards	  for	  resolving	  it;	  or	  [3]	  the	  impossibility	  of	  deciding	  without	  an	  initial	   policy	   determination	   of	   a	   kind	   clearly	   for	   nonjudicial	   discretion;	   or	   [4]	   the	  impossibility	   of	   a	   court's	   undertaking	   independent	   resolution	   without	   expressing	  lack	  of	   the	  respect	  due	  coordinate	  branches	  of	  government;	  or	   [5]	  an	  unusual	  need	  for	   unquestioning	   adherence	   to	   a	   political	   decision	   already	   made;	   or	   [6]	   the	  potentiality	   of	   embarrassment	   from	   multifarious	   pronouncements	   by	   various	  departments	  on	  one	  question.”	  	  This	  test	  allows	  a	  court	  to	  assess	  all	  of	  the	  concerns—particularly	   the	   concern	   for	   the	   “potentiality	   of	   embarrassment	   from	   multifarious	  pronouncements	  by	  various	  departments”	  in	  the	  area	  of	  foreign	  affairs—that	  deferral	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  was	  and	  will	  potentially	  be	  meant	  to	  address.).	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   The	   district	   court	   in	   Matar	   conducted	  precisely	   this	   analysis	   concluding	   that	   adjudicating	   a	   case	   in	  which	   the	   allegations	   related	   to	   military	   action	   coordinated	   on	  behalf	  of	  Israel,	  a	  U.S.	  ally,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  threat	  of	  terrorism	  in	  a	  uniquely	  volatile	  region	  would	  (1)	  express	  a	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  a	  coordinate	   branch	   of	   government,	   that	   is	   the	   executive;	   and	   (2)	  potentially	   embarrass	   the	   executive	   branch	   by	   resulting	   in	  multifarious	   pronouncements	   by	   different	   branches	   of	  government.215	  In	  any	  event,	  courts	  will	  still	  have	  to	  handle	  the	  cases	  wherein	  the	  State	  Department	  remains	  silent.	   	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Muhamed	   Samantar,	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   issued	   no	  suggestion	  of	  immunity	  after	  several	  years,	  and	  the	  district	  court	  had	  to	  make	  its	  own	  decision.	  
2.	  	  Head	  of	  State	  Immunity	  Head	   of	   state	   immunity	   may	   be	   available.	   	   Head-­‐of-­‐state	  immunity	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   federal	   common	   law	   and	   international	  law.	   	  Heads	  of	   state,	  heads	  of	   government,	   and,	  perhaps,	   foreign	  ministers	   are	   eligible	   for	   this	   type	   of	   immunity.216	   	   The	   general	  consensus,	  now	  cemented	  by	  Samantar,	   is	   that	   the	  FSIA	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  supplant	  the	  common	  law	  head	  of	  state	  immunity,217	  but	   law	  as	   to	  when—former	  heads	  of	   state	  versus	   current—and	  for	  what	  acts—public	  versus	  private—a	  head-­‐of-­‐state	   is	   immune	  is	  not	   entirely	   clear.	   	   State	  Department	   suggestions	  of	   immunity	  are	   deemed	   conclusive	   in	   the	   area	   of	   head	   of	   state	   immunity.	  	  Once	   the	   State	   Department	   has	   spoken	   on	   a	   head	   of	   state’s	  immunity	   the	   courts	   may	   not	   even	   inquire	   into	   whether	   the	  Department	   followed	   its	   own	   internal	   procedures	   in	   rendering	  the	   decision.218	   	   For	   example,	   in	  Ye	   v.	   Zemin	   the	   Seventh	   Circuit	  concluded	   the	   FSIA	   did	   not	   apply	   and	   the	   State	   Department’s	  decision	   granting	   immunity	   was	   binding	   as	   to	   the	   former	  president	   of	   China	   for	   actions	   that	   allegedly	   violated	   jus	   cogens	  norms	  of	  customary	  international	  law.219	  	   214 Baker,	  369	  U.S.	  at	  210.	  215 Matar,	  563	  F.3d	  at	  10;	  Matar,	  500	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  at	  293–94.	  216 Marcos,	  665	  F.	  Supp.	  at	  797;	  see	  also	  Abiola	  v.	  Abubakar,	  267	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  907,	  916–17	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  2003)	  (listing	  cases).	  217 Matar	  v.	  Dichter,	  500	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  284,	  288	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2007).	  218 Doe	  v.	  Roman	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Galveston-­‐Houston,	  408	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  272,	  278	  (S.D.	  Tex.	  2005).	  219 383	  F.3d	  620,	  624	  (2004).	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  Taken	  together,	  the	  cases	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  a	  head	  of	  state	  is	  immune	  both	  for	  private	  and	  public	  acts	  while	  he	  is	  in	  office.220	  	  Once	   the	   head	   of	   state	   leaves	   office,	   however,	   he	   may	   enjoy	  immunity	  only	  for	  public	  acts	  taken	  in	  his	  official	  capacity,	  which	  may	   exclude	   acts	   taken	   in	   contravention	   of	   state	   laws.221	   	   The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  explained,	  “[w]here	  the	  officer’s	  powers	  are	  limited	  by	   statute,	   his	   actions	   beyond	   those	   limitations	   are	   considered	  individual	   and	  not	   sovereign	   actions.”222	   	   Furthermore,	   the	  head	  of	  state	  of	  an	  unrecognized	  state	  will	  not	  be	  entitled	  to	  immunity	  absent	  intervention	  by	  the	  State	  Department.223	  Head	  of	  state	  immunity	  might	  be	  applicable	  in	  some	  cases	  like	  Muhamed	  Samantar’s.	   	  Whether	   that	   type	  of	  official	  gets	  head	  of	  state	   immunity	  would,	   at	  present,	   probably	  depend	  on	   the	   State	  Department	   and	   its	   political	   determination.	   	   The	   State	  Department	   would	   have	   to	   certify	   that	   Samantar	   is	   entitled	   to	  head	  of	  state	  immunity.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  positions	  that	  Samantar	  has	  held,	   such	   as	   such	   as	   minister	   of	   defense,	   seem	   less	   likely	   to	  receive	   protection.224	   	   An	   additional	   obstacle	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  Samantar	   is	   a	   former	   official	   of	   a	   non-­‐existent	   government,	   and	  head	  of	  state	   immunity	   is	   typically	  a	  status-­‐based	   immunity	   that	  may	  disappear	  once	  the	  official	  has	  left	  office.225	  
	   220 Howland	  v.	  Resteiner,	  2007	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  89593,	  at	  *6	  (E.D.N.Y.	  Dec.	  5,	  2007)	  (concluding	   that	   sitting	   head	   of	   state	   and	   his	  wife	  were	   immune	   for	   “acts	   taken	   in	  their	  private	  capacities”	  and	  dismissing	  case	  accordingly);	  Lafontant	  v.	  Aristide,	  844	  F.	   Supp.	   128,	   135	   (E.D.N.Y.	   1994);	   see	   also	  FOX,	   LAW	   OF	   STATE	   IMMUNITY,	   supra	  note	  131,	  at	  692	  (“[U]nder	  US	  law,	  recognized	  serving	  heads	  of	  State	  are	  probably	  immune	  from	  civil	  proceedings	  in	  respect	  of	  all	  acts	  whether	  of	  a	  public	  or	  private	  nature.”).	  221 In	  re	  Estate	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos,	  25	  F.3d	  1467,	  1470	  (9th	  Cir.	  1994);	  FOX,	  LAW	  OF	   STATE	   IMMUNITY,	   supra	   note	   131	   at	   692	   (“Immunity	  may	   be	   extended	   to	   former	  heads	  of	  State	  on	  the	  suggestion	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  but	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  held	  to	  enjoy	  no	  immunity	  in	  respect	  of	  acts	  of	  a	  private	  nature	  performed	  while	  in	  office;	  the	  tendency	  of	  US	  courts	  is	  to	  construe	  acts	  of	  theft,	  fraud,	  and	  corrupt	  practices	  as	  performed	  in	  a	  private	  capacity.”).	  	  Cf.	  Lafontant,	  844	  F.	  Supp.	  at	  128.	  222 In	   re	   Estate	   of	   Ferdinand	   Marcos,	   25	   F.3d	   at	   1470	   (quoting	   Chuidian	   v.	  Philippine	  Nat’l	  Bank,	  912	  F.2d	  1095	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990)).	  223 Lafontant,	  844	  F.	  Supp.	  at	  850.	  224 Abiola	  v.	  Abubakar,	  267	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  907,	  916–17	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  2003).	  225 For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  head	  of	  state	  immunity	  under	  U.S.	  and	  international	   law,	   see	   Christopher	   D.	   Totten,	   Head-­‐of-­‐State	   and	   Foreign	   Official	  
Immunity	   in	   the	   United	   States	   After	   Samantar:	   A	   Suggested	   Approach,	   34	   FORDHAM	  INT’L	  L.J.	  332,	  336–51	  (2011).	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3.	  	  Diplomatic	  and	  Consular	  Immunity	  Third,	  treaty	  and	  statutory	  law	  accord	  diplomatic	  and	  consular	  immunity	   to	   members	   of	   staff	   and	   the	   families	   of	   foreign	  diplomatic	  missions	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  “the	  exercise	  by	  the	  receiving	   state	   of	   jurisdiction	   to	   prescribe	   in	   respect	   of	   acts	   or	  omissions	   in	  the	  exercise	  of	   the	  agent’s	  official	   functions,	  as	  well	  as	   from	   other	   regulation	   that	   would	   be	   incompatible	  with	   their	  status.”226	   	  The	  State	  Department	   certifies	  which	  officials	  qualify	  as	   diplomatic	   agents	   for	   purposes	   of	   this	   immunity.227	   	   The	  sources	   of	   this	   immunity	   are	   the	   Vienna	   Treaty	   on	   Diplomatic	  Relations	   and	   the	   Diplomatic	   Relations	   Act.228	   	   The	   Vienna	  Convention	  on	  Consular	  Relations	  governs	  consular	  activities,	  and	  provides	  limited	  immunity	  for	  consular	  officials	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  certain	   consular	   functions.229	   	   Pursuant	   to	   those	   sources,	  diplomats	   and	   foreign	  ministers	   are	   also	   immune	   from	   criminal	  prosecution	   while	   in	   office.	   	   But	   diplomatic	   immunity	   is	   status-­‐based.230	  	  Once	  the	  officer	  leaves	  office,	  he	  may	  be	  sued	  civilly	  and	  prosecuted	   criminally	   for	   acts	   taken	   in	   his	   private	   capacity;	   he	  may,	  however,	  retain	  some	  immunity	  for	  official	  acts.231	  
4.	  	  Act	  of	  State	  Doctrine	  Fourth,	  the	  common	  law	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  has	  been	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  shield	  officials	  from	  suit	  for	  public	  acts.	  	  The	  doctrine’s	  original	   purpose	   was	   to	   “afford	   personal	   immunity	   to	   foreign	  officials	   who	   acted	   consistently	   with	   the	   laws	   of	   their	  jurisdiction.”232	   	   The	   doctrine	   has	   since	   expanded	   to	   protect	  	   226 RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  FOREIGN	  RELATIONS	  LAW	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  §	  464(1)	  (1987).	  	  See	  also	  Swarna	  v.	  Badar	  Al	  Awadi,	  622	  F.3d	  123,	  133	  (2d	  Cir.	  2010)	  (“Under	  22	  U.S.C.	   §	   254d,	   a	   district	   court	  must	   dismiss	   ‘[a]ny	   action	   or	   proceeding	   brought	  against	   an	   individual	   who	   is	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   with	   respect	   to	   such	   action	   or	  proceeding	  under	  the	  [Vienna	  Convention].’	  	  This	  statutory	  dictate	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	   Vienna	   Convention	   itself,	   which	   provides	   that	   a	   ‘diplomatic	   agent	   shall	   enjoy	  immunity	  from	  the	  criminal,	  .	  .	  .	  civil	  and	  administrative	  jurisdiction’	  of	  the	  receiving	  state.”).	  227 Philippines	  v.	  Marcos,	  665	  F.	  Supp.	  793,	  797	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  1987).	  228 22	  U.S.C.	  §	  254(a),	  et	  seq.	  (2010).	  229 See	  Risk	  v.	  Halvorsen,	  936	  F.2d	  393,	  396–98	  (1991)	  (citing	  relevant	  provisions	  and	  dismissing	  the	  case	  in	  part	  on	  those	  grounds).	  230 See	  Swarna,	  622	  F.3d	  at	  133–34.	  231 Id.	  at	  134.	  232 Michael	   J.	  Bazyler,	  Abolishing	   the	  Act	  of	   State	  Doctrine,	   134	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  325,	  387	  (1986).	  	  Bazyler	  makes	  several	  arguments	  why	  the	  doctrine	  should	  be	  abolished	  by	  courts,	   including	   that	  more	  universal	  devices,	   such	  as	   forum	  non	  conveniens	   and	  the	   political	   question	   doctrine,	  may	   provide	   better	   standards	   that	   do	   not	   permit	   a	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  foreign	  states	  generally	  and,	   in	   its	  most	   recent	   formulation,	  now	  permits	  a	  court	  to	  dismiss	  a	  case	  in	  which	  “the	  relief	  sought	  or	  the	  defense	  interposed”	  would	  “require[]	  a	  court	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  declare	  invalid	  the	  official	  act	  of	  a	  foreign	  sovereign	  performed	  within	   its	   territory.”233	   	  A	  party	  may	  only	   invoke	   the	  act	  of	   state	  doctrine	  if	  the	  court	  “must	  decide”	  the	  effect	  of	  official	  action	  by	  a	  foreign	   sovereign.234	   	   The	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   is	   not	   a	   form	   of	  immunity	   from	   suit;	   rather,	   it	   is	   a	   principle	   of	   decision	   and	  defense	  on	  the	  merits.235	  	  Where	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  doctrine,	  that	  is	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  preeminence	  of	  the	  political	  branches	  in	  the	   area	   of	   foreign	   relations,	   are	   not	   implicated,	   it	   is	   within	   a	  district	   court’s	   discretion	   to	   refuse	   to	   apply	   the	   doctrine	  altogether.236	  For	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  to	  apply,	  the	  act	  at	  issue	  should	  be	  legally	   attributable	   to	   an	   existing	   sovereign.	   	   Where	   the	   act	   in	  question	   is	   not	   authorized	  by	   the	   state,	   the	   act	   of	   state	  doctrine	  will	   not	   apply.	   	   However,	   certain	   alleged	   violations	   of	  international	   law	   may	   not	   suffice	   to	   bar	   the	   application	   of	   the	  doctrine,	   unless	   perhaps	   the	   party	   pleads	   a	   violation	   of	   a	  fundamental	  norm	  of	  international	  law	  or	  a	  treaty.237	  	  The	  act	  may	  also	   be	   subject	   to	   some	   additional	   conditions	   such	   as	   (1)	   no	  statute,	   treaty	   or	   agreement	   bars	   the	   act;	   (2)	   the	   act	   is	   a	   public	  act;	   (3)	   the	   act	   is	   of	   a	   recognized	   sovereign;	   (4)	   the	   act	   is	   fully	  executed	   in	   the	   sovereign’s	   territory;	   (5)	   the	   act	   is	   raised	   in	   an	  affirmative	   claim;	  or	   (6)	   the	  executive	  branch	  has	  not	  otherwise	  made	  a	  statement	  for	  or	  against	  the	  application	  of	  the	  doctrine	  to	  the	  act.238	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   third	   condition	   listed	   above,	   if	   the	  government	   that	   authorized	   the	   act	   in	   question	   has	   ceased	   to	  exist,	   then	   a	   court	   might	   refrain	   from	   applying	   the	   doctrine	   to	  dismiss	   the	   case.	   	   In	   early	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   cases,	   courts	  	  court	   to	  dismiss	  cases	  touching	  on	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  a	   foreign	  sovereign.	   	  Id.	  at	  381–92.	  233 Kirkpatrick	  v.	  Envtl.	  Tectonics	  Corp.,	  493	  U.S.	  400,	  405	  (1990).	  234 Id.	  235 Id.	  	  See	  also	  Samantar	  v.	  Yousuf,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2278,	  2291	  (2009).	  236 Kirkpatrick,	  493	  U.S.	  at	  409;	  Sirico	  v.	  British	  Airways,	  PLC,	  2002	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  1551,	  at	  *5–7	  (E.D.N.Y.	  2002).	  237 Mathias	   Reimann,	   A	   Human	   Rights	   Exception	   to	   Sovereign	   Immunity:	   Some	  
Thoughts	   on	   Princz	   v.	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany,	   16	  MICH.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   403,	   428–30	  (1995).	  238 KOH,	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LITIGATION,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  95.	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  OF	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  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  focused	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  government	  under	  which	  the	  act	  was	  committed	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  accused	  official	  could	  derive	  immunity.	   	   For	   example,	   in	  Underhill	   v.	   Hernandez	   a	   U.S.	   citizen	  sued	  a	  Venezuelan	  general	   for	   refusing	   to	  permit	  him	   to	   leave	  a	  city	   under	   the	   general’s	   control	   during	   a	   revolution.239	   	   At	   that	  time,	  the	  general	  and	  his	  colleagues	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  control	  of	  the	  entire	   nation,	   but	   they	   did	   eventually	   seize	   power.240	   	   The	  Supreme	   Court	   dismissed	   the	   case.241	   	   It	   concluded	   that,	   in	  refusing	  to	  grant	  the	  plaintiff	  leave	  to	  flee	  the	  city,	  the	  defendant,	  General	  Hernandez	  was	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  of	  Venezuela.242	  	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  and	  his	  allies	  later	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  country	  was	  sufficient	  to	  render	  it	  an	  act	  of	  state.243	  The	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   would	   likely	   be	   unhelpful	   to	  individuals	   like	   Muhamed	   Samantar.	   	   Despite	   the	   extraordinary	  laws	  lifting	  individual	  freedoms	  in	  Somalia	  at	  the	  time,	  there	  was	  no	   law	   that	   expressly	   authorized,	   for	   example,	   extreme	   torture,	  and	   rape,	   which	   are	   crimes	   that	   may	   not	   be	   considered	   acts	   of	  state	  under	  U.S.	   case	   law.244	   	  More	   importantly,	   the	  government,	  that	  is	  the	  Barre	  regime,	  no	  longer	  existed	  by	  any	  standards,	  and	  therefore,	   the	   application	   of	   the	   doctrine	   would	   not	   protect	  against	  the	  embarrassment	  of	  an	  existing	  government	  with	  which	  the	  United	  States	  had	  foreign	  relations.245	  These	   technical	   issues	   aside,	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   is	   also	  generally	   problematic.	   	   The	   doctrine	   can	   be	   applied	   extremely	  broadly—and	   inconsistently—to	   cover	  nearly	   any	   act	   connected	  with	   the	  state.246	   	   Indeed,	   this	  seems	  similar	   to	  what	   the	  circuits	  	   239 Underhill	  v.	  Hernandez	  168	  U.S.	  250,	  253–54	  (1897).	  240 Id.	  at	  254.	  241 Id.	  242 Id.	   (“The	   acts	   complained	   of	   were	   the	   acts	   of	   a	   military	   commander	  representing	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   revolutionary	   party	   as	   a	   government,	   which	  afterwards	  succeeded	  and	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  We	  think	  the	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  was	  justified	  in	  concluding	  that	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  defendant	  were	  the	  acts	   of	   the	   government	   of	   Venezuela,	   and	   as	   such	   are	   not	   properly	   the	   subject	   of	  adjudication	   in	   the	   courts	   of	   another	   government.”	   (internal	   quotation	   marks	  omitted)).	  243 Id.	  244 Jimenez	  v.	  Aristeguieta,	  311	  F.2d	  547,	  557–58	  (5th	  Cir.	  1962)	  (concluding	  that	  “common	  crimes”	  such	  as	  fraud,	  embezzlement,	  and	  rape	  are	  not	  considered	  acts	  of	  state).	  245 Kirkpatrick	  v.	  Envtl.	  Tectonics	  Corp.,	  493	  U.S.	  400,	  409	  (1990).	  246 Bazyler,	  supra	  note	  232,	  at	  344	  (“One	  of	  the	  most	  alarming	  aspects	  of	  the	  [act	  of	   state]	   doctrine	   is	   the	   potential	   breadth	   of	   its	   application	   to	   American	  jurisprudence.	  	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  lower	  federal	  courts	  illustrate	  that	  the	  act	  of	  state	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  did	  when	  they	  defined	  official	  capacity	  suits	  as	  essentially	  any	  act	  that	   an	   official	   takes	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   job.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  doctrine	  may	  not	  act	  to	  curb	  official	  abuse.	  As	   with	   deference	   to	   the	   State	   Department	   described	   above,	  perhaps	   the	   best	   fate	   for	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   is	   for	   it	   to	   be	  swallowed	   by	   the	   political	   question	   doctrine.	   	   Justice	   Brennan	  touched	  on	  this	  approach	  in	  his	  dissent	  in	  First	  Nat’l	  City	  Bank	  v.	  
Banco	   Nacional	   de	   Cuba,	   part	   of	   a	   line	   of	   cases247	   regarding	   the	  expropriation	  of	   the	  property	  of	  U.S.	   entities	  by	   the	  government	  under	   Fidel	   Castro	   in	   Cuba.248	   	   The	   issue	   in	   First	   National	   City	  
Bank	   was	   essentially	   whether	   a	   court	   should	   refrain	   from	  applying	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  if	  the	  executive	  so	  instructed	  it,	  which	  is	  famously	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Bernstein	  Exception.”249	   	  In	  other	  words,	  would	  a	  court	  examine	  the	  act	  of	  another	  sovereign	  government	   if	   the	   executive	   branch	   advised	   that	   it	   is	   in	   the	  interests	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   	   For	   Justice	   Brennan,	   the	   act	   of	   state	  doctrine	  was	  an	  international	  political	  question	  doctrine	  and—by	  extension—courts,	   not	   the	   executive,	   should	   determine	   its	  contours	   in	   deciding	   whether	   to	   dismiss	   a	   case	   on	   those	  grounds.250	   	   This	   approach	   might	   be	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	  established	   principle	   that	   courts	   have	   jurisdiction	   to	   determine	  their	  own	  jurisdiction.251	  
5.	  	  “Necessary	  Party”	  Defense	  Rule	   19	   of	   the	   Federal	   Rules	   of	   Civil	   Procedure	   (Rule	   19),	  concerning	   joinder	   of	   necessary	   parties	   to	   a	   litigation,	  may	   also	  provide	  some	  derivative	  immunity	  for	  foreign	  officials	  prosecuted	  	  doctrine	  might	   be	   invoked	  whenever	   a	   claim	   arises	   that	   involves	   events	   outside	   of	  the	  United	  States.”).	  247 The	  other	  case	  is	  Banco	  National	  de	  Cuba	  v.	  Sabbatino,	  376	  U.S.	  398,	  399–400	  (1964).	   	   In	   Sabbatino,	   the	   court	   refused	   to	   examine	   the	   legality	   of	   Cuba’s	  expropriation	   of	   property	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   stating	   courts	  should	   defer	   to	   the	   executive	   when	   passing	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   act	   of	   a	   foreign	  sovereign.	  	  The	  court	  thus	  connected	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  to	  separation	  of	  powers	  concerns.	  	  Id.	  	  See	  also	  KOH,	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LITIGATION,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  92.	  248 406	  U.S.	  759,	  787–88	  (1972)	  (Brennan,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  249 The	  Bernstein	  Exception	  to	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  refers	  to	  litigation	  brought	  by	  Arnold	  Bernstein	  in	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  for	  compensation	  for	  the	  forced	  transfer	  of	  his	   property	   to	   the	   Nazis	   during	   World	   War	   II.	   	   The	   Second	   Circuit	   originally	  dismissed	   the	   case.	   	  However,	  when	   a	   State	  Department	   official	  wrote	   to	   the	   court	  and	  asked	  it	  to	  take	  up	  the	  case	  again,	  the	  court	  did	  so	  due	  to	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  KOH,	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LITIGATION,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  89–90.	  250 First	  Nat’l	  City	  Bank,	  406	  U.S.	  759,	  790–91	  (Brennan,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  251 United	  States	  v.	  United	  Mine	  Workers,	  330	  U.S.	  258,	  292	  n.57	  (1947).	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  19	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   in	  pertinent	  part	   that:	   “If	  a	  person	  who	   is	  required	  to	  be	   joined	  if	   feasible	  cannot	  be	   joined,	  the	  court	  must	  determine	   whether,	   in	   equity	   and	   good	   conscience,	   the	   action	  should	   proceed	   among	   the	   existing	   parties	   or	   should	   be	  dismissed.”252	   	   The	   inquiry	   therefore,	   has	   two	   basic	   parts,	   (1)	  whether	   the	   unavailable	   party	   is	   necessary	   and	   (2)	   whether,	   in	  consideration	  of	  that	  and	  other	  equitable	  factors,	  the	  court	  should	  dismiss	  the	  case.253	  In	   the	  case	  of	  Pimentel	  v.	  Republic	  of	   the	  Philippines,	   a	   class	  of	  several	   thousand	   plaintiffs	   sought	   to	   obtain	   offshore	   assets	   of	  former	   President	   of	   the	   Philippines	   Ferdinand	   Marcos	   in	  satisfaction	   of	   a	   judgment	   for	   violations	   of	   fundamental	   human	  rights	   norms	   while	   he	   was	   in	   office.254	   	   The	   government	   of	   the	  Philippines	   also	   asserted	   claim	   to	   the	   assets	   pursuant	   to	   a	  domestic	   Philippine	   law	   regarding	   the	   return	   of	   assets	   wrongly	  diverted	   by	   a	   corrupt	   official.255	   	   Accordingly,	   it	   filed	   a	   claim	   to	  those	  assets	  in	  a	  local	  court	  in	  the	  Philippines.256	  The	  financial	  institution	  with	  control	  over	  the	  assets,	  aware	  of	  the	  competing	  claims	  to	  the	  money,	  filed	  an	  interpleader	  action.257	  	  The	  government	  of	  the	  Philippines	  successfully	  asserted	  a	  defense	  of	   sovereign	   immunity	   to	   that	   action	   and	   requested	   the	   entire	  action	   be	   dismissed	   pursuant	   to	   Rule	   19	   because	   the	   sovereign	  entities	   were	   required	   parties	   whose	   interests	   would	   be	  materially	   prejudiced	   if	   the	   court	   permitted	   the	   interpleader	  action	  to	  proceed	  in	  their	  absence.258	  	  Ultimately	  both	  the	  district	  court	  and	  the	  court	  of	  appeals	  refused	  to	  dismiss	  the	  case	  because	  they	  concluded,	  even	  if	  the	  parties	  entitled	  to	  sovereign	  immunity	  were	   necessary,	   any	   claim	   to	   the	   funds	   they	   would	   assert	   was	  unlikely	  to	  succeed	  under	  the	  applicable	  statute	  of	  limitations.259	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   reversed	   this	   holding,	   analogizing	   the	  
Pimentel	  case	  to	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  had	  dismissed	  suits	  against	  officers	  of	  the	  United	  States	  because	  the	  government	  itself	  
	   252 FED.	  R.	  CIV.	  PROC.	  19	  (2010).	  253 See	  id.	  254 Republic	  of	  Philippines	  v.	  Pimentel,	  553	  U.S.	  851,	  855,	  (2008).	  255 Id.	  256 Id.	  257 28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1335	  (2010).	  258 Pimentel,	  553	  U.S.	  at	  860.	  259 Id..	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  was	  a	  necessary	  party.260	  	  Although	  it	  declined	  to	  opine	  on	  a	  more	  blanket	   standard	   for	   Rule	   19	   cases,	   the	   Court	   appeared	   to	   treat	  sovereign	   immunity	   as	   a	   primary	   concern	   in	   the	   19(b)	  determination	  as	   to	  dismissal,	  and	  stated,	   in	  no	  uncertain	   terms,	  that	   this	   type	  of	   case	  could	   “not	  proceed	  when	  a	  required-­‐entity	  sovereign	  is	  not	  amenable	  to	  suit.”261	  	  The	  Court	  went	  on	  to	  state,	  however,	   that	   the	   case	   could	   proceed	   if	   the	   sovereign’s	   claims	  were	  determined	  to	  be	  frivolous.262	   	  Therefore,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Rule	  19	  inquiry	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  sovereign	  was	  required	  and	   if	   the	   case	   could	   continue	   in	   its	   absence,	   the	   court	   must	  determine	  whether	   the	   sovereign’s	   claims	   are	   colorable.263	   	   The	  Court	   cautioned	   that	   this	   analysis	   does	   not	   permit	   a	   court	   to	  decide	   if	   the	   sovereign’s	   claims	   would	   succeed	   on	   their	   merits,	  but	  rather	  to	  look	  them	  over	  to	  decide	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  legal	  basis	   for	   them.264	   	   The	   Court	   ultimately	   determined	   that	   the	  statute	  of	   limitations	  did	  not	  necessarily	  dispose	  of	   the	  claims	  of	  the	  sovereign	  parties.265	  A	   Rule	   19	   inquiry	   under	   the	   formulation	   in	   Pimentel—which	  seems	  to	  make	  the	  sovereign	  immunity	  of	  required	  nonparties	  an	  important	   factor	   in	   the	   decision	   whether	   to	   dismiss	   the	   case—could	  bar	  a	  number	  of	  suits	  where	  an	  official	  is	  sued	  for	  damages	  from	  the	  immune	  state,266	  provided	  that	  no	  exception	  to	  the	  FSIA	  
	   260 Id.	  at	  866–67	  (citing	  Mine	  Safety	  Appliances	  Co.	  v.	  Forrestal,	  326	  U.S.	  371,	  373–75	  (1945);	  Minnesota	  v.	  United	  States,	  305	  U.S.	  382,	  386–88	  (1939)).	  261 Id.	  at	  867.	  262 Id.	  263 Id.	  at	  868–69.	  264 Id.	  265 Id.	  at	  867.	  266 Where	  damages	  would	  come	  from	  the	  state	  treasury,	  the	  sovereign	  would	  be	  a	  required	  party.	  	  See	  Lopez	  v.	  Arraras,	  606	  F.2d	  347	  (1st	  Cir.	  1979)	  (concluding	  that	  if	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development	  was	  a	   required	  party	   the	  damages	  would	   come	   from	   it,	   but	   not	   reaching	   the	   question	   of	   dismissal);	  Hovensa,	   L.L.C.	   v.	  Technip	  Italy	  S.p.A.,	  2009	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  21191,	  at	  *8	  (S.D.N.Y.	  Mar.	  16,	  2009)	  (“[T]he	  Court	   [must]	   …	   determine	   whether	   a	   party	   is	   not	   only	   ’required,’	   but	   also	  indispensable.	   Rule	   19(b)	   sets	   out	   the	   relevant	   considerations	   as	   follows:	   ‘(1)	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   a	   judgment	   rendered	   in	   the	   person's	   absence	  might	   prejudice	   that	  person	   or	   the	   existing	   parties;	   (2)	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   any	   prejudice	   could	   be	  lessened	  or	   avoided	  by:	   (A)	  protective	  provisions	   in	   the	   judgment;	   (B)	   shaping	   the	  relief;	   or	   (C)	   other	   measures;	   (3)	   whether	   a	   judgment	   rendered	   in	   the	   person's	  absence	  would	  be	   adequate;	   and	   (4)	  whether	   the	  plaintiff	  would	  have	   an	   adequate	  remedy	   if	   the	   action	   were	   dismissed	   for	   non-­‐joinder.’”	   (quoting	   FED.	   R.	   CIV.	   PROC.	  19(b))).	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  The	  concern	  in	  Pimentel	  was	  that	  money,	  which	  might	  belong	   to	   an	   immune-­‐sovereign,	   could	   be	   lost	   if	   the	   suit	   were	  allowed	  to	  proceed.	   	  But,	   lf	   the	  official	  were	  sued	  in	  his	  personal	  capacity,	  then	  this	  concern	  might	  be	  abated.268	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  Rule	  19	  inquiry	  is	  always	  the	  state’s	  interests,	  and	  not	  the	  official’s	  actions	  or	  their	  legitimacy.	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  a	  determination	  of	  derivative	   immunity,	   the	  Rule	  19	  inquiry	  views	  the	   state	   itself	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   international	   law	   and	   not	   the	  individual—an	   approach	   which	   conflicts	   with	   the	   modern	  paradigm	  of	   international	   law	  that	  treats	   individuals	  as	   	  subjects	  in	   certain	   circumstances.	   	   Furthermore,	   using	   Rule	   19	   might	  prompt	   a	   court	   to	   dismiss	   the	   case	   too	   early,	   fearing	   a	   host	   of	  unintended	  consequences	  for	  the	  sovereign.	  	  	  One	  commentator	  has	  noted	  that	  courts	  have	  applied	  the	  Rule	  19	  inquiry	  broadly	  and	  inappropriately	  to	  rid	  themselves	  of	  cases	  where	   an	   immune	   sovereign’s	   interests	   might	   be	   affected.269	  	  Professor	   Katherine	   Florey	   argues	   that	   using	   Rule	   19	   like	   an	  abstention	   doctrine	   in	   sovereign	   immunity	   related	   cases	   is	  problematic,	  because	  the	  case	   law	  shows	  disregard	  for	  plaintiff’s	  rights	   when	   courts	   do	   not	   give	   due	   consideration	   to	   the	  availability	   of	   a	   viable	   alternative	   forum	   when	   sovereigns	   are	  involved.270	   	   This	   concern	   is	   certainly	   valid	   in	   cases	   wherein	   a	  plaintiff	  challenges	  the	  egregious	  actions	  of	  an	  official	  of	  his	  own	  government,	   and	   dismissal	   would	   result	   in	   these	   serious	  violations	   of	   international	   law	   going	   unaddressed.	   	   Professor	  Florey	  also	  argues	   that	  courts	  have	  shown	  an	  ability	   to	  use	  Rule	  19’s	  provisions	  as	   imposing	  a	  procedural	   technicality	   that	  offers	  them	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  dismiss	  the	  case.271	   	  Again,	  this	  could	  have	  been	  dangerous	  in	  a	  case	  like	  Samantar’s—although	  it	  might	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  argue	  how	  a	  non-­‐existent	  government’s	  interests	  would	  be	  prejudiced—if	  temptation	  led	  a	  court	  to	  use	  Rule	  19	  as	  a	  	   267 The	   parties	   in	   Pimentel	   had	   agreed	   that	   no	   exception	   to	   the	   FSIA	   applied.	  	  
Pimentel,	  553	  U.S.	  at	  865	  (2008).	  268 Pettiford	  v.	  City	  of	  Greensboro,	  556	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  512,	  522–23	  (M.D.N.C.	  2008).	  269 Florey,	   supra	   note	   182,	   at	   809	   (“In	   recent	   years,	   certain	   circuits	   have	   come	  close	  to	  developing	  a	  near-­‐absolute	  rule	  that,	   if	  an	  absent	  sovereign’s	   interests	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  allowing	  an	  action	  to	  proceed—in	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  sovereign	  meets	  the	   criteria	   for	   a	   ‘necessary’	   party—that	   sovereign	   is	   also	   indispensible	   and	   the	  action	  must	  be	  dismissed.”).	  270 Katherine	  Florey,	  Making	  Sovereigns	  Indispensable,	  Pimentel	  and	  the	  Evolution	  
of	  Rule	  19,	  58	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  667,	  712–16	  (2011).	  271 Id.	  at	  715–16.	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  tool	  avoid	  a	  difficult	   foreign	  policy-­‐related	  question,	  much	   in	  the	  same	   way	   that	   they	   could	   use	   automatic	   deference	   to	   the	  executive.	  
6.	  	  International	  Law	  The	   Samantar	   decision	   did	   not	   expressly	   mention	   a	   role	   for	  international	   law	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   treaty,272	   customary	  international	  law	  (via	  incorporation	  into	  federal	  common	  law),	  or	  other	   generally	   accepted	   principles273	   as	   a	   source	   of	   immunity.	  	  Commentators	  have	   found	   this	  absence	  puzzling	  considering	   the	  citation	  to	  international	  sources	  in	  the	  briefs,	  and	  the	  proposition	  acknowledged	  on	  prior	  occasions	  by	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   that	   the	  FSIA	  was	  meant	  to	  codify	  international	  law.274	  	  The	  absence	  of	  any	  mention	   of	   the	   role	   of	   international	   law	  might	   have	   been	  more	  expected	  had	  the	  court	   framed	  its	  decision	  entirely	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  statutory	  interpretation	  of	  the	  FSIA,	  but	  it	  didn’t.	  	  Instead	  it	  went	  on,	   as	   described	   above,	   to	   note	   several	   different	   avenues	   for	  obtaining	   immunity	   in	   the	   future:	   for	   instance,	   suggestions	   of	  immunity	  by	  the	  executive,	  Rule	  19,	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine,	  and	  personal	   versus	   official	   capacity	   suits.275	   	   Still,	   the	   absence	   of	  international	   law	   does	   not	   foreclose	   courts	   from	   looking	   to	  
	   272 The	  U.N.	  Convention	  on	  State	  Immunity	  provides	  some	  guidance	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  official	  immunity	  under	  international	  law—although	  the	  United	  States	  has	  not	  signed	  or	   ratified	   it	   and	   it	   has	   not	   yet	   entered	   into	   force.	   	   Under	   the	   U.N.	   Convention,	  representatives	  of	  the	  state	  acting	  in	  their	  official	  capacity	  are	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  state	  and	  thus	  are	  entitled	  to	  utilize	  the	  state’s	  immunity.	   	  The	  U.N.	  Convention,	  like	  the	   FSIA,	   also	   contains	   exceptions	   to	   the	   state’s	   presumptive	   immunity.	   	   Although	  they	  are	  similar	   to	   those	  under	  FSIA—consent,	  commercial	  acts	  and	  certain	   torts—the	   contours	   of	   the	   exceptions	   are	   complex	   and	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   a	   U.S.	   court	  would	  recognize	  those	  exceptions.	  Convention	  on	  Jurisdictional	  Immunities	  of	  States	  and	  Their	  Property,	  G.A.	  Res.	   59/38,	  U.N.	  GAOR,	   59th	   Sess.,	   Supp.	  No.	   49,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/59/49,	   at	   articles	   10-­‐17	   (Dec.	   2nd,	   2004).	   	   The	   Convention	  was	   adopted	   by	   the	  General	   Assembly	   in	   2004,	   but	   has	   not	   seen	   extensive	   ratification.	   	   ANTHONY	   AUST,	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  148–57	  (2010)	  (describing	  the	  U.N.	  Convention	  and	  the	  exceptions	  to	  immunity	  under	  it).	  273 United	  States	  v.	  Gi-­‐Hwan	  Jeong,	  624	  F.3d	  706,	  712	  (5th	  Cir.	  2010)	  (“There	  are	  three	   accepted	   sources	   of	   international	   law	   in	   the	   United	   States:	   customary	  international	   law,	   international	   agreement,	   and	   general	   principles	   common	   to	   the	  major	  legal	  systems	  of	  the	  world.”	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted)).	  	  274 Bradley	   and	   Helfer,	   supra	   note	   51	   at	   230-­‐31.	   	   See	   also	   FOX,	   LAW	   OF	   STATE	  IMMUNITY	   supra	   note	   131	   at	   13	   (noting	   that	   while	   many	   states	   do	   accept	   the	  proposition	  that	  immunity	  is	  a	  rule	  of	  international	  law,	  where	  that	  rule	  has	  not	  been	  reduced	  to	  a	  statute	  such	  as	  FSIA,	  they	  tend	  to	  defer	  entirely	  to	  the	  executive).	  275 Supra	  Part	  II.B.	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  treaties	   or	   customary	   international	   law	   in	   order	   to	   determine	  whether	  foreign	  officials	  of	  differing	  ranks	  are	  immune	  from	  suit.	  Assuming	   courts	   examine	   decisions	   both	   from	   international	  tribunals	  and	  domestic	  courts,	   in	   factual	  scenarios	  such	  as	   those	  presented	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Muhamed	   Samantar,	   courts	   will	   find	  guidance	  both	  granting	  and	  denying	   immunity	  where	  allegations	  of	   human	   rights	   abuses	   are	   at	   stake.276	   	   Again,	   the	   distinction	  comes	   back	   to	   conceptions	   and	   definitions	   of	   official	   capacity.	  	  While	   most	   courts	   around	   the	   world	   agree	   that	   officials	   are	  immune	  for	  their	  official	  actions,	  some	  courts	  have	  taken	  pains	  to	  craft	  the	  definition	  of	  official	  acts	  or	  official	  capacity	  as	  excluding	  certain	   egregious	   violations	   of	   fundamental	   or	   universally	  accepted	   norms.277	   	   This	   type	   of	   thinking	   was	   present	   in	   the	  
Pinochet	   opinions	   in	   which	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   of	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  concluded	  that	  former	  Chilean	  Pinochet’s	  alleged	  acts	  of	  torture	   did	   not	   qualify	   as	   official	   acts	   of	   a	   head	   of	   state	   for	  purposes	  of	  immunity	  from	  criminal	  prosecution.278	  	  This	  holding	  was	   later	   rejected	   in	   the	   civil	   context	   by	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   in	  
Jones	   v.	   Saudia	  Arabia,	  which	  was	   an	   action	   by	   several	   plaintiffs	  seeking	   compensation	   for	   alleged	   acts	   of	   torture	   by	   the	   Saudi	  Minister	  of	  the	  Interior	  and	  Saudi	  police	  officers.279	  	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	   rejected	   the	   application	   of	   Pinochet	   to	   the	   civil	   context	  because,	   it	   said	   that	   Pinochet	   held	   that	   the	   U.N.	   Torture	  Convention	   provided	   an	   exception	   to	   immunity	   for	   crimes	   of	  torture,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  similar	  exception	  for	  civil	  suits	  under	  the	  Convention	   or	   international	   law	   generally.	   	   In	   civil	   suits	   of	   that	  
	   276 Jones	  v.	  Saudi	  Arabia,	   [2006]	  UKHL	  26,	   [2007]	  1	  A.C.	  270	  (appeal	   taken	   from	  Eng.)	   (denying	   access	   to	   officials	   to	   remedy	   these	   abuses	   in	   civil	   cases);	   Francesco	  Moneta,	  State	   Immunity	   for	   International	  Crimes:	  The	  Case	  of	  Germany	  versus	  Italy	  before	   the	   ICJ,	  Hague	   Justice	  Portal,	  available	  at	   http://www.haguejusticeportal.net	  /Docs	   /Commentaries%20PDF/Moneta_Germany-­‐Italy_EN.pdf	   (last	   visited	  Mar.	   27,	  2011)	  (describing	  similar	  Italian	  cases).	  277 Bradley	   and	   Helfer,	   supra	   note	   51	   at	   246-­‐49	   (recognizing	   minority	   and	  majority	   positions,	   and	   that	   U.S.	   court	   ATCA	   jurisprudence	   has	   contributed	   to	   the	  erosion	  of	  official	   immunity	   for	  human	  rights	  violations).	   	  Ex	  parte	  Pinochet	  Ugarte	  (No.	  3),	  [2000]	  1	  A.C.	  147	  (appeal	  taken	  from	  Eng.)	  (acts	  of	  torture	  not	  official	  acts	  for	  purposes	  of	  criminal	  jurisdiction).	  278 Amnon	  Reichman,	   “When	  we	   Sit	   to	   Judge	  we	  Are	  Being	   Judge”	  The	   Israeli	   GSS	  
Case,	   Ex	   Parte	   Pinochet	   and	   Domestic/Global	   Deliberation,	   9	   CARDOZO	   J.	   INT’L	   &	  COMPARATIVE	  L.	  41,	  72–73	  (2001)	  (describing	  the	  holding	  in	  the	  case).	  279 [2006]	  UKHL	  26,	  [4]–[10],	  [2007]	  1.	  A.C.	  270	  (appeal	  taken	  from	  Eng.).	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  type	  an	  official	  is	  protected	  under	  Britain’s	  State	  Immunity	  Act.280	  	  The	  debate	  amongst	  national	   courts,	   international	   tribunals,	  and	  regional	   courts	   over	   whether	   certain	   universally	   condemned	  practices	  should	  be	  exempted	  from	  sovereign	  immunity	  defenses	  is	  still	  “controversial.”281	  In	   2009,	   a	   “resolution”	   by	   the	   Institute	   of	   International	   Law	  abolished	  immunity	  for	  former	  officials	  for	  “international	  crimes”	  committed	   under	   the	   color	   of	   law.282	   	   “International	   crimes”	  includes	   crimes	   such	   as	   torture,	   genocide,	   crimes	   against	  humanity,	   and	   war	   crimes	   “as	   reflected	   in	   relevant	   treaties,	  statutes,	   and	   jurisprudence	   of	   international	   tribunals.”283	   	   The	  status-­‐based	   immunities	   of	   heads	   of	   state	   and	   diplomats	   were	  retained.284	   	  As	  one	  commentator	  noted,	  however,	   “international	  crimes”	  is	  a	  misnomer	  because	  these	  offenses	  can	  be	  tried	  under	  the	   criminal,	   civil	   or	   administrative	   jurisdiction	   of	   national	  courts.285	   	   “Gross	   human	   rights	   abuses”	   might,	   therefore,	   have	  been	  a	  more	  appropriate	  term.286	  United	  States	  courts	  have	  carved	  out	  an	  exception	  for	  heinous	  acts	   by	   foreign	   officials	   that	   are	   deemed	   legally	   illegitimate	   or	  outside	   the	   scope	  of	   their	   authority.	   	  One	  prominent	   example	  of	  an	   ultra	   vires	   exception	   to	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   comes	  from	   the	   various	   cases	   filed	   against	   former	   President	   of	   the	  Philippines	   Ferdinand	  Marcos	   and	  his	   family,	   including	  his	  wife,	  Imelda	   Marcos,	   and	   his	   daughter,	   Imee	   Marcos-­‐Manotoc,	   for	  fraud,	   embezzlement	   of	   government	   funds,	   and	   human	   rights	  violations.287	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  violations,	  in	  In	  re	  	   280 Marko	  Milanovic,	  Norm	  Conflict	  in	  International	  Law:	  Whiter	  Human	  Rights,	  21	  DUKE	  J.	  COMP.	  &	  INT’L	  L.	  131	  n.10	  (2009)	  (describing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  cases).	  281 JENNIFER	   K.	   ELSEA,	   CONG.	   RESEARCH	   SERV.	   R	   41379,	   SAMANTAR	   V.	   YOUSEF:	   THE	  FOREIGN	  SOVEREIGN	  IMMUNITIES	  ACT	  AND	  FOREIGN	  OFFICIALS	  (2010)	  (noting	  the	  view	  by	  some	   scholars	   that	   foreign	   officials	   are	   not	   always	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   for	   their	  official	  acts);	  FOX,	  LAW	  OF	  STATE	  IMMUNITY,	  supra	  note	  131,	  at	  462–67.	  282 Annyssa	   Bellal,	   The	   2009	   Resolution	   of	   the	   Institute	   of	   International	   Law	   on	  
Immunity	  and	   International	  Crimes:	  A	  Partial	  Codification	  of	   the	  Law,	  9	   J.	   INT’L	  CRIM.	  JUSTICE,	  227	  (2011);	  Resolution	  on	  the	  Immunity	  from	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  State	  and	  of	  Persons	  Who	  Act	  on	  Behalf	  of	  the	  State	   in	  Case	  of	  International	  Crimes,	  available	  at	  http://www.idi-­‐iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	  27,	  2011).	  283 Id.	  at	  7.	  284 Id.	  at	  11.	  285 Id.	  at	  14.	  286 Id.	  287 In	  re	  Estate	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos,	  25	  F.3d	  1467,	  1469	  (9th	  Cir.	  1994).	  
120	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  
Estate	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos	  (Hilao),	  the	  plaintiffs	  claimed	  that	  they	  or	   their	   family	  members	   were	   tortured,	   summarily	   executed	   or	  disappeared	   during	   Marcos’s	   tenure	   as	   President	   of	   the	  Philippines.288	  	  They	  brought	  claims	  under	  the	  ATCA.289	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   had	   already	   ruled	   in	  
Chuidian	   that	   foreign	   officials	   were	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   under	  FSIA,	   it	   had	   exempted	   acts	   that	   fell	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   official	  duties.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  court	  in	  Marcos	  did	  not	  grant	  Marcos	  immunity	  for	  his	  alleged	  actions.290	   	  Rather,	   the	  panel	  noted	  that	  Marcos’s	   actions	   violated	   the	   Philippines	   own	   laws,	   stating	  “Marcos’	   acts	   of	   torture,	   execution,	   and	   disappearance	   were	  clearly	   acts	   outside	   of	   his	   authority	   as	   President.	   	   Like	   those	   of	  Marcos-­‐Manotoc,	  Marcos’	  acts	  were	  not	   taken	  within	  any	  official	  mandate	   and	   were	   therefore	   not	   the	   acts	   of	   an	   agency	   or	  instrumentality	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  FSIA.”291	  	  In	  reaching	  this	  conclusion,	  the	  court	  relied	  in	  part	  on	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	   cases	   that	   concluded	   common	   crimes	   which	   lack	  statutory	   basis	   could	   not	   be	   considered	   the	   sovereign—or	  public—acts	   of	   a	   foreign	   official.292	   	   The	   court	   also	   noted	   that	  Marcos	   himself	   was	   not	   the	   core	   sovereign	   entity,	   rather:	  “[a]lthough	  sometimes	  criticized	  as	  a	  ruler	  and	  at	  times	  invested	  with	  extraordinary	  powers,	  Ferdinand	  Marcos	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	   had	   the	   authority	   of	   an	   absolute	   autocrat.	   	  He	  was	   not	   the	  state,	  but	  the	  head	  of	  the	  state,	  bound	  by	  the	  laws	  that	  applied	  to	  him.”293	   	  One	  of	   the	  primary	   factors	   that	   separated	  Marcos	   from	  the	   core	   sovereign	   entity,	   therefore,	   was	   the	   illegitimacy	   of	   his	  actions.	   	   On	   these	   grounds,	   the	   Ninth	   Circuit	   refused	   to	   dismiss	  the	   complaint	   on	   immunity	   grounds.294	   	   Marcos	   was	   therefore	  deemed	  to	  be	  acting	  under	  the	  color	  of	  state	  authority	  but	  without	  
	   288 Id.	  289 Id.	  at	  1473.	  290 Id.	  at	  1472.	  291 Id.	  292 Id.	  at	  1471.	  293 Id.	   (citing	   Republic	   of	   Philippines	   v.	   Marcos,	   862	   F.2d	   1355,	   1361	   (9th	   Cir.	  1998)).	  294 Id.	  at	  1471–72.	   	  See	  also	  Republic	  of	  Philippines	  v.	  Marcos,	  665	  F.	   Supp.	  793,	  797	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  1987)	   (discussing	   the	   Jimenez	  case	  cited	  by	   the	  Ninth	  Circuit	   in	   In	  re	  Estate	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos	  and	  its	  implications).	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  an	   official	   mandate	   in	   violation	   of	   international	   law.295	   	   Other	  cases	  have	  conducted	  a	  similar	  analysis	  in	  these	  circumstances.	  296	  
II	  
A	  PROPOSAL	  FOR	  QUALIFIED	  IMMUNITY	  FOR	  FOREIGN	  OFFICIALS	  This	   section	  does	  not	   argue	   that	   courts	   should	   abrogate	  well-­‐settled	   questions	   of	   head-­‐of-­‐state	   immunity	   or	   diplomatic	  immunity,	   for	   which	   the	   international	   standards	   articulated	  above	   are	   evident	   in	   the	   decisions	   of	   federal	   courts	   on	   these	  matters.	   	  Nor	  do	   I	   argue	   that	  where	  a	  genuine	  political	  question	  exists,	   a	   court	   should	  not	  dismiss	   the	   case	   as	  nonjusticiable	   and	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  And,	  of	  course,	  if	  another	   statute	   grants	   immunity	   in	   some	   instance,	   then	   the	  common	  law	  may	  no	  longer	  apply.	  What	   happens	   when	   courts	   have	   to	   decide	   when	   parties’	  alleged	  violations	  of	  international	  law,	  (as	  federal	  common	  law,	  or	  in	   whatever	   form),	   entitle	   a	   foreign	   official	   to	   immunity	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   actions	   that	   relate	   in	   some	  way	   to	   his	   employment?	   	   A	  court	   considering	   this	  question	  may	  determine	   that	   it	  will	   apply	  international	   law	   in	   some	   form,	   whether	   a	   treaty	   or	   customary	  international	   law	   as	   incorporated	   into	   federal	   common	   law,	   to	  resolve	  the	  foreign	  official	  immunity	  question.	  	  A	  court	  might	  rely	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	   in	  First	  Nat’l	  City	  Bank	  v.	  Banco	  
Para	   El	   Comercio	   Exterior	   de	   Cuba	   (BANCEC).297	   	   That	   case	  involved	  a	  suit	  by	  a	  bank	  of	  the	  Cuban	  government	  to	  recover	  on	  a	  letter	   of	   credit	   from	   an	   American	   bank,	   Citibank.298	   	   Citibank	  counterclaimed	   for	   setoff	   against	   the	   assets	   that	   the	   Cuban	  government	   had	   seized	   during	   the	   revolution.299	   	   The	   plaintiff	  	   295 In	  re	  Estate	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos,	  25	  F.3d	  at	  1472	  n.8.	  296 See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  at	  1472;	  In	  re	  Estate	  of	  Marcos	  Human	  Rights	  Litig.,	  978	  F.2d	  493,	  498	  (9th	  Cir.	  1992);	  Chuidian	  v.	  Philippine	  Nat'l	  Bank,	  912	  F2d	  1095,	  1106	  (9th	  Cir.	  1990);	  United	  States	  v.	  Yakima	  Tribal	  Court,	  806	  F.2d	  853,	  859	  (9th	  Cir.	  1986);	  Doe	  v.	  Qi,	   349	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1258,	   1282	   (N.D.	   Cal.	   2004);	   Caribri	   v.	   Assasie	   Gyimay,	   921	   F.	  Supp.	  1189	   (S.D.N.Y.	  1996).	   	  See	  also	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  of	   the	  United	  States	  v.	  Reich,	   74	   F.3d	   1322,	   1328–29	   (D.C.	   Cir.	   1996)	   (non-­‐statutory	   review	   of	  ultra	   vires	  official	   action	   in	   the	   United	   States	   is	   available,	   “[s]ince	   the	   [Secretary	   of	   Labor's]	  powers	   are	   [allegedly]	   limited	   by	   [the	  NLRA],	   his	   actions	   beyond	   those	   limitations	  [viz.,	   enforcing	   the	   Executive	   Order]	   are	   considered	   individual	   and	   not	   sovereign	  actions.	   	  The	  officer	   is	  not	  doing	   the	  business	  which	   the	   sovereign	  has	   empowered	  him	  to	  do	  ….”)	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted).	  297 First	  Nat'l	  City	  Bank	  v.	  Banco	  Para	  El	  Comercio	  Exterior	  De	  Cuba,	  462	  U.S.	  611	  (1983).	  298 Id.	  at	  613.	  299 Id.	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  bank	   was	   dissolved	   during	   the	   litigation	   and	   the	   ultimate	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  letter	  of	  credit	  would	  be	  the	  government,	  which	  claimed	   immunity	   from	   the	   setoff	   claim.300	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	  held	  that	  commonly	  accepted	  principles	  of	   international	   law	  and	  federal	   common	   law	   should	   be	   used	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	  components	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  are	  juridically	  distinct	  for	  purposes	  of	   liability.301	   	   The	   Court	   in	  BANCEC	   applied	   this	   formulation	   of	  international	   law,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   law	   of	   the	   place	   of	  incorporation	   of	   a	   foreign	   sovereign	   owned	   entity,	   because	   it	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  a	   foreign	  nation	  from	  simply	  passing	  a	   law	  to	  shield	  itself	  from	  international	  liability.302	  If	   international	   law	   applies,	  what	   is	   the	   law?	   	   Presented	  with	  this	   question,	   a	   court	   could	   look	   to	   the	   different	   views	   amongst	  courts	   in	   the	  world,	   summarized	  above	   as	   to	  whether	   egregious	  violations	   of	   human	   rights	  may	   be	   characterized	   as	   official	   acts,	  and	   perhaps,	   meld	   the	   minority	   position	   with	   an	   analog	   in	   U.S.	  jurisprudence,	  such	  as	  the	  line	  of	  ultra	  vires	  cases.	  	  The	  ultra	  vires	  cases	  look	  to	  whether	  the	  official	  was	  acting	  in	  an	  official	  capacity	  or	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   his	   authority	   under	   his	   own	   domestic	  laws.303	  	  The	  question	  for	  U.S.	  courts	  is	  whether	  they	  will	  attempt	  to	  define	  what	   is	  an	  official	  act	  under	   international	   law	  and	  how	  they	  will	  do	  so.	   	  Even	   if	  applying	   the	   international	   law	  of	  official	  immunity,	   U.S.	   courts	   retain	   some	   prerogative	   in	  itsimplementation.	  	  As	  commentator	  Hazel	  Fox	  notes	  “[i]mmunity	  .	   .	   .	   is	   a	   doctrine	   of	   international	   law	   which	   is	   applied	   in	  accordance	   with	   municipal	   law	   in	   national	   courts.	   	   Its	  requirements	   are	   governed	   by	   international	   law	   but	   the	  individual	  municipal	  law	  of	  the	  State	  before	  whose	  courts	  a	  claim	  against	  another	  State	   is	  made	  determines	   the	  precise	  extent	  and	  manner	  of	  application	  .	  .	  .	  Consequently	  the	  law	  of	  State	  immunity	  is	   a	  mix	   of	   international	   and	  municipal	   law.”304	   	   The	  melding	   of	  international	   and	   domestic	   approaches	   could	   mean	   asking	  whether	   the	   official	   was	   acting	   ultra	   vires	   because	   he	   was	   in	  violation	   of	   international	   law.	   	   The	   qualified	   immunity	   inquiry	  
	   300 Id.	  at	  615.	  301 Id.	  at	  622–23.	  302 Id.	  at	  633–34.	  303 Doe	   v.	   Qi,	   349	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1258,	   1287	   (N.D.	   Cal.	   2004)	   (“The	   authorities	  presented	  by	  Plaintiffs	   establish	   that	   the	   alleged	   conduct	   for	  which	   the	  Defendants	  are	  responsible	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  Chinese	  law.”).	  304 FOX,	  LAW	  OF	  STATE	  IMMUNITY,	  supra	  note	  131	  at	  1.	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  under	   Section	   1983	   provides	   an	   answer	   to	   this,	   as	   the	   next	  section	  will	  argue.	  Still,	   it	   should	   be	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   application	   of	  international	  law	  to	  sovereign	  immunity	  determinations	  arguably	  conflicts	   with	   the	   conception	   of	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	  under	  the	  Ex	  Parte	  Peru	  line	  of	  cases	  as	  a	  “privilege”	  that	  may	  be	  determined	   by	   the	   State	   Department	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  executive	  with	  foreign	  policy	  considerations	  in	  mind305—a	  strain	  of	   thinking	   that	   was	   echoed	   later	   on	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	  
Altmann	  decision.306	   	  That	  approach	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	  foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   is	   a	   procedural	   device	   and	   almost	  wholly	  a	  matter	  of	  domestic	  prerogatives	  and	  principles.	  There	   are	   important	   considerations	   that	   militate	   in	   favor	   of	  applying	   international	   law	   in	   some	   measure	   to	   determine	  immunity	  for	  egregious	  human	  rights	  violations.	   	  Not	  the	  least	  of	  these	  considerations	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  led	  Congress	  to	  enact	  FSIA	  initially—that	   is	   the	   depoliticization	   of	   the	   process	   and	  conformity	   with	   other	   nations	   that	   increasingly	   make	   these	  determinations	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law	  rather	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  ad	  hoc	  privilege.307	  	  Further,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  stated	  that	  FSIA	  was	  meant	   to	   codify	   international	   law,	   which	   acknowledges	   that	  immunity	  determinations	  should	  be	  made	  thereunder.308	  One	   might	   consider	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   federal	  government	   and	   the	   state	   governments—also	   a	   sovereign	   to	  sovereign	   relationship—in	   the	   constitutional	   tort	   context	   as	   an	  analogy	   to	   this	   context.	   	   Unless	   Eleventh	   Amendment	   immunity	  applies,	   states	   are	   not	   permitted	   to	   immunize	   their	   agencies	   or	  their	   officials	   from	   §	   1983	   cases	   in	   their	   own	   courts	   of	   general	  jurisdiction.309	  	  A	  state	  may	  not	  refuse	  to	  grant	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   a	   suit	   is	   brought	   under	   federal	   law.310	   	   This	   is	   not	  	   305 See	  Nat’l	  City	  Bank	  v.	  Republic	  of	  China,	  348	  U.S.	  356,	  359–62	  (1955).	  306 Altmann,	  541	  U.S.	  at	  701–02.	  307 Supra	  Part	  II.C.1.	  (discussing	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  FSIA).	  308 Permanent	  Mission	  of	  India	  to	  the	  U.N.	  v.	  City	  of	  New	  York,	  551	  U.S.	  193,	  195,	  199–200	  (2007).	  309 Howlett	  v.	  Rose,	  496	  U.S.	  356,	  373	  (1990);	  Martinez	  v.	  Cal.,	  444	  U.S.	  277,	  284	  (1980)	  (“Conduct	  by	  persons	  acting	  under	  color	  of	  state	  law	  which	  is	  wrongful	  under	  42	  U.	  S.	  C.	  §	  1983	  or	  §	  1985	  (3)	  cannot	  be	  immunized	  by	  state	  law.	  A	  construction	  of	  the	   federal	   statute	   which	   permitted	   a	   state	   immunity	   defense	   to	   have	   controlling	  effect	   would	   transmute	   a	   basic	   guarantee	   into	   an	   illusory	   promise;	   and	   the	  supremacy	   clause	   of	   the	   Constitution	   insures	   that	   the	   proper	   construction	  may	   be	  enforced.”).	  310 Id.	  
124	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  simply	   a	   neutral,	   procedural	   rule311	   that	   it	   is	   the	   state’s	  prerogative	  to	  apply;	  rather,	  broader	  state-­‐court	  immunity	  in	  this	  context	  results	   in	  a	   lack	  of	  enforcement	  of	   federal	  rights	   in	  state	  courts.312	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   concluded	   that	   such	   a	   result	  would	  violate	  the	  Supremacy	  Clause.313	  	  An	  underlying	  concern	  in	  this	  type	  of	  a	  case	  is	  of	  course	  that	  permitting	  states	  to	  immunize	  their	  own	  officials	   in	   this	  way	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  discriminate	  against	   federal	   law,	  and	  therefore	  violate	  and	  effectively	  weaken	  important	   rights.314	   	   In	   contrast,	   the	   lack	   of	   an	   avenue	   for	   an	  interlocutory	   appeal	   from	   a	   denial	   of	   immunity	   is	   a	   neutral	  procedural	   rule	   that	   states	   may	   apply	   without	   denigrating	   an	  individual’s	  federal	  rights.315	  These	   propositions	   a	   lens	   for	   thinking	   about	   immunity	  questions	  in	  national	  courts	  for	  violations	  of	  international	  law.	  	  In	  that	   context,	   it	   is	   equally	   problematic	   to	   think	   of	   immunity	   as	  something	  that	  is	  entirely	  procedural	  and	  therefore	  left	  entirely	  to	  the	  national	  court	  to	  determine	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  international	  law.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   by	   implication	   concluded	  that	   denying	   or	   granting	   immunity	   under	   FSIA	   is	   a	   substantive	  determination	  that	  creates	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  arising	  under	  federal	  law	   for	   purposes	   of	   Article	   Three	   of	   the	   Constitution.316	   	   Courts	  should	   therefore	   not	   be	   permitted	   to	   discriminate	   against,	   and	  thereby	  violate,	   international	   law	  by	  paying	  no	  attention	   to	   it	   in	  immunity	  determinations.	  This	   analogy	   is	   not	   the	   only	   one	   that	   is	   possible	   between	  various	   aspects	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunities.	  	  Although	   they	  domestic	   and	   foreign	   sovereign	   immunity	   rest	   on	  different	  foundations,	  both	  are	  justified	  on	  similar	  grounds.	  	  They	  seek	   to	   protect	   the	   state,	   whether	   it	   is	   the	   state	   or	   the	   nation-­‐state,	  from	  the	  inconvenience	  of	  suit,	  and	  both	  doctrines	  also	  seek	  to	   preserve	   its	   dignity	   317	   or	   authority.318	   	   Under	   both	   domestic	  	   311 Cf.	  Peter	  D.	  Trooboff,	  Foreign	  State	  Immunity:	  Emerging	  Consensus	  on	  Principles,	  200	  RECUEIL	  DES	  COURS	  235,	  254–55	  (1986)	  (describing	   foreign	  sovereign	   immunity	  as	  a	  procedural	  rule	  that	  does	  not	  affect	  substantive	  liability).	  312 Howlett,	  496	  U.S.	  at	  374–75.	  313 Id.	  at	  375.	  314 Id.	  at	  377–78.	  315 Johnson	  v.	  Fankell,	  520	  U.S.	  910,	  918–19	  (1997).	  316 Verlinden	  B.V.	  v.	  Cent.	  Bank	  of	  Nig.,	  461	  U.S.	  480,	  492	  (1983).	  317 Philippines	  v.	  Pimentel,	  553	  U.S.	  851,	  865–66,	  (2008)	  (noting	  that	  the	  foreign	  state	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  having	  its	  officials	  subject	  to	  costly	  litigation);	  Harlow	  v.	  Fitzgerald,	  457	  U.S.	  800,	  814	  (1982)	  (noting	  essentially	  same	  for	  domestic	  officials).	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  and	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity,	  the	  sovereign	  itself,	  whether	  an	  entity,	  or	  more	  rarely	  a	  person,	  receives	  the	  most	  if	  not	  absolute	  protection.	  	  The	  closer	  and	  more	  tied	  to	  the	  core	  sovereign	  that	  an	  entity	  or	  person	  is,	  the	  more	  protection	  he	  receives.	  And,	   when	   circumstances	   arise	   in	   which	   the	   actions	   of	   an	  official	   or	   an	  entity	  of	   the	   state	   are	   somehow	  disconnected	  with	  the	   state’s	   unique	   public	   authority,	   then	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   more	  acceptable	   to	   courts	   to	   sue	   a	   state	   or	   its	   entities,	   such	   as	   in	   the	  case	   of	   commercial	   activities	   that	   private	   parties	   could	   also	  perform.	   	   In	   addition,	   courts	   have	   introduced	   the	   idea	   in	   both	  foreign	   and	   domestic	   cases	   that	   an	   official	   is	   not	   entitled	   to	  immunity	   if	   he	   acts	   under	   the	   color	   of	   law,	   but	   illegitimately.319	  	  Under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   official’s	   actions	   are	  disaggregated	  from	  the	  state	  which	  creates	  a	  channel	  in	  court	  for	  citizens	  to	  obtain	  relief	  for	  egregious	  official	  wrongs.320	  	  Although	  both	   international	   and	   domestic	   laws	   have	   recognized	   the	   need	  for	   this	   type	   of	   channel,	   the	   domestic	   framework	   executes	   the	  immunity	  inquiry	  in	  a	  clearer	  and	  more	  balanced	  way.	  
	   318 With	  authority	  typically	  comes	  the	  state’s	  power	  to	  implement	  its	  policies.	  	  See	  JOHN	  O.	  HALEY,	  AUTHORITY	  WITHOUT	  POWER:	  LAW	  AND	  THE	  JAPANESE	  PARADOX	  193	  (1991)	  (noting	   that	   there	   is	   an	   “unstated	   premise”	   in	  most	   political	   and	   legal	   orders	   that	  with	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   state	   to	   command	   also	   comes	   the	   power	   to	   coerce	  implementation	   of	   those	   commands,	   but	   also	   noting	   that	   in	   reality	   authority	   and	  power	  are	  divorced	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  government	  must	  rely	  on	  persuasion	  and	  consent	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  its	  policies).	  319 Sanchez-­‐Espinosa,	  770	  F.2d	  at	  207;	  supra	  Part	  II.C.6.	  320 Hearing	   on	   Courtroom	   Use:	   Access	   to	   Justice,	   Effective	   Judicial	   Administration,	  
and	  Courtroom	  Security	  before	   Subcomm.	  on	  Courts	   and	  Competition	  Policy	   of	   the	  H.	  
Comm.	   on	   the	   Judiciary,	   111th	  Cong.	   84	   (2011)	   (statement	   of	   Judith	  Resnik,	   Arthur	  Liman	   Professor	   of	   Law,	   Yale	   Law	   School).	   	   “Courts	   are	   themselves	   a	   site	   of	  democratic	  practices.	  	  Public	  courts	  are	  one	  of	  many	  venues	  to	  understand,	  as	  well	  as	  to	   contest,	   societal	   norms.	   	   Courts	   both	   model	   the	   democratic	   precepts	   of	   equal	  treatment	  and	   subject	   the	   state	   itself	   to	  democratic	   constraints.	   	  The	  obligations	  of	  judges	  to	  protect	  disputants’	  rights,	  and	  the	  requirements	   imposed	  on	   litigants	  (the	  government	  included)	  to	  treat	  their	  opponents	  as	  equals,	  are	  themselves	  democratic	  practices	   of	   reciprocal	   respect.	   	   By	   imposing	   processes	   that	   dignify	   individuals	   as	  equals	   before	   the	   law,	   litigation	   makes	   good	   on	   one	   of	   democracy’s	   promises—or	  may	   reveal	   democracy’s	   failures	   to	   conform	   to	   its	   ideological	   precepts.	   	  Moreover,	  rights	   of	   audience	   divest	   the	   litigants	   and	   government	   of	   exclusive	   control	   over	  conflicts	  and	  their	  resolution.	  	  Empowered,	  participatory	  audiences	  can	  therefore	  see	  and	   then	   debate	   what	   legal	   parameters	   ought	   to	   govern.”	   	   Id.	   	   See	   also	  Malone	   v.	  Bowdoin,	   369	   U.S.	   643,	   653	   (1962)	   (“The	   balance	   between	   the	   convenience	   of	   the	  citizen	   and	   the	   management	   of	   public	   affairs	   is	   a	   recurring	   consideration	   in	   suits	  determining	  when	  and	  where	  a	  citizen	  can	  sue	  a	  governmental	  official.”);	  supra	  Parts	  II.A.2	  &	  II.C.6.	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   that	   referencing	   the	   qualified	  immunity	  framework	  employed	  in	  constitutional	  tort	  cases	  would	  help	   courts	   to	   adapt	   the	   ultra	   vires	   cases	   to	   the	   position	   of	  international	   law	   that	   officials	   should	   not	   be	   immune	   for	   gross	  human	   rights	   abuses,	   and	   thereby	   avoid	   some	   of	   the	   more	  complex	   and	   technical	   questions	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	  conceptual	   similarities	   between	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   sovereign	  immunities.	  	  This	  Article	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  inquiry	  will	  help	  courts	   to	   adjudicate	   questions	   of	   official	   immunity	   in	   a	   fair	   and	  meaningful	  way,	  furthering	  the	  development	  of	  international	  law,	  while	   also	   taking	   into	   account	   significant	   differences	   between	  nations.	  
A.	  	  Qualified	  Immunity	  for	  Domestic	  Officials	  Section	   1983	   cases,	   which	   punish	   state	   officials	   for	   illegal	  deprivations	   of	   federal	   rights,	   have	   steadily	   increased	   in	   their	  number	  on	  federal	  court	  dockets.321	  	  “This	  act	  is	  remedial,	  and	  in	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  human	  liberty	  and	  human	  rights.”322	  The	  provision	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983	  states	  in	  pertinent	  part	  that	  Every	   person	   who,	   under	   color	   of	   any	   statute,	   ordinance,	  regulation,	   custom,	   or	   usage,	   of	   any	   State	   or	   Territory	   or	   the	  District	   of	   Columbia,	   subjects,	   or	   causes	   to	   be	   subjected,	   any	  citizen	   of	   the	   United	   States	   or	   other	   person	   within	   the	  jurisdiction	   thereof	   to	   the	  deprivation	  of	  any	  rights,	  privileges,	  or	   immunities	   secured	   by	   the	   Constitution	   and	   laws,	   shall	   be	  liable	  to	  the	  party	   injured	  in	  an	  action	  at	   law,	  suit	   in	  equity,	  or	  other	  proper	  proceeding	  for	  redress	  .	  .	  .323	  To	   oversimplify	   and	   summarize,	   the	   provision	   allows	   state	  officials	   to	   be	   sued	   in	   federal	   court	   for	   their	   unconstitutional	  behavior,	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   Bivens	   v.	   Six	  
Unknown	  Named	  Agents324	  permits	  approximately	  the	  same	  relief	  against	  federal	  officials.	  Because	   §	   1983	   is	   such	   a	   powerful	   tool	   in	   combating	  unconstitutional	   official	   behavior,325	   federal	   courts	   have	   become	  	   321 SCHWARTZ	  &	  URBONYA,	  supra	  note	  112,	  at	  4.	  322 Monell	  v.	  N.Y.	  City	  Dept.	  of	  Soc.	  Servs.	  of	  New	  York,	  436	  U.S.	  658,	  684	  (1978)	  (quoting	  Representative	  Shellabarger).	  323 42	  U.S.C.	  §	  1983	  (2010).	  324 Bivens	  v.	  Six	  Unknown	  Named	  Agents	  of	  Fed.	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics,	  403	  U.S.	  388	  (1971).	  325 See	  Akhil	   Reed	  Amar,	  Of	   Sovereignty	   and	   Federalism,	  96	   YALE	   L.J.	   1425,	   1504	  (1987).	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  familiar	   with	   the	   various	   procedural	   and	   substantive	   doctrines	  involved	   in	   adjudicating	   the	   constitutional	   tort	   cases	   brought	  under	  §	  1983.	   	   Indeed,	   these	  doctrines	  provide	  useful	  analogs	   in	  different	  types	  of	  cases.326	  In	  Harlow	  v.	  Fitzgerald,	  which	  enunciates	  the	  current	  standard	  for	   evaluating	   claims	   of	   qualified	   immunity,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	  set	  forth	  its	  rationale	  for	  providing	  government	  officials	  with	  such	  immunity.	   	  Qualified	   immunity	  was	  meant,	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  public	  policy,	  to	  resolve	  the	  tension	  between	  providing	  a	  realistic	  avenue	  for	   “vindication	   of	   constitutional	   guarantees”	   in	   situations	   of	  official	   abuse	   of	   office	   and	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   potentially	  unsuccessful	  constitutional	  tort	  litigation	  against	  officials	  such	  as	  “the	   expenses	   of	   the	   litigation,	   the	   diversion	   of	   official	   energy	  from	   pressing	   public	   issues,	   and	   the	   deterrence	   of	   able	   citizens	  from	  acceptance	  of	  public	  office.”327	  Therefore,	  although	  public	  policy	  dictated	  that	  the	  head	  of	  the	  government	   (the	   president)	   receives	   nearly	   absolute	   immunity,	  U.S.	   courts	   generally	   granted	   only	   qualified	   immunity	   for	   lower	  ranking	   officials	   or	   former	   officials.	   	   Although	   other	   immunities	  might	   exist	   under	   English	   and	   American	   common	   law,328	   the	  current	  form	  has	  been	  modified	  to	  be	  a	  completely	  objective	  (but	  fact-­‐specific)	   standard	   that	   applies	   across	   the	   board	   to	   all	  constitutional	   torts,	  whether	  under	  §	  1983	  or	   the	  Bivens	   case.329	  	  Qualified	   immunity	   applies	   to	   suits	   in	   which	   a	   governmental	  
	   326 Section	   1983	   jurisprudence	   is	   as	   highly	   developed	   as	   that	   surrounding	   the	  statutory	  and	  common	  law	  regimes	  governing	  Habeas	  Corpus	  or	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	   Act	   of	   1964,	   which	   also	  makes	   up	   a	   large	   percentage	   of	   cases	   heard	   in	   the	  federal	   courts.	   	  Perhaps	  because	   these	   cases	  make	  up	   such	  a	   significant	  part	  of	   the	  diet	   of	   the	   federal	   courts,	   §	   1983	   jurisprudence	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   analog	   in	   other	  contexts.	   	  Kiobel	  v.	  Royal	  Dutch	  Petroleum	  Co.,	  621	  F.3d	  111,	  123,	  165,	  177	  (2010)	  (looking	  to	  §	  1983	  cases	  for	  analogy	  in	  an	  ATCA	  case);	  Liu	  Bo	  Shan	  v.	  China	  Constr.	  Bank	  Corp.,	  2010	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  63938,	  at	  *10–11	  (S.D.N.Y.	  June	  28,	  2010)	  (looking	  to	   §	   1983	   cases	   to	   determine	   whether	   state	   action	   is	   present	   for	   purposes	   of	   the	  ATCA).	  327 Harlow	  v.	   Fitzgerald,	   457	  U.S.	   800,	   814	   (1982).	   	   I	  would	   argue	   that	   a	   similar	  tension	  exists	   for	  foreign	  official	   immunity.	   	  That	   is	  a	  tension	  between	  providing	  an	  avenue	  of	  civil	  relief	  for	  gross	  and	  horrific	  violations	  of	  international	  law,	  which	  the	  growth	   in	   such	  claims	  since	   the	  1980s	  and	  more	   recently	  during	   the	  war	  on	   terror	  has	   shown	   a	   great	   desire	   for,	   and	   preventing	   the	   damage	   to	   delicate	   foreign	  relationships	   that	   could	   result	   if	   current	   or	   former	   officials	   are	   subjected	   to	  protracted	  civil	  litigation	  in	  federal	  court.	  328 Anderson	  v.	  Creighton,	  483	  U.S.	  635,	  645–46	  (1987).	  329 See	  id.;	  Harlow,	  457	  U.S.	  at	  814–16.	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  official	   would	   be	   personally	   liable	   for	   his	   conduct,	   or	   rather	   is	  sued	  in	  his	  or	  her	  personal	  capacity.330	  The	  current	  doctrine	  rests	  upon	   the	  explicit	   rationale	   that	   the	  social	  costs	  of	  long	  and	  costly	  litigation	  against	  individual	  federal	  and	  state	  officials	   in	   their	  personal	  capacity	  may	  be	   too	  great.331	  	  Qualified	   immunity	  permits	  officials	  of	  varying	  ranks	   to	  exercise	  their	   discretion	   without	   the	   fear	   that	   they	   will	   ultimately	   incur	  personal	   liability	   for	   their	   official	   acts	   so	   long	   as	   they	   do	   not	  violate	  a	  clearly	  established	  constitutional	  right	  of	  an	  individual	  of	  which	   a	   reasonable	   person	   would	   have	   known.332	   	   The	   basic	  premise	   is	   that	   it	   is	   unfair	   to	   subject	   an	   official	   to	   personal	  liability	   for	   the	  discretionary	  actions	   that	  she	   is	   legally	  obligated	  to	   take,	   and	   such	   liability	   would	   ultimately	   deter	   her	   from	  exercising	  her	  discretionary	  power	  under	  the	  law	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  people	  that	  she	  serves.333	  Whether	  a	  right	  or	  law	  is	  “clearly	  established”	  is	  a	  question	  that	  has	   been	   a	   considerable	   bother	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	  circuit	  courts.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  circuit	  courts	  have	  developed	  various	  tests	  for	  determining	  whether	  an	  individual	  governmental	  officer	  is	  entitled	   to	   immunity	   from	  suit	  under	   the	  doctrine	  of	  qualified	  immunity.	   	   Most	   of	   these	   tests	   permit	   courts	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  flexibility	  to	  deny	  immunity	  only	  in	  the	  most	  factually	  appropriate	  scenarios,334	   and	   some	  have	   noted	   that	   the	   doctrine	  may	   be	   too	  official-­‐friendly.335	  	  Still	  others	  believe	  that	  the	  doctrine	  is	  flexible	  enough	   in	  general	  so	  as	   to	  permit	  both	  plaintiffs	  and	  defendants	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  potentially	  convincing	  immunity	  arguments.336	  Central	   to	   the	   qualified	   immunity	   inquiry	   is	   whether	   the	   law	  violated	   was	   clearly	   established	   at	   the	   time	   that	   the	   allegedly	  offensive	   official	   behavior	   was	   committed	   such	   that	   the	   official	  had	  or	  should	  have	  had	  fair	  notice,	  or	  that	  it	  was	  obvious	  that	  his	  conduct	  was	  problematic.337	   	  The	  Second	  Circuit	  applies	  a	   three-­‐factor	  test	  to	  make	  this	  determination	  and	  asks:	  “(1)	  whether	  the	  	   330 Kentucky	  v.	  Graham,	  473	  U.S.	  159,	  165–67	  (1985).	  331 Harlow,	  457	  U.S.	  at	  814–16.	  332 Id.	  333 Id.	  334 Karen	  M.	   Blum,	   The	   Qualified	   Immunity	   Defense:	  What’s	   “Clearly	   Established”	  
and	  What’s	  Not,	  24	  TOURO	  L.	  REV.	  501,	  519	  (2008).	  335 Allen	   H.	   Denson,	   Neither	   Clear	   Nor	   Established:	   The	   Problem	   with	   Objective	  
Legal	  Reasonableness,	  59	  ALA.	  L.	  REV.	  747,	  764–65	  (2008).	  336 Blum,	  supra	  note	  334,	  at	  579.	  337 Hope	  v.	  Pelzer,	  536	  U.S.	  730,	  739–40	  (2002).	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  right	   in	   question	   was	   defined	   with	   ‘reasonable	   specificity’;	   (2)	  whether	   the	   decisional	   law	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   the	  applicable	   circuit	   court	   support	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   right	   in	  question;	   and	   (3)	   whether	   under	   preexisting	   law	   a	   reasonable	  defendant	   would	   have	   understood	   that	   his	   or	   her	   acts	   were	  unlawful.”338	  The	   Eleventh	   Circuit	   has	   employed	   a	   three-­‐tiered	   and	  instructive	  approach	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  right	  at	  issue	  is	  clearly	  established.	   	  First,	   in	  some	  cases,	   “the	  words	  of	  a	   federal	   statute	  or	   federal	   constitutional	   provision	   may	   be	   so	   clear	   and	   the	  conduct	   so	  bad	   that	   case	   law	   is	  not	  needed	   to	   establish	   that	   the	  conduct	   cannot	   be	   lawful.”339	   	   In	   other	   cases,	   the	   case	   law	   will	  articulate	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   that	   may	   be	   detached	   from	   the	  original	  factual	  scenario	  and	  applied	  to	  other	  cases—that	  is,	  “the	  decision	  on	  ‘X	  Conduct’	  can	  be	  read	  as	  having	  clearly	  established	  a	  constitutional	   principle:	   put	   differently,	   the	   precise	   facts	  surrounding	   ‘X	   Conduct’	   are	   immaterial	   to	   the	   violation.”340	  	  Finally,	   a	   case	   with	   fairly	   undistinguishable	   facts	   may	   clearly	  establish	  law	  in	  a	  specific	  area.341	  Qualified	   immunity	   defenses	   may	   be	   raised	   early	   on	   in	   the	  litigation	   at,	   for	   example,	   the	   summary	   judgment	   stage,	   or	   they	  can	  be	   raised	  much	   later	  after	  discovery	  at	   the	   trial	   stage	  of	   the	  proceedings.342	  	  At	  the	  motion	  to	  dismiss	  stage,	  the	  court	  will	  take	  the	  plaintiff’s	  allegations	  as	  true	  in	  its	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  complaint	   states	   a	   constitutional	   claim.343	   	   The	   question	   of	  whether	  a	  right	  is	  clearly	  established	  is	  often	  a	  question	  of	  law,344	  but	  certain	  questions	  of	  fact	  may	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  jury	  or	  judge	  where	   there	  are	  narrowly	  disputed	   issues	  of	   fact	  material	   to	   the	  determination	  of	  whether	  a	  reasonable	  person	  in	  the	  defendant’s	  position	   would	   have	   known	   what	   he	   was	   doing	   violated	   the	  plaintiff’s	  rights.345	  
	   338 Jermosen	  v.	  Smith,	  945	  F.2d	  547,	  550	  (2d	  Cir.	  1991).	  339 Vinyard	  v.	  Wilson,	  311	  F.3d	  1340,	  1350–51	  (11th	  Cir.	  2002).	  340 Id.	  at	  1351.	  341 Id.	   at	   1351–52.	   	   The	   case	  must	   come	   from	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   the	   United	  States,	   the	   relevant	   Circuit	   Court,	   or	   the	   highest	   court	   of	   the	   relevant	   state.	   	   Id.	   at	  1351	  n.22.	  342 See	  Sanchez	  v.	  Pereira-­‐Castillo,	  590	  F.3d	  31,	  52	  (1st	  Cir.	  2009).	  343 Id.	  344 Id.	  345 Gonzales	  v.	  Duran,	  590	  F.3d	  855,	  859–60	  (10th	  Cir.	  2009).	  
130	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  71	  
B.	  	  The	  Qualified	  Immunity	  Framework	  Furthers	  the	  
Development	  of	  International	  Law	  by	  National	  Courts	  There	  is	  certain	  guidance	  that	  domestic	  courts	  can	  derive	  from	  the	   qualified	   immunity	   framework	   in	   situations	   where	  international	  law	  is	  the	  rule	  of	  decision.	  	  As	  already	  discussed,	  and	  noted	  by	  Justice	  Stevens	  in	  Samantar,	  the	  personal	  versus	  official	  capacity	  distinction	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  differentiating	  between	  suits	  brought	  against	  the	  official	  himself	  for	  damages	  and	  suits	  brought	  against	  an	  official	  merely	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  damages	  come	  from	  the	  state	   itself.346	   	  While	  Professors	  Bradley	  and	   Goldsmith	   have	   argued	   that	   permitting	   personal	   capacity	  suits	  would	  force	  the	  foreign	  state	  to	  indemnify	  the	  official,	  there	  is	   no	   such	   compulsion.347	   	   Indemnification	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   free	  choice	  and	  not	  the	  basis	  for	  immunity	  under	  domestic	  law.	  First,	   qualified	   immunity	   looks	   to	   the	   substantive	   law	   under	  which	   the	   cause	   of	   action	   arises	   to	   evaluate	   the	   actions	   that	   a	  state	   official	   takes	   under	   the	   color	   of	   law.	   	   In	   other	   words,	  although	   the	   state	   official	   is	   acting	   in	   the	   course	   of	   his	   or	   her	  duties	   under	   state	   law,	   his	   actions	   are	   deemed	   objectively	  illegitimate	   and	   not	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   because	   he	   acted	   in	  violation	  of	  a	  clearly	  established	  Constitutional	  right	  or	  a	   federal	  law.	   	   If	   it	  did	  not,	  then	  states	  could	  immunize	  their	  officials	  from	  failing	  to	  enforce	  federal	  rights.	   	  Under	  §	  1983,	  a	  court	  may	  now	  choose	   to	   first	   determine	   whether	   the	   plaintiff	   has	   stated	   a	  constitutional	   claim	   and	   then	   assess	   whether	   the	   defendant	  allegedly	   violated	   clearly	   established	   law,	   or	   reverse	   the	  inquiry.348	   	  One	  reason	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  endorsed	  the	  first	   step	   in	   the	   inquiry	   as	   beneficial	   is	   that	   it	   furthers	   the	  development	  of	  federal	  constitutional	  law.349	  The	  same	  may	  be	  said	  with	  regard	  to	  international	   law	  versus	  national	  law.	  	  If	  a	  court	  were	  to	  apply	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  the	  ultra	   vires	   cases	   then	   the	   court	  might	   look	   to	   the	   law	  of	   the	  foreign	   nation	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   official	   had	   acted	  	   346 Supra	  Part	  II.A,	  text	  and	  accompanying	  notes.	  347 Supra	  note	  50.	  348 Pearson	  v.	  Callahan,	  129	  S.	  Ct.	  808,	  815–16	  (2009).	  349 Id.	   at	   816	   (“This	   two-­‐step	   procedure,	   [the	   Supreme	   Court]	   reasoned,	   is	  necessary	  to	  support	  the	  Constitution's	  ‘elaboration	  from	  case	  to	  case’	  and	  to	  prevent	  constitutional	   stagnation.	   (citation	   omitted)	   	   The	   law	   might	   be	   deprived	   of	   this	  explanation	   were	   a	   court	   simply	   to	   skip	   ahead	   to	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   law	  clearly	  established	  that	  the	  officer's	  conduct	  was	  unlawful	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case.’”).	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   This	   approach	   is	   problematic	   for	   several	   reasons.	  	  First,	   it	   allows	   municipal,	   that	   is	   national	   law,	   to	   trump	  international	   law	   and	   renders	   international	   law	   weak	   and	  avoidable.	  	  Second,	  and	  closely	  related,	  if	  immunity	  is	  determined	  by	   focusing	  on	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	   action	  under	   the	   law	  of	   the	  foreign	   state,	   then	   a	   state	   could	   structure	   its	   laws	   to	   enable	  officials	   to	   escape	   liability	   under	   international	   law.	   	   These	  problem	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   dilemma	   that	   caused	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   to	   determine	   that	   principles	   of	   international	   law,	   and	   not	  the	   law	   of	   the	   state	   of	   incorporation,	   should	   govern	   the	  relationships	   between	   a	   foreign	   state	   and	   its	   agencies	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  third	   parties	   for	   purposes	   of	   liability,	   as	   in	   the	   aforementioned	  
BANCEC	  case.350	  	  The	  Cuban	  government	  had	  dissolved	  the	  agency	  at	   issue	   but	   attempted	   to	   recover	   on	   a	   letter	   of	   credit,	   while	  shielding	  itself	  from	  liability	  by	  way	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  for	  the	  illegal	   expropriation	   of	   U.S.	   corporate	   assets.351	   	   The	   court	  explained,	  Giving	  effect	   to	  [the	  agency’s]	  separate	   juridical	  status	   in	  these	  circumstances,	   even	   though	   it	   has	   long	   been	   dissolved,	   would	  permit	  the	  real	  beneficiary	  of	  such	  an	  action,	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cuba,	  to	  obtain	  relief	  in	  our	  courts	  that	  it	  could	  not	   obtain	   in	   its	   own	   right	   without	   waiving	   its	   sovereign	  immunity	  and	  answering	  for	  .	  .	  .	  a	  seizure	  previously	  held	  .	  .	  .	  to	  have	  violated	  international	  law.352	  Third,	  if	  domestic	  law	  is	  taken	  too	  heavily	  into	  account,	  then	  it	  is	  much	  less	  likely	  that	  national	  courts	  will	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  the	  international	   law	   of	   immunity	   because	   the	   inquiry	   will	   be	  particularized	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   each	   individual	   nation	   however	  similar	  those	  laws	  might	  be	  to	  one	  another.	   	  It	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  reach	   even	   a	   rough	   consensus	   on	   the	   general	   principles	   of	   the	  immunity	  determination.	   	  And,	  achieving	  such	  a	  consensus,	  or	  at	  least	   a	   more	   regularized	   and	   less	   political	   way	   for	   making	  immunity	  determinations,	   is	  one	  of	   the	   founding	  motivations	   for	  the	   FSIA.353	   	   Although	   Professors	   Bradley	   and	   Goldsmith	   have	  	   350 First	  Nat'l	  City	  Bank	  v.	  Banco	  Para	  El	  Comercio	  Exterior	  De	  Cuba,	  462	  U.S.	  611,	  633–35	   (1983).	   	   See	   also	   Stephens,	   supra	   note	   51,	   at	   2714	   (positing	   a	   scenario	   in	  which	  a	  state	  authorizes	  genocide).	  351 Banco	  Para	  El	  Comercio	  Exterior	  De	  Cuba,	  462	  U.S.	  at	  611.	  352 Id.	  at	  632.	  353 Philippines	  v.	  Pimentel,	  553	  U.S.	  851,	  854,	   (2008)	  (noting	   that,	  when	  officials	  are	   sued	   in	   their	   official	   capacity,	   joinder	   of	   the	   sovereign	   is	   required	   and	  without	  such	  joinder	  the	  suit	  must	  be	  dismissed).	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  that	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  would	  not	  be	  an	  able	  body	  to	  determine	   if	   a	   rule	   of	   international	   law	   is	   clearly	   established,	  because	   it	   is	  not	   the	  ultimate	  arbiter	  of	   international	   law	  and	   its	  interpretations	   of	   that	   body	   of	   law	   are	   considered	  idiosyncratic354,	   all	   national	   courts’	   interpretations	   of	  international	   law	  may	   in	  some	  way	  bear	   the	  quirks	  of	   their	  own	  legal	  systems.	   	  Despite	  this,	  the	  courts	  of	   individual	  nations	  have	  long	  been	  recognized	  as	  important	  sources	  of	  international	  law	  in	  the	  horizontal	  international	  legal	  order.355	  	  Applying	  the	  qualified	  immunity	   framework	   would	   allow	   national	   courts	   to	   develop	  international	   law	   by	   assessing	   (1)	   whether	   a	   violation	   of	  international	  law	  has	  been	  adequately	  alleged	  and/or	  (2)	  whether	  an	  official	  was	  acting	  in	  an	  objectively	  reasonable	  fashion.	  
C.	  	  Assessing	  a	  Range	  of	  Sources	  to	  Clearly	  Establish	  a	  Norm	  Second,	   courts	   may	   look	   to	   the	   qualified	   immunity	   debate	   to	  determine	   what	   sources	   they	   should	   examine	   to	   determine	  whether	   an	   international	   norm	   is	   clearly	   established.	   	   In	   the	  United	   States,	   while	   there	   is	   agreement	   that	   sources	   of	   binding	  law	  or	  precedent—decisions	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   federal	   laws,	  decisions	   of	   the	   applicable	   federal	   circuit	   court—may	   clearly	  establish	  a	  norm,	  courts	  in	  the	  different	  circuits	  differ	  on	  whether	  decisions	   from	   other	   circuits	   or	   lower	   courts’	   decisions	  may	   do	  so.356	   	   Parties	   have	   also	   argued,	   albeit	   unsuccessfully,	   that	   a	  court’s	   acceptance	   of	   a	   settlement	   in	   a	   highly	   factually	   similar	  case	   might	   be	   one	   factor	   in	   suggesting	   that	   a	   right	   is	   clearly	  established.357	   	   To	   some	   extent	   the	   nature	   of	   that	   question	   is	  whether	   only	   a	   binding	   source	   of	   law,	   or	   that	   and	   a	  
	  
	  	  	  	  354	  Supra	  note	  49.	  	  355 RICHARD	   A.	   FALK,	   THE	   ROLE	   OF	   DOMESTIC	   COURTS	   IN	   THE	   INTERNATIONAL	   LEGAL	  ORDER	  19	  (1964).	  356 Al-­‐Kidd	   v.	   Ashcroft,	   598	   F.3d	   1129,	   1134	   (9th	   Cir.	   2010)	   (district	   court	  decisions,	   both	   published	   and	   unpublished,	   are	   acceptable	   evidence,	   albeit	   not	  conclusive,	  of	   clearly	  established	   law);	  Armijo	  v.	  Peterson,	  601	  F.3d	  1065,	  1070–71	  (10th	   Cir.	   2010)	   (cases	   from	  multiple	   circuits);	   Holzemer	   v.	   City	   of	   Memphis,	   621	  F.3d	  512,	  519	  (6th	  Cir.	  2010)	  (binding	  precedent	  from	  the	  Sixth	  Circuit	  and	  Supreme	  Court).	   	   See	   also	   Jonathan	   M.	   Stemerman,	   Issues	   in	   the	   Third	   Circuit:	   Unclearly	  
Establishing	  Qualified	  Immunity:	  What	  Sources	  of	  Authority	  May	  be	  Used	  to	  Determine	  
Whether	   the	   Law	   is	   “Clearly	   Established”	   in	   the	   Third	   Circuit,	   47	   VILL.	   L.	   REV.	   1221,	  1228–29	   (2002)	   (discussing	   approaches	   of	   the	   circuits	   as	   to	   sources	   of	   clearly	  established	  law).	  357 Doe	  v.	  Delie,	  257	  F.3d	  309,	  321–22	  (3d	  Cir.	  2001).	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  preponderance	   of	   persuasive	   authority	   will	   suffice.358	   	   Another	  question	   is	   what	   weight,	   if	   any	   at	   all,	   should	   be	   given	   to	   lower	  sources	   of	   law	   such	   as	   state	   statutory	   law,	   court	   decisions	   of	  various	   levels,359	  and	  perhaps	  even	  related	  secondary	  sources	   in	  that	  determination.	  Like	   courts	   in	   the	   §	   1983	   context,	   courts	   faced	   with	   a	   legal	  question	   of	   clearly	   established	   international	   law	   will	   have	   to	  determine	  what	  way	  to	  treat	  other	  international	  sources,	  such	  as	  treaties,	   the	   decisions	   of	   international	   tribunals,	   and	   customary	  international	   law.	   	  Courts	  will	   also	  have	   to	  determine	  whether	  a	  binding	   source	   of	   law	   is	   required	   or	   whether	   only	   a	  preponderance	   of	   authority	   will	   suffice.	   	   Courts	   may	   also	  determine	   what	   effect,	   if	   any,	   they	   should	   give	   to	   the	   official’s	  domestic	   court’s,	   legislature’s,	   and	   executive’s	   interpretation	   of	  international	   law,	   and	  what	   authority	   to	   give	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   the	  official’s	   home	   state	   that	   arguably	   could	   conflict	   with	   certain	  points	   of	   international	   law.	   	   Considering	   these	   questions	   in	   the	  official	  immunity	  context	  may	  be	  different	  from	  considering	  them	  in	  other	  contexts.	   	  As	  the	  qualified	  immunity	  framework	  teaches,	  the	   clearly	   established	   framework	   centers	   not	   just	   on	   whether	  there	   is	   sufficient	   authority	   for	   liability,	   but	   on	  whether	   there	   is	  sufficient	  authority	  for	  fair	  notice	  to	  the	  official.	  Courts	  should	  avoid	  using	  the	  test	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  developed	  for	  understanding	  whether	  a	  rule	  of	   international	   law	  is	  sufficiently	  specific	  for	  an	  ATCA	  claim,	  for	  immunity	  purposes.	  	  In	   those	  ATCA	  cases,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   requires	   that	  violations	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  cognizable	  under	  the	  ATCA	  be	  “accepted	  by	   the	   civilized	  world	  and	  defined	  with	  a	   specificity	   comparable	  to	   the	   features	   of	   the	   18th-­‐century	   paradigms	   we	   have	  recognized”	   or	   rather	   those	   recognized	   when	   the	   ATCA	   was	  enacted.360	  	  As	  one	  court	  stated:	  ‘[T]he	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  particular	  customary	  international	  law	   norm	   is	   sufficiently	   specific,	   universal,	   and	   obligatory	   to	  permit	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   cause	   of	   action	   under	   the	   [ATCA],’	  courts	  must	  ‘examine	  how	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  norm	  compares	  with	  18th-­‐century	  paradigms,	  whether	  the	  norm	  is	  accepted	  in	  
	   358 Stemerman,	  supra	  note	  356	  at	  1239	  (discussing	  Judge	  Nygaard’s	  dissent	  in	  Doe	  
v.	  Delie).	  359 Id.	  at	  1240.	  360 Sosa	  v.	  Alvarez	  Machain,	  542	  U.S.	  692,	  725	  (2004).	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  the	  world	  community,	  and	  whether	  States	  universally	  abide	  by	  the	  norm	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  mutual	  concern.’361	  This	  test	  serves	  a	  different	  purpose	  than	  an	  immunity	  inquiry.	  	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  aid	  a	  court	  in	  deciding	  if	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  stated	  a	  claim	  under	   the	  ATCA	  and	  reflects	   specific	  policy	   considerations	  in	  that	  respect.362	  	  Indeed,	  as	  Sosa	  articulates,	  this	  test	  is	  designed	  to	   serve	   five	   separate	   rationales:	   (1)	   a	   change	   in	   the	   prevailing	  perception	  of	  the	  common	  law	  as	  something	  that	  is	  made	  and	  not	  found;	  (2)	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  federal	  judiciary’s	  power	  to	  make	  federal	   common	   law;	   (3)	   the	   development	   of	   Supreme	   Court	  decisions	  leaving	  the	  creation	  of	  private	  rights	  of	  action	  typically	  in	   the	   hands	   of	   Congress;	   (4)	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   courts	   to	  interfere	   impermissibly	   in	   the	   foreign	   affairs	   powers	   of	   the	  executive	   and	   congress;	   and	   (5)	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   Congressional	  mandate	   permitting	   the	   court	   to	   define	   violations	   of	   the	   law	   of	  nations	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  ATCA.363	  	  Therefore,	  courts	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  conflating	   this	   test	  with	   the	  clearly	  established	  qualified	  immunity	  standard.	  	  Again,	  they	  should	  consider	  the	  specificity	  of	  a	  norm	  in	  light	  of	  the	  last	  parts	  of	  the	  qualified	  immunity	  inquiry,	  which	  are	  whether	  the	  law	  is	  clearly	  established	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	   reasonable	   official	   would	   have	   known	   of	   the	   law	   and	   would	  have	   seen	   its	   applicability	   under	   the	   circumstances.364	   	   For	  example,	   in	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   context,	   a	   search	  may	   have	  been	  unreasonable	  for	  liability	  purposes,	  but	  an	  officer	  may	  have	  still	  acted	  reasonably	  for	  immunity	  purposes.365	  
D.	  	  Guidelines	  for	  Determining	  the	  Reasonableness	  of	  Official	  
Behavior	  Under	  the	  Circumstances366	  Applying	   the	   clearly	   established	   standard	   for	   qualified	  immunity	   to	   international	   cases	   and	   considering	   the	   cases	   and	  	   361 Liu	  Bo	  Shan	  v.	  China	  Constr.	  Bank	  Corp.,	  2010	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  63938,	  at	  *10–11	  (citing	  Abdullahi	  v.	  Pfizer,	  Inc.,	  562	  F.3d	  163,	  173–74	  (2d	  Cir.	  2009)).	  362 Cf.	   Stephens,	   supra	   note	   51,	   at	   2709.	   	   The	   Sosa	   inquiry	   is	   an	   inquiry	   to	  determine	  whether	   the	   plaintiff	   has	   stated	   a	   claim	  under	   the	  ATCA,	   not	   an	   inquiry	  into	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   official	   had	   some	   fair	   notice	   that	   his	   conduct	   under	   the	  circumstances	  clearly	  violated	  an	  international	  norm.	  363 Sosa,	  542	  U.S.	  at	  725–29.	  364 Holzemer	  v.	  City	  of	  Memphis,	  621	  F.3d	  512,	  519	  (6th	  Cir.	  2010).	  365 Saucier	  v.	  Katz,	  533	  U.S.	  194,	  199–201	  (2001).	  366 Ghaleb	   Nassar	   Al-­‐Bihani	   v.	   Obama,	   619	   F.3d	   1,	   14	   (D.C.	   Cir.	   2010)	   (“When	  incorporating	   international-­‐law	   norms	   into	   domestic	   U.S.	   law,	   Congress	   sometimes	  simply	  enacts	  statutes	  that	  refer	  generically	  to	  ‘international	  law’	  (or	  some	  variation	  thereof)	  without	  further	  defining	  what	  international	  law	  requires.”).	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  commentary	  that	  have	  surrounded	  its	  development	  as	  part	  of	  that	  determination	   will	   permit	   courts	   to	   evaluate	   the	   compliance	   of	  officials	  with	  international	   law	  in	  a	  more	  meaningful	  way,	  taking	  into	   account	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   including	   the	   circumstances	  surrounding	   the	  official	  decision	  at	   issue,	   the	   time	   for	   reflection,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  knowledge	  of	  international	  law	  with	  which	  the	  official	  was	  acting.367	  The	  clearly	  established	  qualified	  immunity	  standard	  focuses	  on	  the	   reasonableness	   of	   the	   official’s	   conduct	   under	   the	  circumstances	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  degree	  of	   fair	  notice	  that	  he	  had	  of	   the	   norm.	   	   Originally	   courts	   employed	   a	   subjective	   and	  objective	  test	  in	  this	  respect.368	  	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  qualified	  immunity	  stemmed	  from	  a	  defense	  that	  the	  official	  was	  acting	  in	  good	  faith,369	  an	  official	  could	  be	   liable	   if	  he	  acted	  with	  malice	   in	  violating	   the	  plaintiff’s	   rights	  or	   if	   the	   right	  was	   so	   clear	   that	  he	  should	   have	   known	   that	   his	   conduct	   was	   problematic.370	   	   The	  adoption	  of	  an	  entirely	  objective	  standard	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Harlow	  v.	  
Fitzgerald	  was	  intended	  to	  permit	  courts	  to	  dismiss	  cases	  early	  in	  a	  lawsuit,	  at	  the	  summary	  judgment	  stage,	  and	  save	  the	  defendant	  the	  onerous	  burden	  of	  the	  substantial	  discovery	  permitted	  under	  the	   Federal	   Rules.371	   	   Avoiding	   the	   inconvenience	   of	   suit	   is	   also	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  that	  foreign	  sovereign	  immunity	  is	  meant	  to	  serve.	  Despite	   the	   switch,	   courts—including	   the	   Supreme	   Court—seemed	   to	   have	   struggled	   to	   balance	   a	   policy	   of	   to	   disposing	   of	  cases	  early	  on	  before	  engaging	  in	  expensive	  discovery,	  while	  still	  engaging	   in	   what	   is	   essentially	   a	   fact-­‐intensive	   inquiry	   as	   to	  	   367 Kit	   Kinports,	   Qualified	   Immunity	   in	   Section	   1983	   Cases:	   The	   Unanswered	  
Questions,	  23	  GA.	  L.	  REV.	  597,	  622	  (1989)	  (noting	  that	  in	  order	  to	  contextualize	  official	  behavior	   three	   considerations	  might	   be	   relevant	   “the	   defendant’s	   legal	   training	   or	  access	  to	   legal	  advice;	  her	  rank	  and	  responsibilities;	  and	  the	  time	  constraints	  under	  which	  she	  operated”).	  368 Wood	   v.	   Strickland	   420	   U.S.	   308,	   321–22	   (1975)	   (concluding	   that	   an	   official	  should	  sincerely	  believe	  that	  he	  is	  doing	  the	  right	  in	  acting	  as	  he	  did,	  but	  that,	  despite	  any	  sincere	  belief	  of	  right,	  he	  should	  be	  held	  accountable	   for	  negligently	  violating	  a	  clear	  and	  well	  settled	  right	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s,	  and,	  therefore,	  that	  an	  official	  shall	  liable	  under	  Section	  1983	  if	  he	  knew	  or	  should	  have	  known	  that	  what	  he	  was	  doing	  would	  violate	  a	  plaintiff’s	  rights).	  369 Pierson	  v.	  Ray,	  386	  U.S.	  547,	  557	  (1967).	  370 Strickland,	  420	  U.S.	  at	  322.	  371 Harlow	   v.	   Fitzgerald,	   457	   U.S.	   800,	   818	   (1982)	   (“Reliance	   on	   the	   objective	  reasonableness	   of	   an	   official's	   conduct,	   as	   measured	   by	   reference	   to	   clearly	  established	   law,	   should	   avoid	   excessive	   disruption	   of	   government	   and	   permit	   the	  resolution	  of	  many	  insubstantial	  claims	  on	  summary	  judgment.”).	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   a	   reasonable	   official	   under	   the	   circumstances	   should	  have	  know	  that	  what	  he	  was	  doing	  was	  violative	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  rights;	  put	  differently,	  how	  clearly	  established	  does	  a	   right	  need	  to	  be.	  	  Two	  cases	  described	  below	  illustrate	  this	  dilemma.	  In	   Anderson	   v.	   Creighton,372	   the	   plaintiffs	   brought	   a	   Bivens	  action	  against	  an	  FBI	  agent	  that	  had	  searched	  their	  home	  without	  a	  warrant	  under	  the	  erroneous	  belief	  that	  a	  suspect	  was	  there,	  in	  violation	   of	   their	   rights	   under	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.373	   	   The	  district	   court	   that	   heard	   the	   case	   dismissed	   it	   pre-­‐discovery	   on	  the	   ground	   that	   the	   officer	   was	   entitled	   to	   qualified	   immunity	  because	   the	   search	   was	   justified	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   exigent	  circumstances.374	   	   The	   Eight	   Circuit	   disagreed	   and	   reformulated	  the	   qualified	   immunity	   inquiry	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   right	   that	   the	  defendant	  was	  alleged	  to	  have	  violated,	  “the	  right	  of	  persons	  to	  be	  protected	   from	   warrantless	   searches	   of	   their	   home	   unless	   the	  searching	   officers	   had	   probable	   cause	   and	   there	   are	   exigent	  circumstances,”	   is	   clearly	   established.375	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	  reversed	  the	  Eighth	  Circuit,	  however.	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  the	  objective,	  clearly	  established	  standard	  justice,	  the	  right	  must	  be	  established	  in	   a	  more	   “particularlized,	   and	   hence	  more	   relevant,	   sense:	   The	  contours	  of	   the	  right	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  clear	   that	  a	  reasonable	  official	   would	   understand	   that	   what	   he	   is	   doing	   violates	   that	  right.”376	  	  Thus,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  a	  reasonable	  officer	  could	  have	  believed	  that	  the	  warrantless	  search	  in	  Anderson	  was	  lawful	  given	  the	  well-­‐settled	  law	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  information	  that	  the	  defendant	   possessed.	   	   What	   the	   officer	   did	   in	   fact	   believe,	  however,	   is	   still	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   inquiry.377	   	   In	   so	   holding,	   the	  Court	  seemed	  to	  be	  endeavoring	  to	  protect	  against	  highly	  abstract	  rights	   serving	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   eviscerating	   any	   substance	   the	  qualified	  immunity	  doctrine	  has.	  But	   the	   Court	   later	   had	   to	   explore	   the	   limits	   to	   this	  particularization	   in	   response	   to	   authority	   from	   the	   circuits	   that	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  prior	  precedent	  clearly	  establishing	  this	  right	  had	  to	  be	  materially	   similar	   to	   the	   case	  at	  bar.	   	   In	  Hope	  v.	  Pelzer	   the	  plaintiff,	  an	  inmate	  at	  an	  Alabama	  prison,	  alleged	  that	  the	  guards	  	   372 Anderson	  v.	  Creighton,	  483	  U.S.	  635	  (1987).	  373 Id.	  at	  637.	  374 Id.	  375 Id.	  at	  638.	  376 Id.	  at	  639–40.	  377 Id.	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  had	  chained	  him	   to	  a	  hitching	  post	   in	   the	  scorching	  sun	  without	  water	   in	   retaliation	   for	   allegedly	   disruptive	   behavior	   on	   two	  occasions	  while	  on	  a	  work	  squad.378	  	  The	  plaintiff	  alleged	  under	  §	  1983	  that	  the	  guards	  had	  violated	  his	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  cruel	  and	  unusual	  punishment.379	  	  With	  little	  to	  no	  analysis,	  the	  district	  court	  dismissed	   the	  case	  on	  qualified	   immunity	  grounds.380	   	  The	  Eleventh	   Circuit	   affirmed,	   but	   conducted	   a	   more	   reasoned	  analysis	  and	  concluded	  (1)	  that	  the	  conduct	  had	  violated	  the	  Eight	  Amendment,	  and	  (2)	  that	  law	  was	  not	  clearly	  established	  because	  clearly	   established	   law	   for	   purposes	   of	   qualified	   immunity	  must	  be	   preexisting,	   obvious,	   and	  mandatory,	   and	   established,	   not	   by	  abstractions	  but	  by	  cases	  that	  are	  materially	  similar	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  present	  case.381	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  the	  Eleventh	  Circuit.	  	  It	  concluded	  that	   the	   clearly	   established	   standard	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   “fair	  warning”	   or	   “fair	   notice”	   standard	   developed	   under	   the	  jurisprudence	  for	  a	  criminal	  deprivation	  of	  rights	  under	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  242.382	  	  The	  Court	  adopted	  this	  standard	  and	  stated	  In	  some	  circumstances,	  as	  when	  an	  earlier	  case	  expressly	  leaves	  open	   whether	   a	   general	   rule	   applies	   to	   the	   particular	   type	   of	  conduct	  at	  issue,	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	  prior	  factual	  particularity	  may	   be	   necessary.	   	   But	   general	   statements	   of	   the	   law	   are	   not	  inherently	   incapable	   of	   giving	   fair	   and	   clear	   warning,	   and	   in	  other	   instances	   a	   general	   constitutional	   rule	   already	   identified	  in	   the	   decisional	   law	   may	   apply	   with	   obvious	   clarity	   to	   the	  specific	   conduct	   in	   question,	   even	   though	   ‘the	   very	   action	   in	  question	  has	  [not]	  previously	  been	  held	  unlawful.’383	  The	   court	   concluded,	   therefore,	   that	   although	   the	   hitching	   post	  punishment	   had	  not	  per	   se	   been	  held	   to	   be	   unlawful	   by	   binding	  precedent,	   other	   Eighth	   Amendment	   decisions,	   coupled	   with	   an	  Alabama	  Department	   of	   Corrections	  Regulation	   and	  Department	  of	   Justice	   report	   indicating	   that	   the	   hitching	   post	   was	  constitutionally	  problematic,	  was	  enough	  to	  give	  fair	  notice	  of	  the	  unreasonableness	  of	  the	  conduct	  in	  question.384	  
	   378 Hope	  v.	  Pelzer,	  536	  U.S.	  730,	  734–35	  (2002).	  379 Id.	  at	  735.	  380 Id.	  at	  735–36.	  381 Id.	  at	  736.	  382 Id.	  at	  739–40.	  383 Id.	  at	  741.	  384 Id.	  at	  741–42.	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  boundaries	   set	   forth	   in	  Andersen	  and	  Hope	  could	  provide	  guidance	   for	   difficult	   questions	   in	   the	   international	   context	   as	  well.	   	   Adjudicating	   issues	   that	   might	   involve	   foreign	   or	  international	   legal	   sources	   and	   facts	   or	   events	   that	   occurred	  outside	  of	  the	  forum	  are	  not	  unfamiliar	  to	  courts	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  antitrust	   and	   asylum	   contexts.	   	   And,	   adjudicating	   the	   fair	   notice	  inquiry	   according	   to	   the	   above	   described,	   well-­‐established	  standards,	   will	   turn	   what	   Professors	   Bradley	   and	   Goldsmith	  perceive	   to	   be	   a	   difficult	   foreign	   policy	   inquiry	   into	   a	   simpler	  question	   of	   law.385	   	   In	   the	   international	   context,	   evaluating	   the	  reasonableness	  of	   the	  official’s	   conduct	  under	   the	   circumstances	  permits	   courts	   to	  ask	  questions	   similar	   to	   the	  ones	   in	   the	  above	  cases.	   	   As	   one	   scholar	   has	   suggested	   in	   the	   domestic	   context,	  courts	  might	  ask	  questions	  such	  as	  whether	  the	  official	  had	  legal	  training;	   whether	   the	   official	   had	   the	   benefit	   of	   legal	   advice	   on	  questions	   of	   international	   law;	   or	   whether	   the	   official	   had	  previously	   dealt	   with	   international	   or	   foreign	   affairs.386	   	   These	  questions	  guide	  a	  fairer	  evaluation	  of	  vastly	  disparate	  and	  varied	  circumstances	   in	   the	   nations	   where	   violations	   occur.	   	   And,	   this	  standard	   allows	   for	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   domestic	   law	   of	   the	  official’s	  home	  state	  that	  is	  less	  threatening	  to	  the	  development	  of	  international	   law.	   	   Compliance	   with	   an	   official’s	   domestic	   law	  might	   be	   a	   factor	   in	   whether	   he	   was	   acting	   reasonably	   under	  international	  law.	  	  For	  example,	  whether	  domestic	  law	  prohibited	  the	   action	   would	   be	   a	   significant	   factor.	   	   And,	   a	   court	   might	  consider	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  analyzing	  whether	  domestic	   law	  and	  policy	  reasonably	  obscured	  the	  official’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  his	  actions.	  Courts	  may	  also	  have	  to	  consider	  not	  only	  an	  expanded	  number	  of	   legal	   sources	   than	   they	   are	   used	   to	   considering	   when	  interpreting	  foreign	  law,387	  but	  also	  the	  historical	  legal	  experience	  of	   the	   nation	   at	   issue	   in	   conducting	   a	   fair	   notice	   inquiry.	   	   For	  example,	   in	   the	   Samantar’s	   case,	   Somalia’s	   1963	   and	   1979	  constitutions	   pledged	   to	   support	   and	   uphold	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	  
	   385 See	  supra	  note	  50.	  386 See	  Kinports,	  supra	  note	  367,	  at	  622.	  387 See	  Arthur	  R.	  Miller,	  Federal	  Rule	  44.1	  and	  the	  “Fact”	  Approach	  to	  Determining	  
Foreign	   law:	   Death	   Knell	   for	   a	   Die-­‐Hard	   Doctrine,	   65	  MICH.	   L.	   REV.	   613,	   620	   (1966-­‐1967).	  	  Courts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  traditionally	  been	  reluctant	  to	  interpret	  and	  apply	  foreign	  law	  if	  they	  can	  possibly	  avoid	  it.	   	  Id.	   	  Yet,	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  without	  resort	  to	  foreign	  law.	  	  Id.	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  international	   law,	   and	   human	   rights.388	   	   Samantar	   was	   a	   high	  official	   in	   that	   regime,	   having	   served	   as	   vice	   president,	   prime	  minister,	   and	   minister	   of	   defense.	   	   He	   likely	   visited	   other	  countries	   on	   diplomatic	  missions	   and	   can	   be	   presumed	   to	   have	  known	   of	   various	   positions	   in	   the	   international	   community	   on	  norms	   such	   as	   torture,	   rape,	   and	   extrajudicial	   killing	   in	   multi-­‐lateral	  organizations	  like	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  In	  addition,	  Somalia	  had	  ratified	  numerous	   international	   treaties	   such	  as	   the	  Torture	  Convention389	   and	   the	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	  Political	   Rights.390	   	   These	   sources	   may	   provide	   answers	   as	   to	  whether	  a	   reasonable	  official	   in	  Samantar’s	  position	  would	  have	  known	   that	   what	   he	   was	   doing	   in	   the	   circumstances	   alleged	  would	  violate	  international	  law.	  	  Section	  1983	  cases	  may	  provide	  useful	   analogs	   in	   such	   cases,	   and	   serve	   as	   a	   reminder	   just	   how	  complex	  and	  fact-­‐intensive	  an	  immunity	  inquiry	  can	  be.	  	  Although	  some	   violations	   will	   be	   heinous	   and	   undoubtedly	   unworthy	   of	  immunity,	   §	   1983	   cases	  provide	   a	  useful	   heuristic	   for	   the	   closer	  cases.	  
CONCLUSION	  The	  critique	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  is	  frequently	  that	  it	  should	  be	   written	   out	   of	   existence	   or	   severely	   curtailed,	   and	  commentators	   argue	   that	   immunities	   from	   one	   subject	   area	  (foreign,	   federal,	  state,	  tribal)	  should	  not	  be	  applied	  by	  courts	  so	  freely	  in	  another	  to	  expand	  the	  doctrine.391	  	  This	  Article	  conceives	  of	   sovereign	   immunity	   not	   organized	   by	   subject	   area,	   but	  organized	   more	   conceptually—domestic	   jurisdiction	   (intra),	  foreign	  jurisdiction	  (inter),	  and	  derivative.	  	  As	  well,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  where	  a	  statute	  does	  not	  apply,	  courts	  should	  utilize	  common	  solutions	  and	   frameworks	   to	  what,	  upon	  closer	  examination,	  are	  not	   such	   disparate	   problems—that	   is	  whether	   an	   official	   should	  	   388 Somali	  History	  Brief,	  supra	  note	  146	  at	  17	  n.17.	  389 See	   U.N.	   Treaty	   Collection,	   9.	   Convention	   Against	   Torture	   and	   Other	   Cruel,	  
Inhumane,	   or	   Degrading	   Treatment	   or	   Punishment	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	   27,	   2011)	  http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-­‐9	  &chapter=4	  &lang=en#3.	  390 See	   Signatures	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  WEB	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  27,	  2011)	  http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cprsigs	  .html.	   	  Ratification	  occurred	   in	  1990	   just	  before	  the	  Barre	  regime	  fell	   in	  1991.	   	  U.N.	  Treaty	   Collection,	   4.	   International	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	  http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-­‐4&chapter=4&lang=en	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  27,	  2011).	  
391	  Florey	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  782-­‐84,	  824-­‐25.	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  be	   permitted	   to	   derive	   immunity	   from	   the	   state	   when	   she	   has	  acted	   willfully	   in	   contravention	   of	   a	   clearly	   established	   higher	  norm.	   	   My	   hope	   is	   that	   by	   thinking	   in	   a	   more	   conceptually	  rigorous	  manner	  and	  using	  common	  standards,	  courts	  will	  engage	  in	   a	   more	   constructive	   dialogue	   with	   litigants	   about	   the	  compromise	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  individual,	  and	  the	  public	  and	   private	   spheres	   that	   restrictive	   sovereign	   immunity	  embodies.	  In	   short,	   courts	   may	   use	   the	   §	   1983	   cases	   and	   the	   qualified	  immunity	   framework	   as	   a	   guide	   because	   §	   1983	   is	   meant	  domestically	  to	  cover	  the	  same	  thing	  that	  Samantar	  was	  meant	  to	  cover	  internationally:	  individuals	  being	  responsible	  to	  individuals	  under	  international	  law	  for	  illegitimate	  actions	  taken	  as	  an	  officer	  of	   the	   government.	   	   These	   government	   officials	   are	   thus	  responsible	   personally	   for	   the	   damages	   they	   have	   caused.	   	   But,	  officials	   may	   still	   be	   entitled	   to	   immunity	   for	   ostensible	   official	  action	  because	   that	   immunity	  preserves	   certain	  key	   functions	  of	  sovereign	   immunity,	   for	   example,	   preserving	   the	   willingness	   of	  officials	   to	   exercise	   their	   discretion	   in	   good	   faith.	   	   The	   qualified	  immunity	   applied	   under	   §	   1983	  may	   guide	   courts	   in	   answering	  several	   salient	   questions	   in	   the	   foreign	   official	   context,	   such	   as:	  (1)	   why	   they	   should	   adjudicate	   the	   immunity	   question,	   to	   the	  extent	  possible,	  according	  to	   international	   law;	  (2)	  whether	  they	  should	   focus	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   establishment	   of	   an	   international	  norm	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   objectively	   reasonable	   knowledge	   of	   an	  official	  of	  it	  under	  specific	  circumstances;	  and	  (3)	  what	  sources	  of	  international	  law	  they	  might	  utilize	  and	  what	  questions	  to	  ask	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  official	  had	  fair	  notice	  of	  the	  norm	  and	  yet	  chose	   to	   act	   in	   a	   way	   that	   may	   be	   objectively	   evaluated	   to	   be	  deemed	  a	  willful	  violation	  of	  that	  norm.	  Congress	   has	   not	   yet	   introduced—and	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   it	  will—an	   amendment	   to	   FSIA	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Samantar	  decision.	  	  The	  lower	  courts	  are	  slowly	  absorbing	  the	  decision	  and	  will	  likely	  utilize	  the	  alternative	  doctrines	  enumerated	  above	  and	  by	   Justice	   Stevens	   in	   his	   opinion.	   	   My	   argument	   remains	   the	  same—that	   the	   §	   1983	   cases	   provide	   a	   well-­‐developed	  framework	   that	   courts	   can	   readily	   apply	   to	   international	   and	  human	   rights	   tort	   cases	   like	   Samantar.	   	   Application	   of	   that	  framework	  provides	  a	  consistent,	  logical,	  and	  uniform	  solution	  to	  the	   problem	   of	   foreign	   official	   immunity	   in	   controversial	  circumstances.	   	   And,	   it	   will	   force	   U.S.	   courts	   to	   grapple	   with	  foreign	  law	  issues	  and	  different	  political	  cultures—a	  practice	  that	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  it	   is	   important	   for	   them	   to	   develop	   more	   thoroughly	   in	   a	  globalizing	  and	  multi-­‐polar	  world.	  	  
